









THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSPIRACY

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THE TRANSVAAL
FROM WITHIN

A Private Record of Public Affairs

By J. P. FITZPATRICK

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THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSPIRACY

OR

THE AIMS OF AFRIKANDERDOM

BY

FRED. W. BELL. F.S.S.



LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN
1900



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‘Events in South Africa show that Great Britain has been nourishing in the midst of her colony a formidable enemy, who one day would have robbed her of it, if she had neglected to grapple with the situation.’

La Perseveranza, Milan.

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TO ALL LOVERS OF FREEDOM,

Especially those by whose sympathy the intensity of feeling for the Empire has been quickened, and by whose responsive action the Empire itself has been drawn and banded together, this book is dedicated, by a Colonial.

By the ready manner in which the offshoots of the old stock proved their devotion to the Mother Land and their Queen, the force of the words, or prophecy, of England's greatest writer is made manifest when he wrote :

*' This England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself. . . .
Come the three corners of the world in arms,
And we shall shock them : naught shall make us rue
If England to itself do rest but true.'*

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INTRODUCTION

As so much has of late years been written about South Africa and the Transvaal, by interested and even subsidized agencies, lest I, too, should be included amongst those who have an 'axe to grind,' I may perhaps be excused for making some personal reference to myself, and, at the same time, an explanation. Of course, those who think and feel strongly on either side are liable to be called partisans. But everyone may claim a legitimate aspiration. 'Afrikanders,' so called, have every right to desire a United South Africa, *even* under their own flag, as others desire a United South Africa under the Union Jack. But, considering the obligations of the Cape Colony towards Great Britain, and that by every claim Cape Colonials are British subjects, they, as such, have no right, in the pursuit of this aspiration, to endeavour to subvert the authority of the Crown. Beyond being a British subject, and, naturally, proud of the fact, I am no partisan.

By adoption I am a South African, having lived uninterruptedly in the country since 1871. For eight

years I lived in the Eastern Province of the Cape Colony, for nine years in and around Cape Town, for one year I was stationed in Northern Bechuanaland, and the remainder of the time I have been domiciled in the Transvaal. During the eleven years I have been living in the Transvaal, as well as while in the Cape Colony, I have had occasion to travel about the country and become acquainted with its people. As an Uitlander I have no political or other bias. I am not a capitalist. Neither am I dependent upon any clique or group for support. But as a Scotchman by birth, a South African by adoption, and an Uitlander by force of circumstances, I claim at least that my opinions and convictions are not only broad and honest, but have been fairly formed, after mature deliberation, and with knowledge of my surroundings.

In addition to moving amongst the Dutch population in the Cape Colony, I have travelled about the country districts of the Transvaal, and, as well as having received great hospitality from the hands of the Dutch population generally (with whom I have great sympathy), have married into a family of Dutch descent. Any feelings, therefore, I may have of hostility towards the Government of the South African Republic, as it existed, or towards scheming traitors within the Cape Colony, have been created by the treatment experienced, in common with other South Africans, at the hands of the Government of the Transvaal, and by

my abhorrence of the abettors of that oligarchy at the Cape.

If I feel strongly, it is because to me, as to many who have made this country their home, the political affairs of South Africa enter into my very life, and the manner of their settlement determines whether my future will be spent there or whether I shall go to some other portion of the Empire where, at least, a Briton is not placed at a disadvantage. And had the British Government again turned back, in 1899, after acknowledging its obligations, as by accepting the Uitlanders' petition to the Queen it did acknowledge them, thousands would have left the shores of South Africa never to return.

(To all English-speaking lands the Transvaal trouble has a vital interest. Its possibilities were so serious) And in other countries the question is not devoid of attraction—yet such gross misapprehensions exist! It is the author's hope that the friends and relations of those who have gathered from all the ends of the earth to fight the cause of liberty and justice, and other friends in America—lovers of Freedom too—may be enabled by his efforts better to understand some of the issues so inextricably bound up in the conspiracy, which culminated in a war that at another time might have staggered the greatest Empire the world has ever known.

It is almost needless to add that this little work is by no means intended as an irrefutable defence of the

policy of the British Government. Her Majesty's Government is perfectly competent to look after itself, and has its own able advocates, but if any side-lights or thoughts such as are herein penned can in any way help those not conversant with South African conditions and affairs better to understand the general position, my labour will not have been in vain.

F. W. B.

CAPETOWN,

March 14, 1900.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN CONSPIRACY

CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE RAID

Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman on 'Afrikanderdom'—'Afrikanderdom' antagonistic to Britain—'Afrikander' an undesirable term—The issues not Imperialism *versus* Republicanism—The Transvaal a capitalistic Government—Dates and changes—Greatest freedom under British rule—Boers always 'trekking'—One Central Government necessary—British rule bred contentment—Transvaal not so unfriendly towards strangers at the discovery of the gold-fields—Uitlanders friendly in return—Discontent engendered by misrule—Then change in administration desired by the newcomers—Uitlanders spurned by Pretoria—The Raid an effect—Possible only under such conditions as were responsible for it—Lord Rosmead's opportunity—Britain too sensitive.

WHAT is Afrikanderdom? Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in a recent speech on South African affairs said: "The whole effort of the true statesman ought to be directed, not to reduce and destroy the power of Afrikanderdom, but to build it up and develop it;" while Sir Alfred Milner is credited by some as being desirous of breaking its dominion.

ERRATA

Page 55, line 8, *for* 'successively' *read* 'successfully.'

„ 76, „ 10, *for* 'is sufficiently comprehensive' *read* 'is not sufficiently comprehensive.'

without the Governor's subsequent denial; but knowing the 'Afrikanderdom' to which Sir Alfred Milner alluded—if he used the term at all—let us contrast it with the ideal Afrikanderdom which evidently was in the mind of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.

Afrikanderdom, as understood by the anti-British party at the Cape, means all that is antagonistic to the policy and aim of such administrators as Sir George Grey, Sir Bartle Frere, and Sir Alfred Milner. These statesmen, as well as administrators, have advocated Imperial expansion and confederation. The ideal Afrikanderdom of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman must surely be different from the Afrikander idea, and manifestly cannot mean anything antagonistic to the British Crown, or he would not advocate its advancement and development. Let us consider in the following chapters, after viewing the past, whether the 'Afrikander' idea should be crushed or no.

'Canadianism,' 'Australianism,' or any other term which may be chosen to designate the feeling or entity of any separate branch of the one Empire as such cannot be found fault with. But while Canadianism, for instance, if it means anything at all, means the national feeling or spirit of the Canadians as a whole—English and French Canadians alike—'Afrikanderdom' has, in reality, no place for British influence and interest, except as for its own ends, and differentiates between the British South African and the Dutch South African.

As has been justly remarked,

'The essence of Canadianism is a broad patriotism based on the equality of the two white races. In the historic words of its House of Commons, the Canadians are "a people which has largely succeeded, by the adoption of the principle of conceding equal political rights to every portion of the population, in harmonizing estrangements and in producing general content." The Afrikander Bond—whence the essence called "Afrikanderdom" is distilled—

has largely succeeded, by opposing the principle of equal political rights, in hardening estrangements and in exasperating animosities which otherwise would have vanished in a natural fusion of races. It is true the Afrikaner Bond is open to persons of all races who will pledge themselves to its principles. It is true that politicians of British birth have cast in their lot with it at different times, and thereby secured no small advantage in the polls. To genuine Britons, however, the principles of the Bond are no more digestible than its name. No English colonist calls himself an Afrikaner; colonists of Dutch and French stock who have any pride of race are as little disposed to adopt the designation. Its associations are too degrading to be tolerated for the mere sake of convenience of political nomenclature. The word lives in history as the name of a Hottentot, with a strain of Dutch blood, who gave some trouble to the colony early in the century in Namaqualand. It was the recognised description, too, of slaves of mixed blood, the advertising columns of the old *Gazette* having frequent notifications either of the desertion of some Afrikaner boy or girl, or of the offer of the like chattel—according to the estimation of the time—at public sale. And when, hard pressed for a title, the promoters of the political evolution transmuted their Farmers' League into an Afrikaner Bond, they did so with the definite intention of resisting English ideas and English policy, and bringing about a condition inconsistent with the sentiments and aspirations of men inheriting the highest civilization of this period in the world's history.¹

Fully to realize the situation in South Africa, when Mr. Reitz penned his ultimatum to the Imperial Government on October 9, it is not only necessary to have some knowledge of South African history, but also to understand and appreciate the position of the British Government, the Government of the South African Republic, the Uitlanders as a body, and the capitalists, as well as the feeling of South Africa generally on the question of Transvaal misrule.

But first the impression must be removed from all minds that the war was, as the Transvaal subsidized press imply, a question of Republicanism *versus* Imperialism. Of course, I mean in the true sense of the terms. Many Americans, Canadians, or 'forward' politicians in

¹ *Cape Times*, December 16, 1899.

New Zealand or Australia may picture the so-called 'republicans' and 'federal forces' of the pro-Boer organs as true republicans, fighting for republican principles. No greater mistake could be made. The South African Republic was a republic only in name. The free representative systems of government enjoyed by the British colonies in South Africa, in effect, hardly differed from the republican form existing in that once model little republic, the Orange Free State. Of all the old and settled communities in South Africa, the Transvaal alone stood out as a dark blot where white men were denied equal rights. The Transvaal was an oligarchy in the strongest sense of the term; indeed, a one-man despotism centring in Paul Kruger. And the clique which overruled the resolutions of the Volksraad, and even of the Executive Council, continued to rule and fatten while the 'Grondwet,' or Constitution, and the interests of the country were ignored. Much has been said and written by the Transvaal inspired press, and by the Presidents and Volksraad members of both Republics, against capitalists. In open Raad in both Republics the capitalists have been denounced unceasingly as enemies of the State, while in reality they have been the means of its wonderful development. But what of the Transvaal itself? Its Volksraad members are by no means poor men. The President is an exceedingly rich capitalist. All the executive members are capitalists. If not wealthy when elected members of the Council, they become so very soon after. Many of those who are, or have been, closely allied to and interested in the Transvaal Government and the iniquitous 'concessions' granted by it, are capitalists. What are men like Messrs. Lippert, Sam Marks and Solomon Gillingham, and all those interested closely in the Dynamite monopoly but capitalists? And what is such a one as Emanuel Mendelssohn, with

his subsidized support and intimate connection with Pretoria jobbery, but a capitalist in a small way, and a 'would-be' one in a very large way? Mr. Mendelssohn through the columns of his paper, the *Standard and Diggers' News*, reviles the capitalists, but he would not have been long in becoming (through jobbery) a capitalist of very high order had the iniquitous sewerage concession, which he obtained from the Government, not been cancelled owing to the height to which public feeling in the matter was aroused. Let us, then, in considering the position put aside the idea that the Government in the Transvaal is a democratic administration fighting the abuses of capitalism, or even for democratic principles.

The history of the Government of South Africa may be divided into four epochs: the first, under the Dutch East India Company's rule, from the landing of Van Riebeck in 1652 till its surrender to the British in 1795; the second, a short period under the British Government from 1795 till 1802; the third, when, in the latter year, by the Treaty of Amiens, the possession reverted to the Batavian Republic; and the fourth, when four years later, in 1806, the settlement was again taken by the British, who have uninterruptedly held the colony ever since. The history of these times clearly shows that the inhabitants have always enjoyed greatest freedom under British rule.

History also shows that it is not alone from the rule of the British Government that the Dutch Voortrekker has fled. Under Dutch rule 'treks' were made owing to the same causes which prompted those from the Transvaal to N'gamiland and Banjailand. In most cases the Dutch Voortrekkers have not fled from misrule and oppression, but rather to gratify the desire to appropriate an almost unlimited extent of land and be freed from the trammels of any law at all.

And it has been solely owing to the fear of accepting responsibility on the part of the British Government, and from the consent on the part of the Central Governing Power to recognise independent States, that, in the end, British supremacy has been challenged. By the recognition of the independent rights of the settlements of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, the British Government, in its desire to allow freedom to the wanderers and to avoid responsibility, sowed seeds which are now bearing fruit. America with its Monroe Doctrine has been wiser than we. For the good of South Africa there should have been only one Central Government exercising undisputed authority over all territories and States. Little wonder, then, owing to the reversals of policy and the mistakes—generally through lack of knowledge or fear of responsibilities—on the part of the Colonial Office, that colonists have been disheartened by the action of the Home Government. It has been fatal to the possibility of the steady development of a consistent and continuous policy that the Imperial plans have been dependent upon the wiles of party government in England.

But though the policy of the Imperial Government, as viewed by far-seeing South Africans, lacked continuity, British rule in the main was fair and just to all, and never by its continuous pressure or consistent unpopularity engendered such personal discontent as to create movements like those witnessed under the Dutch Administrations in the Cape in 1779 and 1784,¹ and in the Transvaal during the last decade.

By the manner in which the measure regarding the emancipation of slaves was carried out, in the same way as, later, under responsible government, the manner in which the *Phylloxera*, the Excise, or the Scab Acts have, in some instances, been administered—

¹ Theal, 'History of South Africa, 1691-1795,' pp. 232, 238, 260.

irritation amongst a class may have been occasioned ; but all these are instances very different from those where almost universal discontent existed owing to the badness of the administration generally.

At no time during the present century, prior to the advent of the Afrikaner Bond, did we see in South Africa one white race aspiring to dominate the other. The British gave equal rights, and, in the main, the Dutch population was content. Indeed, it was this very contentment, resulting from good and unoppressive government, which, in a great measure, gave the promoters of the Bond the idea of its development.

And at the time of the discovery of the Witwatersrand Gold-fields, when a large number of British subjects, including thousands of Cape and Natal colonists, migrated to the South African Republic, the feeling of the Dutch population towards the English in the Transvaal itself was not very unfriendly. Nor was the feeling in the Cape Colony between the Dutch and the English so bitter as it afterwards became through the machinations of the Bond. In 1889 I 'trekked' to Johannesburg in company with native servants only from Shoshong, via Mafeking, Zeerust, Rustenburg, and Pretoria, and can speak from personal experience of the uniformly kind treatment and friendly feeling extended at that time by the Boer population to strangers. And the people of the Transvaal themselves—that is to say, the old Boer population—had no reason to look unfavourably on the Uitlanders. The newcomers brought money into the country. They purchased 'options' or mining leases on their farms. Again and again farmers have received handsome sums for 'prospecting rights,' with the large figure in view should the option of purchase be chosen by the Uitlander syndicate, while all the time he has been going on in the same slow old way, deriving an income from

the mere possibility of minerals being found on his ground. And often, too, have farms, which have been of little value as such, been sold to the benefit of the farmer for sums beyond all his former dreams. The Uitlanders created markets for the farmers' produce—even for grass, which formerly dried up on the veld, but under the new order created sold in the town markets as bedding for cattle. In addition, the newcomers proved a community eminently capable of furnishing the Government with funds, through taxation.

The seeds sown by the Bond had not borne mature fruit at that time. Many colonists of Dutch descent were amongst the newcomers, and, most important of all, the majority of the new population prospered in the Transvaal, and, harmoniously working with the old population, hoped for the best. For about seven years after the proclamation of Johannesburg as a township, I think it may be safely asserted that the majority of the Uitlander inhabitants—I would even go so far as to say the majority of the *British* Uitlander inhabitants—did not look unfavourably upon the republican form of government. Whatever discontent existed—and at times the feeling of discontent was very acute—resulted from the neglect of the interests of the Uitlander community, or from the contemptuous treatment it received from the governing clique at Pretoria. The feeling on the side of the Uitlander was not one of hostility to the *form* of government, nor to the burgher inhabitants of the State. The hostility was against the oligarchy which was denounced by genuine Afrikanders, or South Africans like advocates J. W. Wessels, J. W. Leonard, Q.C., late Attorney-General of the Cape, Mr. Charles Leonard, and the Hon. John Tudhope from the National Union platform in the early nineties,

and by Transvaal burghers like Mr. Ewald Esselen and Mr. Eugene Marais. One hardly likes to couple these two last names. However, instead of trusting myself to write about Mr. Esselen, I will be content to refer to a speech that political weathercock made at Johannesburg, at a National Union meeting in September, 1892. Mr. Esselen, it will be remembered, acted as secretary in England to the deputation which went to Europe in 1880 for the purpose of getting the annexation revoked. Later he has held the positions of Judge of the High Court and State Attorney. He is now bitterly anti-British, as, indeed, I believe he has been for long. Mr. Esselen, on the occasion I refer to (*more than three years before the Raid*), said:

‘I have heard to-night, with surprise and with deep regret, the report which your committee has brought back from the powers that be in Pretoria. I wish to ask you whether you can give any credence to the statements of a man (President Kruger) who says he is going to unite two peoples, when the whole of his acts for the last ten years show it is absolutely untrue. I do not speak without knowing what I am talking about—I say you have been kept out of your political privileges, not because the people have kept you out from fear that your being granted these privileges would wreck or endanger the independence of this country, but to enable a few, and a greedy few, to rule this country for their own ends. . . . Who was it that proposed the measure that is now in force, that the newcomer in this country should only get the full franchise after he had been here fourteen years, and then only at the sweet will of the legislative body?¹ Who was it proposed that? Was it not the same man (President Kruger) who gave your committee the answer to do nothing more? I ask you, gentlemen, can you after that sit still and follow the advice that is given you to hold no more meetings?’

All this might have been said to the Uitlanders, as it is a true representation of the case every year

¹ At that time, indeed until the time of the Bloemfontein Conference, it was necessary for the applicant for burgher rights to be approved by two-thirds of the burghers in his ward. That proportion of the burghers do not record their votes at the Presidential elections. Would they trouble more for an Uitlander?

onward to the time of the Raid, and after, right up to the time of the Bloemfontein Conference. They had been kept out of their political privileges, not for fear of their endangering the independence of the country, but to enable the greedy few to rule the country for their own ends. Further, the franchise offered then was an impossible franchise, dependent upon the 'sweet will of the legislative body.' This same Mr. Esselen, as well as holding the responsible positions above alluded to, was at one time looked upon by progressives as a promising candidate for the Presidency.

But although the majority of Uitlanders did not look unfavourably upon the form of government, they were very discontented with the manner in which the government was administered. I well remember Mr. Advocate Wessels—that staunch and thorough Dutchman from the Cape—who for the last twelve years has been living in the Transvaal, speak, in 1894, against the suicidal policy pursued by Pretoria. I shall never forget his sincerity, as in measured tones, facing the large and earnest crowd in the Amphitheatre Building in Johannesburg, he said: 'I—am—an—Afrikander—of—Afrikanders.' Although the words have gone from me, I remember well their import, the sentiments he expressed, and the impression he made when, after showing that as an Afrikander and a Dutchman he yielded place to no one, yet he foresaw trouble and bloodshed for the Dutch Republic and South Africa by a continuance of Pretorian methods. I can remember, too, how Mr. Wessels, in an outburst of feeling, raising his hand impressively towards the sea of upturned faces, said: 'Mark my words. Blood will flow—blood will flow in the streets of Johannesburg.'¹

And all this clamouring and pleading for rights, be it remembered, was long before the Raid or the forma-

¹ See Appendix A.

tion of the Reform Committee, and the leaders of the movement for reform in these days were principally Afrikaners or South Africans—men who were making their homes in the country. The capitalists at that time absolutely refused to join the movement.

This was the time of the parting of the ways. The Uitlanders might have been won as trusted friends by Pretoria during all these pre-Raid years, between 1887 and 1892,¹ as most of them abhorred the thought of war, with its consequent commercial disturbance. And had Paul Kruger or the Afrikaner Bond earnestly desired a United South Africa under the then existing conditions, and had the aims of Afrikanerdom not spelt antagonism to Britain, the Republics, with Natal, which at that time was coquetting with the Transvaal, could have shaped the destiny of South Africa.

It is a great mistake, however, to imagine that antagonism to the Government of the South African Republic as it existed dates from the time of the so-called 'Reform Movement' of 1895, or that the ebullition of feeling displayed by speakers at the old Union League and National Union meetings was the limit to which opposition went. Shortly after the time of the flag-pulling incident, after President Kruger's disappointing visit to Johannesburg in 1890, a conspiracy was on foot to seize the artillery barracks and magazines at Pretoria as well as the public offices and members of the Executive Council. Plans were more fully mature than Mr. Stead seems to dream of. But whatever revolutionary plans were on foot on different occasions long before the Raid, the clamour was ever persistent. And the most sincere and bitter against Pretoria were the colonials. The reason is not far to

¹ The Raid occurred in December 1895, but the Uitlanders were more ready to join Pretoria between the years mentioned. They were further estranged afterwards.

seek. However, that phase of the question I propose alluding to in a subsequent chapter, in my remarks upon 'The Afrikaner Uitlander.'

Much has been written on the question of Boer expenditure, and proposed expenditure on armaments, etc., before the Raid. Probably it will never be known exactly how much was spent by the Transvaal on military expenditure and secret service together, or on what resources, before the Raid, in the event of trouble culminating in war, the South African Republic could rely. But as regards armaments and forts, etc., there is evidence to show that the construction of these, and other warlike preparations (on a scale which could only have been indulged in in contemplation of a conflict with the paramount Power¹), were not caused by the Raid, for the simple reason that the Raid was of a more subsequent date.

Mr. Charles Leonard, at the time Chairman of the National Union, in a letter addressed to *Ons Land*, December 30, 1895, in the Dutch language, said, *inter alia* :

'There are other matters, but I cannot deal with them all. The worst is, alas ! that there is now no doubt of it : President Kruger, advised by his false friends, intends by means of force to keep the Uitlanders in order, instead of by means of love, justice, and fraternity. Cannons, Maxims, rifles, and thousands of cartridges ; a fort at Pretoria, to be built with our money at a cost of £250,000 ; another fort at Johannesburg, at a cost of £100,000 ;² German officers to be imported to teach the artillerymen how to shoot down Afrikanders.'

The fact that Mr. Charles Leonard could thus write before the Raid is important, and the circumstance that the letter was written so near to the time of the actual incursion is irrelevant to the contention that the forts and armaments were not called into being by the

¹ See Appendix B.

² The ultimate cost of these forts was much greater, and others were built as well, but this is immaterial to the point at issue.

Raid. The estimates quoted by Mr. Leonard must have been made months beforehand, and the visit of the French engineer and representative of the Creusot works, Monsieur S. Leon, alluded to elsewhere, who arrived in South Africa on his mission to Pretoria about eight months before the Raid, furnishes additional significant testimony of the extent to which the Transvaal had gone before the end of 1895. It is doubtless true that owing to the Raid increased activity was displayed in the matter of armaments by the Transvaal Government, but this has never been disputed, and is quite another matter. On the other hand, the knowledge of the fact that the Transvaal was making and contemplating such increased expenditures before the Raid, I have no doubt, accelerated the revolutionary movement in 1895-96. But the Reform Movement of 1895 must not be confused with the previous constitutional movement of the National Union, even although some of the National Union leaders, including its President, joined the Reform Committee. The National Union leaders only joined the new movement as individual Uitlanders. Indeed, the impression was prevalent that the National Union had been dissolved, as its meetings had been discontinued for some time before the Raid. Towards the end of 1895 it became apparent that naught could be achieved by constitutional means in the Transvaal, and then moderate men and the capitalists, who had hitherto held aloof, and Mr. Rhodes became involved in the entanglement which culminated in the Jameson Raid, the greatest justification for which was the position which rendered it possible. Admit, for sake of argument, or as a matter of fact, that the Raid was a crime. The blame lies at the door of the Transvaal and the Imperial Government. The Transvaal brought the Raid on itself through misgovernment, and the Imperial Government by its

policy in 1881 created a position which led up to it. The British Government, in ignoring the sentiments of Loyalists in 1881, and giving too much consideration to the susceptibilities of the anti-British section, sowed dragons' teeth. May this be the last harvest it will reap from a like cause!

That the Raid was brought on the Transvaal by its own misrule was shown by the feeling displayed at the time. Had such an incursion been made into the Orange Free State, with its then truly republican form of government and its well-administered laws, the whole world would have denounced the proceeding in unqualified terms. Uitlanders, newcomers, English and colonials, all would have joined in its condemnation. But in the case of the Raid into the Transvaal, although none can defend the principle of such an undertaking, the immediate verdict of reasoning men at the time—before opinion was influenced by the outcry of denunciation which afterwards was raised—pronounced against Pretoria was, 'It served you right.' Thus it was that the popular idea in England was at first regret at the failure of the Raid—I mean amongst the comparative few who knew of the Uitlanders' wrongs. It was not only the spectacle of a daring deed which evoked enthusiasm. And thus, too, it was that almost half of South Africa regretted that Dr. Jameson did not get through to the Uitlanders at Johannesburg. It is obviously quite another question whether it was not better for Johannesburg and the Uitlanders that, after all, the raiders did not reach their goal. 'Bounce' might have carried the day had Dr. Jameson succeeded in reaching Johannesburg, but it is problematical. Those most capable of judging think it would not have done so, for the Raid was not only the one thing necessary to put Great Britain apparently in the wrong, and the Transvaal apparently

in the right, but it was the thing above all others to unite and raise up an undivided opposition from the Boers.¹

But however opinions may differ as to certain aspects of the Raid, there is no doubt that Sir Hercules Robinson missed his opportunity. The situation before the Raid was this: The Uitlanders had recognized grievances, and their position politically was steadily growing worse. Their grievances were admitted by President Kruger, and by men like Messrs. Schreiner, Solomon and Merriman at the Cape. The Cape Colonists generally, with the burghers of the Orange Free State, and the whole of Natal and Rhodesia, were on the side of the Uitlanders in their demand to have fair treatment and their grievances redressed. Indeed, not half of the Boer population of the Transvaal itself would have taken up arms against Johannesburg and the Uitlanders as apart from external supporters. How, then, was it possible that a good cause, which was universally acknowledged as such, could be abandoned on account of the action of external agencies? With the position which confronted Sir Hercules Robinson, and with President Kruger and the governing clique at Pretoria alarmed at the serious aspect of affairs—for they *were* alarmed, notwithstanding much that has been said to the contrary—the High Commissioner had an opportunity such as seldom presents itself to a statesman. And had Sir Hercules Robinson, who was authorized to mediate and to see that the Uitlanders' rights were not neglected, in admitting the seriousness of the position and the iniquity of the Raid, forcibly impressed upon President Kruger that all the occurrences of the closing days of 1895 were but results of which the President and his Government were the cause, an

¹ *Vide* p. 81.

honourable, proper, and lasting settlement could have been demanded. After the High Commissioner's proclamation against the Raiders, and after the disarmament of the revolutionary party on his recommendation, if Sir Hercules Robinson had played his cards wisely or well, he rightly might have plainly and forcibly intimated that the British Government was determined once and for all to put an end to the danger to the peace of South Africa caused (as Mr. R. Solomon, Q.C., present Attorney-General of the Cape, said in the House of Assembly) by leaving 'legitimate grievances unredressed.' It might have been pointed out that the Raid and revolution were ills, but ills which, when suppressed, were less unpalatable to the taste of Pretoria than British interference. And British interference at that time was justifiable by the existence of a conflagration which threatened to put all South Africa ablaze. Russia, Germany, or France would have had little scruple about interfering in such a case, and Great Britain's intervention at that time would have been equally if not more justifiable than the interference of America in Cuba. It matters little who were implicated in the original plans of the Reformers and the Raiders. The attitude which the High Commissioner might well have assumed was, that so long as the causes which rendered revolution apparently the only solution of the troubles of so large a section of the inhabitants, the necessity for the immediate removal of the causes of discontent and danger was imperative.

CHAPTER II

PAUL KRUGER ON TRIAL

Kruger's opportunity—Himself his country's wrecker—Indifference to would-be supporters—Conflicting evidence—Uitlanders adrift—The Industrial Commission—More disappointments—Various factors—The British Government—The Uitlanders—The capitalists—South African feeling—Mr. Solomon—Mr. Rose Innes—Mr. Merriman, all for the Uitlanders—War inevitable.

THERE is a saying that 'Cards never forgive you.' If ever one held good cards, Paul Kruger did after the Raid. That he played them badly the result plainly shows.

Up to the time the late Lord Rosmead (then Sir Hercules Robinson) left Pretoria after his mission of intervention, in the early days of January, 1896, President Kruger seemed to have scored nothing but successes. The Reform Movement had collapsed; the Raiders had been captured, and were denounced; and by the exercise of the 'magnanimity dodge' President Kruger stood before the world as one who had proved himself a statesman.

It is not the intention of the writer in these pages to show how the Reformers, or those who threw in their lot with them, were cheated into submission, nor to show that, whether statesman or not, President Kruger, as he so often has done, went back on his word. Mr. FitzPatrick's excellent book, 'The Trans-

vaal from Within,' affords ample testimony that this was the case, and by the new light it throws upon the part played by the Reformers supplies part of a chapter hitherto missing in the history of those times. I desire, however, to try and show that instead of jealously guarding the independence of the Transvaal, as President Kruger with wearisome reiteration says is his desire,¹ he has by his acts and influence, and harmonizing his policy with the aims of Afrikanerdom, thrown away opportunities of strengthening his position, and in the end has brought ruin to the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State, to say nothing of poverty, trouble, and desolation to thousands of people in all parts of South Africa.

By breaking faith with the Reform leaders; by their arrest and costly ransom; by the 'set' trial and 'magnanimity by inches'; by the Raid indemnity account; by his subornation of the High Courts of Justice; by the rejection of the report of his own Industrial Commission; by broken pledges and unfulfilled promises, President Kruger dispelled the impressions formed by those who were his admirers shortly after the Raid, and proved himself to be, as those who know him thoroughly have always contended, no statesman at all, but simply a strong-minded and obstinate despot.

Instead of winning the support of all sections of the community, and consolidating his position by the introduction of beneficent and beneficial legislation, President Kruger in the end most successfully alienated from himself all classes of the Uitlander population, with the exception of a certain section of foreigners who considered they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by an upheaval.

¹ See Appendix C.

If President Kruger had faithfully carried out his promise of reform, and fulfilled the hopes raised by his 'Forget and forgive' declaration, made immediately after the Raid, the Uitlanders, as a body, at that time would have been ready and willing to meet the Boer Government even three-quarters of the way.¹

Even after the arrest and conviction of the Reform leaders the average Johannesburger would have gladly welcomed a reconciliation with Pretoria. For, although the Uitlanders were stunned by the death-sentence of the four leading Reformers, and hailed with delight the gradual release of them all, yet the 'man in the street,' and average Uitlander, partly through ignorance of the true circumstances, did not feel too kindly towards the Reformers after the failure of their movement. Whether it was, as was explained by Mr. Fitz-Patrick, owing to the arrest of the leaders, and the oaths by which they were bound, or not, the fact remains that the particulars of the occurrences of the last days of 1895 and the early days of 1896 came very gradually to light. Stead's 'History of a Mystery,'² Garrett and Edward's 'Story of a Crisis,' the Reformers' Trial, the Cape Parliamentary Committee's Report, the inquiry at Westminster, Sir John Willoughby's article to the *Nineteenth Century*, and Mr. Lionel Phillip's rejoinder—all these threw light upon the Reform Movement and the Raid; but something was wanting and necessary to explain and harmonize them all, and that 'something,' to a great extent, was sup-

¹ See Appendix D.

² It was in the 'History of a Mystery' that the public received the first intimation that the Drifts question so nearly provoked war between England and the Transvaal. Mr. Stead's assertions regarding the opening of the Drifts received official confirmation by the production of the 'Drifts Papers' in the Cape House of Assembly on the motion of Mr. Merriman, who raised a hornets' nest by his inquisitiveness.

plied by the publication of Mr. FitzPatrick's book, which, for various reasons, is most interesting for the new information it supplies respecting the attitude and feelings of the Reformers. But even there, as in all proceedings connected with the Raid, it is felt that something is held back, and we would fain know a little more. Nevertheless, in the volume 'The Transvaal from Within' we feel thankful for the particulars we *do* get.

But it must be remembered that the before-mentioned average Uitlander and 'man in the street' naturally judged the Reformers and Raiders by what he knew at the time. Thus, at first there was a feeling of resentment against those who appeared to have quarrelled amongst themselves and deserted Jameson. Then an idea gained ground that Dr. Jameson had rushed in and spoiled the play—this a very correct idea. Then the thought that some in Johannesburg had proved traitors. Then a suspicion that we had all been made a tool of by some of the capitalists to play their own game. With all these conflicting thoughts, and suffering through the depression which followed the prosperous days of 1895, when the share market and property boomed, the Uitlanders, as a body, would have been only too glad to have seen the end of all political 'movements' and to have compromised with Pretoria for a reasonable settlement. But President Kruger still retained his olive-branch, and still belied the expectations he had falsely raised.

A ray of hope appeared with the appointment of the Industrial Commission which was authorized by the Government of the South African Republic to inquire into the 'present alleged state of affairs in connection with the mining industry of the Witwatersrand diggings in general.'¹

¹ See Appendix E.

The mining industry, the reason of the Transvaal's prosperity in those days and the source from which it was enabled to accumulate funds to further its anti-British policy, suffered under, and had, many legitimate grievances. The Government of the Transvaal professed to disbelieve this. So after the Raid, and after attention had been drawn to the 'alleged grievances,' the committee above alluded to was appointed and instructed to make such recommendations, '*as soon as possible,*' as might tend to the improvement and amendment of such matters.

The finding of the committee came as a surprise to the mining industry. It seemed an honest attempt to relieve the position. But however pleased those connected with the mining industry were, such pleasure was not shared by President Kruger. He called the committee to curse, and, lo! they had blessed altogether. The Government stood self-condemned by its own Commission. Then Pretoria's usual plan was resorted to. A new Commission was appointed to consider the recommendations of the first committee, and, after much delay, the impression became confirmed that after all Pretoria really did not mean reform.

The dismissal of Chief-Justice Kotze, and the appointment, under Law No. 1 of 1897, of Judge Gregorowski—the judge who declared that no honest man would sit on the bench so long as Law No. 1 of 1897 remained in the Statute Book—did not tend to improve matters or inspire confidence amongst a community which had always regarded the High Court of Justice in the Transvaal as one of its greatest safeguards.

About that time it was urged that until after the Presidential election Mr. Kruger could not unbend. 'Wait,' it was said, 'till President Kruger feels his

position secure; then you will see that, being freer to act, he will make concessions to the Uitlander.' The reverse was the case. I can well remember the anxious expectation with which Johannesburg awaited the President's speech at the opening of the Volksraad after the last Presidential election.

The same was said when the Bond Ministry gained office at the Cape. Then we were promised better times. Mr. Harry Hofmeyr (a near relation of the Dictator of the Bond), himself an Afrikaner Uitlander in Johannesburg, in conversation, assured me that he had little doubt that with the defeat of the Progressives at the polls, and with a Bond Ministry in power, friendly to Pretoria, President Kruger would adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Uitlanders. But in this hope, too, we were doomed to disappointment.

In the preceding chapter I remarked that, to have a proper conception of the position when the Boers launched their ultimatum, it was necessary to understand and appreciate the position of the two Governments, the Uitlanders, the capitalists, and the feeling of South Africa generally, on the question of Pretorian misrule. The Transvaal was taxing a community heavily and giving no representation in return. The Government was acting harshly and oppressively to a section of the inhabitants which was not only the most industrious and enlightened section, but which actually contributed about nine-tenths of the entire revenue of the State, and possessed greater interests in the country than the burghers themselves.

We have seen how the Transvaal Government's own Commission admitted that there were valid grievances. President Kruger himself admitted these grievances existed, and furthermore, in 1896, promised that they would be redressed. General Joubert said later that the Uitlanders should not have to beg for the franchise,

but should be able to demand it as a right.¹ So it is seen that the Government and the leading members of the Administration in the Transvaal admitted the Uitlander grievances. I have above tried to depict to a certain extent the feelings of the Uitlanders. Let us now turn to the other groups before mentioned, and consider their attitude during the few years succeeding the Raid when President Kruger was on trial.

The British Government, according to the utterances of Cabinet Ministers, since the Raid refrained from making representations to the Government of the Transvaal excepting when they were compelled to do so by force of circumstances,² solely on account of the consciousness that in the eyes of the world—one might almost say the jealous and hostile world—Great Britain had undoubtedly been placed in a false position by that unfortunate and deplorable occurrence, the Jameson Raid.

It must be remembered the British Government was unable to ignore the suzerainty challenge, nor could it have ignored the Uitlanders' position. But between the time of President Kruger's memorable 'forget and forgive' speech in the early days of 1896 and, say, the time when the first Uitlanders' petition to the Queen was framed, the Government had ample opportunity to inaugurate its promised policy of reconciliation, forgiveness and reform. And during this time the policy of the British Government was, as Mr. Solomon, now Attorney-General under a Bond Government, said during the peace debate in the Cape House of Assembly, 'one of wisdom and moderation.'

¹ General Joubert's words were: 'He (the Uitlander) must not then come crawling on his knees begging with outstretched hands, "Oh, please give me the franchise!" No, he must demand it.'

² Twice despatches were withheld in consideration of Boer susceptibilities, when it might have been thought their presentation to the Government of the South African Republic was inopportune.

And during the three years that followed the Raid, while the British Government was exercising restraint upon itself, what was the Transvaal doing? Redressing admitted grievances? Let us see.

Between January, 1896, and December, 1898, the principal safeguard for the security of the person or property of the Uitlander was swept away. And with the independence of the High Court destroyed, the remaining confidence in the Administration was shattered. The Press was further gagged. The right of public meeting was taken away. A law was passed enabling the President to expel whom he pleased without reference to the courts. Privileges in the matter of municipal self-government to Johannesburgers, instead, as promised, of being increased, were curtailed. Taxation, on the whole, was increased. Additional class legislation was introduced. Educational grants and facilities were withdrawn or rendered impracticable. Money drawn from the Uitlander population was squandered amongst the burghers, in many cases to smother discontent. Good statutes, such as the Liquor and Native Pass Laws, were rendered ineffectual by maladministration, and the acquisition of the full franchise by the Uitlander, through the clause requiring the approval of the applicant by three-quarters of the burghers in the ward, was rendered an *absolute impossibility*.

These were some of the measures adopted by President Kruger to produce a better feeling amongst the new population.

From all this it will be seen that, while the British Government considered President Kruger and his Government practically on trial, after the desertion in January, 1896, of those whose cause it espoused, the Pretoria oligarchy steadily applied the pressure.

The climax was reached in January, 1899. On the

14th of that month, at a public meeting held within a hired building under the auspices of the South African League and with the acquired consent of the authorities at Pretoria, one section of unarmed, peaceable and law-abiding inhabitants were assaulted and battered without provocation by another section, surreptitiously armed with bars of iron and sticks, aided in this disgraceful conduct by the police and by Government officials, within a stone's-throw of the police-station, not only without interference from, but with actual encouragement by the local authorities. On that memorable day was witnessed a spectacle which clearly proved that the Government of the South African Republic was either unable or unwilling to maintain order in broad daylight in the principal city in the State. Either alternative can be chosen. Drawing conclusions from the sights I witnessed on that day, I felt certain, knowing the circumstances of the case, war and conquest of the Transvaal would prove to be the only thing possible to enable its people to live in peace together.

In the foregoing pages I have endeavoured to show the feelings of the Uitlanders and of the respective Governments. Let us now turn to the capitalists.

One feels rather nervous about writing about capitalists; their power is so great. However, in all seriousness, let me begin by stating that the capitalists at Johannesburg are, I believe, no worse than capitalists in any other part of the world. They are more of the people than is generally the case elsewhere, and are therefore in a position to understand and appreciate the feelings of the classes. And they have come forward generously—apart from the time of the Reform Movement, when, it will be asserted, they acted to further their own aims—on many occasions. Instances like that of the time of the great dynamite explosion,

the time of the establishment of Uitlander schools, and during the recent exodus from the Transvaal, prove that they are not callous or indifferent to the interests of the community to which they belong. Having always been a disinterested observer of the doings of the capitalists and the Transvaal Government, I may be allowed to hazard the opinion that the capitalists did not, until perhaps very recently, desire any change of government in the South African Republic. They desired certain grievances redressed, especially those affecting the gold industry, which, by the way, proportionately, was taxed lightly compared with the average Uitlander. The capitalists' desire was natural. They wanted to be richer; but to tell me, notwithstanding much which may appear to point otherwise, that the capitalists desired the British Government in the Transvaal is to tell me what I do not believe. By their back-stair influence with the corrupt Government at Pretoria from the time of the discovery of the Witwatersrand fields till 1898 they benefited to a far greater extent than they would have done under an honest administration. But this is not the place to speak of the Sweitzer-Township scandal, or of the illegal splitting up of Turf-fontein. Sufficient is it for the purpose of this volume to say that, had President Kruger acted fairly towards the Uitlanders as a body, and assisted in the formation of a true Republic, the capitalists would not have been the people to thwart him. And, after all said about the 'big houses,' they did no more than 'big houses' are doing all the world over. It is the law of the survival of the fittest. The strong look after their own interests, even if they have to manœuvre to 'collar' them, and the weak go to the wall. It will be noticed now the capitalists are on the side of the British Government. They generally back the winning horse or go with those holding the whip-

hand. Let us now consider the feeling of the people of South Africa.

As indicating the feeling at the Cape, I think we cannot do better than consider such utterances as those of three members of the Executive Council of the Government of the Cape Colony, Messrs. the Honourable Solomon, Rose-Innes and Merriman, none of whom can be classed as Rhodesite men, and all South Africans.

Mr. Solomon, Q.C., speaking of Transvaal misrule, said :

‘He thought the time had now come when representatives in Parliament should honestly give their opinions on the present state of affairs in South Africa and the best means of securing peace in the country. Even Mr. Kruger admitted that the people of Johannesburg were suffering from legitimate grievances, and there was not a member of the House who would not say the grievances of the Uitlanders were legitimate, and what would be the effect of not redressing them?’

‘Until the Transvaal Government redressed those grievances there must be a feeling of unrest in the country, and it logically followed that one of the means of restoring peace was for the Transvaal Government to remove, or make some honest attempt to remove, those legitimate grievances. . . . It was because they earnestly thought the best means of preserving peace in South Africa was the removal of those grievances that they had the amendment brought forward by his honourable friend . . . So long as those grievances were allowed to continue, so long would there be unrest in South Africa. . . . And they, who supported that amendment, felt confident that the Imperial Government would take every step to bring about a satisfactory state of things before referring to war. The policy of the Imperial Government had been one of wisdom and moderation. . . . If the grievances of Johannesburg were redressed, and if a policy of moderation was pursued by the Imperial Government and the South African Republic, they felt that the best means would then be in operation for securing a permanent peace in South Africa, and bringing about a better understanding between the States in South Africa.’¹

¹ Cape Hansard, 1897, House of Assembly, pp. 100-102.

Mr. Merriman, Treasurer of the Cape, in the course of the 'Charter and Raid' debate, referring to the grievances of the people of Johannesburg, said:

'He, for one, believed those men had very grave grievances. . . . That there were real grievances nobody could deny. . . . Another thing he would tell them, that these grievances had the sympathy not only of the people in the colony, but also in the Free State, and in the Transvaal, too, to a very large degree. There was no question about it. They had the sympathy of the whole of South Africa, and things were working for reform. Nor did he blame the Uitlanders for taking up arms.'¹

Mr. Rose-Innes, a former Attorney-General of the Cape, and a most moderate man, before the war publicly made the following statement in writing to the press:

'I think President Kruger's franchise proposals inadequate, in that they afford no present relief to the present danger, and are too complicated.

'The franchise agreement having failed, the whole question of the position of the Uitlanders and the observance of the Convention will be dealt with by the English Cabinet.

'There is no reason to fear that the position they take up will be either unwarrantable or unreasonable; especially after the clear statement of the High Commissioner on Monday.

'The whole matter will then depend whether President Kruger is prepared to make concessions and meet the English proposals in a reasonable and open spirit. On him more than any other single person depends the grave issue of the future.

'It seems to me the urgent duty of those who have influence with the President to bring it to bear to induce him to make reasonable concessions; those who have no influence can at least refrain from doing anything which would make the position more difficult.

'The fact that Mr. Kruger has already made some advance gives ground for hope that he will advance further still, and thus ensure peace for South Africa, and the permanent stability of his own State.'²

¹ Cape Hansard, House of Assembly, 1896, p. 191.


² *Cape Times*, June 14, 1899.

Carefully selected words of wisdom from the oracle of the Cape which could give offence to no party. However, apart from the obvious or self-evident facts, one sentence stands out pre-eminently true. *'On him more than any other single person depends the grave issue of the future.'*

The feeling of the Cape Colony—in fact, of the whole of South Africa—on the general question of Uitlanders' grievances could be seen by the sympathetic action of the Mayors and delegates from all the principal South African towns who went to Pretoria on behalf of the Reform prisoners.

From a review of the foregoing, and from the records of these times, it will be seen that during the years which followed the surrender of Dr. Jameson, on all hands, President Kruger was recognised as the man who held the cards, and upon whose pleasure it was necessary and expedient to wait.

Great Britain and the Uitlanders had been put in the wrong. Kruger was exalted. He promised to forgive and forget, but, as was remarked three years later, he *'forgot to forgive, and gave only to his burghers.'* Paul Kruger played his cards badly, and they have not forgiven *him*.



CHAPTER III

THE BOND AND ITS AIMS

Which is it to be? A wasted and enslaved South Africa, or a free and united South Africa?—*Mr. Reitz, founder of the Bond in the Orange Free State, late Free State President; then State Secretary, Transvaal.*

Original aims of the Bond—Bond's practice short of its precept—The Bond in the Free State—Sir John Brand's prophecy—The Bond's present declarations and principles—The Bond's desire for non-interference—Consequent dangers regarding native question as a whole—The Bond on contagious diseases—'Commissie van Toezicht'—The founder of the Bond—The Origin, Progress, and Object of the Bond, by its Secretary—Naturalized aliens on 'pure nationality'—Profession and practice—Afrikander leaders on their aims—*Ons Land* suggests rebellion—State Secretary Reitz—Mr. Theo. Schreiner on Reitz—Mr. Schalk Burger—General Kock—Paardekraal opinions—Executive Member A. D. Wolmarans—Other Afrikanders—'The Truth in a Nutshell,' by Sir Alfred Milner—Kruger to America—Mr. J. T. Molteno and 'Afrikanderdom'—Mr. Merriman on the Bond—And on Reform—An alleged dream—The elimination of the Imperial factor—Independence commendable, but not antagonism—British supremacy in danger—A very real 'dream,' almost a nightmare.

By the first three articles of the original constitution of the Afrikander Bond, it is explicitly stated that the primary aim of that organization is the establishment

of a separate South African nationality. The articles were as follows :¹

‘1. The Bond knows no other nationality but that of Afrikaners, considering everybody as such, no matter what his origin may be, who shall bind himself to advance the welfare and prosperity of South Africa.

‘2. The object of the Afrikaner Bond is the establishment of a South African nationality by fostering true patriotism.

‘3. This object shall be attained by encouraging Afrikaners, from a political as well as a social point of view, to assert themselves as a nation ; (a) by establishing this Bond in all the States and colonies, and by creating an organization throughout South Africa.’

On the surface, it may be urged, there does not appear to be anything particularly disloyal or objectionable in connection with the articles here quoted. However, two points invite comment :

The first is that, although the Afrikaner Bond professes to know no other nationality than that of the Afrikaner, and at its birth stipulated that it considered everyone as such (no matter what his origin) who bound himself to advance the welfare of South Africa, it has persistently and consistently favoured the Dutch Afrikaner section of the population as against the English ; and the Transvaal—which has been a convenient medium through which to further and work the secret aims of the Bond—has always acted at variance with, and in direct opposition to, the *professed* principles of the Afrikaner Bond. The Transvaal treated South Africans as aliens, although they had the welfare of South Africa at heart.

The other point is that, although the Bond was furthered and developed in the Cape Colony ostensibly with a view to better and protect the farmer’s interest,²

¹ These were republished by the *Friend of the Free State* in its issue of September 16, 1898. See Appendix F.

² This is manifestly plain, as may be seen by reference to the first portion of the lecture on ‘The Origin, Progress, and Object

yet it immediately established itself in 'all the States and colonies' in South Africa as an organization with decided political aims, and has in reality achieved nothing or little to advance the welfare of the farmer, in the way of the improvement of his stock, or in matters regarding agriculture, irrigation, or education.

It is not denied that legislation for the good of the farmer may have received the support of the Bond, but be it remembered that this was at a time when Mr. Rhodes was working with and through the Bond for the benefit of the farmers and the country population. Mr. Rhodes and Sir Gordon Sprigg at such times were to be found voting together with the Bond party. Regarding education in the broadest sense of the term, neither the Bond nor any other party could by legislative enactments 'educate' the farmer in the course of, comparatively, a few years. But judged, as the Bond should be, by its works, its deliberations in Congress year by year, and by the way it used the influence it possessed and controlled, it must be admitted that its policy has undoubtedly been rather to allow the uneducated farmer to remain in ignorance, so that he might be used as a political factor, than to educate or enable him to form intelligent and independent opinions of his own.

When it is remembered that the leading spirits of the Bond at the time of its inception in the Orange Free State were bitterly anti-English—such men as the late Mr. Borckenhagen, editor of the *Bloemfontein Express*, and (the then) Chief-Justice F. W. Reitz—and when the words and actions of such schemers are considered in the light of what is now known, it

of the Afrikaner Bond,' delivered by its Secretary, at the request of the Provincial Committee, at Uitenhage, March 27, 1887.

will be seen and realized how cunningly the net was laid. However, the Bond never flourished in the Orange Free State, this in no small measure owing to the strong discouragement it received from President Sir John Brand.

The following letter, written by Sir John Brand in reply to an address presented to him by a number of Bondsmen, who bade him welcome to Smithfield on one of his Presidential visits, is so full of prophetic warning that I offer no excuse for its reproduction. It bore date of Smithfield, October 22, 1881, and ran as follows :

‘GENTLEMEN,

‘I would like to repeat in writing what I said verbally, and tender my gratitude to you for the hearty welcome with which I was received at such a distance from Smithfield, and make known my objections to the propriety or suitableness of the Afrikaner Bond.

‘It was agreeable to me to once more meet you all in health, among whom I have so many old friends and acquaintances, but it was not gratifying to me that you in your salutation of welcome placed the Afrikaner Bond so prominently in the foreground. However, since this has occurred, I may not now pass it over in silence, but exercise my duty in warning you against the dangers which I see beforehand, in order that the seeds of dissension may not be sown where unity should exist.

‘I am a thorough Afrikaner. My career demonstrates that I love the Free State and that I have endeavoured to promote its interests. You are Free Staters and inhabitants of South Africa. Poets of all nations have ever sung of patriotism. Rightly says Vondel: “Love of his country is inborn in everyone.” Therefore, it is not necessary for you nor for me to be members of the Afrikaner Bond to show our love for our native land. Have you not—have not all the inhabitants of the Orange Free State—proved during the troublous times of the war, in 1865-66, that you were bound together in soul and spirit to fight for and to vindicate our rights?

‘To foster and promote that harmony, that hearty co-operation and friendly relationship among the inhabitants of the Free State and the whole of South Africa must be our earnest endeavour. This can only be done by drawing closer the bonds of love

between one another, and this we can only accomplish by giving offence to no one and respecting the feelings of each one as we would that others would do unto us ; by everyone in his own sphere doing his best to promote the welfare and prosperity of the Orange Free State, and thereby also of the whole of South Africa, and by strengthening and confirming the most amicable relations with the Governments and inhabitants of the neighbouring colonies.

‘ If you consider any amendment in this or that matter necessary in the Free State, use, then, the means which for that purpose are afforded by the Constitution. Your representative will support your wishes in the honourable the Volksraad in the same way as he has hitherto done, and earnestly strive to do what is best for the country and its inhabitants. But, as your friend, I must tell you plainly that I entertain grave doubts whether the path which the Afrikaner Bond has adopted is calculated to lead to that unity and fraternization which is so indispensable for the bright future of South Africa.

‘ According to my conception, the Constitution of the Afrikaner Bond appears desirous of exalting itself above the established Government, and of forming an *imperium in imperio*.

‘ Wishing you and yours, Smithfield and the district of Caledon River, God’s blessing and a large measure of welfare and prosperity, and tendering you all my sincere thanks for your hearty welcome and your friendly disposition and good wishes for me,

‘ I remain,

‘ Your sincere, well-wishing friend and servant.

‘ (Signed) J. H. BRAND.

‘ To John Schnehage, Esq., Rev. S. G. M. Van Niekerk. W. C. Peters, M.V., and others.’

While on the subject of the Bond’s Constitution and principles, it may be worth while briefly to review the present authorized declarations of that organization.

In the establishment of the independent and ‘ pure nationality ’ which, ‘ under the guidance of Providence,’ it is the aim of the Bond to form, it expects, to promote its aims, ‘ that foreign intervention with the local concerns of South Africa be guarded against,’ which, as shown by a previous clause in the ‘ Programme of the Afrikaner National Party,’ means that, for

instance, it is against the principles of the Bond that Great Britain should interfere in the Native Question.

Quite apart from the question whether, from an individual and personal point of view, the Dutch, or inexperienced Englishman, understands the treatment of natives best, considering that by every right, by conquest, treaty and purchase the Cape Colony is a British possession, and that millions and millions have been spent on the country in administration and in defence of its very existence, and considering, from an Imperial point of view, the various interests of British possessions in South Africa and their connection in the complex problem involved in what we glibly call the 'Native Question'—considering all this, I repeat, it can readily be seen how inconsistent such a principle as that of non-interference, put forward by the Bond, is with the essential condition necessary to ensure a consistent and effectual Imperial Native policy.

Article VI. of the 'Programme of Principles' says: 'While acknowledging the Governments existing . . . the Bond considers . . . it the duty of those Governments to promote the interests of South Africa in accordance with the foregoing clauses . . . taking into account, in all its general doings, the Christian character of the people,' etc. The 'foregoing clauses' show that the Bond considers it necessary, to promote independence, to have an efficient 'Masters and Servants Act,' and to manage the Native Question itself.¹

The Afrikaner Bond co-operates with the Pretoria oligarchy, and has received support from that source—they are hand in glove. The State Attorney of the South African Republic, according to the uncontradicted reports appearing in the public press at the

¹ See 'Officieele Stukken van de Afrikaner Bond' (1898), pp. 1, 2.

time, declared, in the Volksraad, in reply to a question from a member, 'With regard to the dishonouring nature of a sentence, that fact was dependent on the offence more than the sentence. Thus, a man might thrash a native, who died, and then the man be sentenced to six months' imprisonment, but that would not be dishonouring.'¹ Between 1870 and the time of the annexation, in 1877, the Boers practised slavery,² so that it is not difficult to conceive positions where, owing to the treatment of natives by individuals, or by the acts of the Government, as in times past, British interference would be necessary.

Whatever independence was granted to the Dutch Republics was given conditionally upon a specified manner of treatment of the natives. And although under the Conventions the interests of white inhabitants were not specifically guarded (it being assumed that all white inhabitants would participate in the equal rights of self-government, as promised by President Kruger), the ill-treatment of the natives was always provided against. So that here, too, can be seen the possibility of trouble through the declaration of principles antagonistic to those laid down by the paramount Power.

The Bond under Article VI. (f) declares itself in favour of watching and guarding against the spread of contagious diseases, yet in Congress it has repeatedly declared itself against the Scab Act, a measure by which the contagious disease of 'scab' might have been eradicated from sheep in South Africa to the benefit of the farmer and the country.

In Article II. of the General Constitution of the Afrikaner Bond the 'chief object' is stated to be the formation of a South African nationality by union and

¹ *Cape Times*, July 14, 1899, and Transvaal press same date.

² Nixon's 'Complete Story of the Transvaal,' pp. 62-78.

co-operation, and by giving all support to the respective Governments and Legislatures. Yet the Bond has sown and promoted dissension. Its members in *many* districts have tried their utmost to subvert the Government or Constitution under which they enjoyed every privilege. And its members in *all* districts, and its official press, have been antagonistic in thought and feeling to the Power under whose free Constitution they flourished. And yet, strange to say, if the question be put to the anti-British back-country farmer or Bondsman: 'Granted that you drive the British into the sea, do you want to live under Oom Paul's flag, or the German flag, or the Russian or the French flag?' the answer invariably comes: 'We don't want any other European Power; we are content that England shall protect our coasts.'

A few months before the last General Election in the Cape Colony the wire-pullers of the Afrikaner Bond became desirous of altering its Provincial Constitution¹ for the Cape Colony, under which they would be able to influence and control the election of their nominees for Parliament. By the alteration introduced at the Worcester Congress, in February, 1898, it was laid down (Article IX.) that—

'Whenever the Provincial Committee becomes convinced that the Bond and Farmers' Association in one or more wards or districts had become under influences detrimental or inimical to the organization, it will have the right to dissolve (*ontbinden*) the Bond and Farmers' Protection Association in such ward or wards, district or districts, by resolution, leaving the assets at the disposal

¹ It was impossible to alter the *General* Constitution, which was the Constitution of the organization for the whole of South Africa. The Provincial Congress held at Worcester had power only to change the Provincial Constitution. Owing to the non-existence of the Transvaal and Free State branches of the Bond no General Congress was possible at the time, so the General Constitution was even above Mr. Dictator Hofmeyr.

of the officials at the time being, and it will have the right of taking steps for re-organizing the Bond and Farmers' Association in such ward or wards, district or districts ;'

and by section g of Article XVI., regarding the 'Commissie van Toezicht' (lit. Committee to View, or Supervising Committee), it was enacted that—

'It' (the Committee) 'will also have the right of refusing to announce any person as nominated a Bond candidate under Articles XI. or XII., and to enforce Article XV. on his behalf, if it is of opinion that by such refusal it is acting in the spirit of true Bondsmen, and is promoting Bond interests.'

Thus, the Bond organization, which, whatever its aims, stood on a solid basis and possessed a cleverly and well-framed Constitution, was overturned, and became as a pyramid resting on its apex. The anti-British section in Southern Africa seem to believe in inverted pyramids. Instead of naturally working and bubbling up from below, the attempt was made to force the bubbles downwards. So, from being an organization capable (under favourable conditions amongst an educated people) of becoming a representative institution, the Bond became, as it now is, an unworkable political machine, driven solely by Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr to work, with *Ons Land*, in furthering disloyal aims, and to oppose one whom Mr. Hofmeyr, it is said, will never forgive. In Mr. Hofmeyr, now, Mr. Rhodes may have his bitterest enemy, more, however, I believe, because he was not taken into Mr. Rhodes's confidence at the time of the Raid than for his connection with the movement itself.

Shortly after the Bond's constitutional principles were reversed, Mr. S. J. du Toit, its founder, dissociated himself from the organization, after formally recording his 'protest' against the introduction of the cut-and-dried reactionary principles brought forward by his then colleagues on the Supervising Committee (Messrs.

J. H. Hofmeyr and N. F. de Waal) for approval by the Congress at Worcester.

Whatever may have been in the mind of Mr. du Toit when he founded the Bond, or when, perhaps, the pill was sugared later by the mention of 'constitutional means' and 'giving support to the respective Governments and Legislatures and respecting the rights of each,' there is no doubt that his present opinions harmonize with his reasons for severing his connection with the Bond. And it must be admitted also that Mr. du Toit and many other South Africans had reason once to aspire to a 'South African National Party,' and even to the 'elimination of the Imperial factor,' both of which ideas were legitimate aspirations so long as they did not desire, like the anti-British section in South Africa, to *force* the idea, and to attain its accomplishment as they have tried to do, figuratively, through rivers of blood, and by successfully resisting in war the might of the paramount Power in South Africa.

The Bond, as it has done with others with whom it found itself in antagonism, now tries to discredit its founder, the Rev. S. J. du Toit, by every means in its power. This is its usual practice. All such are then termed 'Rhodesites.'

From a lecture on the 'Origin, Progress, and Object of the Afrikaner Bond,' delivered at the request of the Provincial Committee, by its Secretary (Mr. T. P. Theron), at Uitenhage, March 27, 1887, which deliverance is still printed in the official publications of the Bond, much information is to be gleaned; but, as that gentleman says 'I have made a point of omitting whatever might give offence,' possibly interesting revelations are lost.

Mr. Theron remarks that at the time of the establishment of the Bond the back-country farmer was 'a tool in the hands of political wire-pullers.' No phrase

more exactly describes the back-country farmer in relation to the Bond to-day, and the Hon. Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr pulls the wire.

By a propaganda of wilful perversion and misstatement, *Ons Land* has poisoned the minds, played upon the prejudices, and misled a class to an extent that can be realized only by personal intercourse with, and knowledge of, the people. And the day will come when Afrikaners in the Cape Colony will teach their children to curse the memory of that wretched sheet and the despicable creatures who have inspired and controlled it.

Mr. Theron then labours to show that through the actions of political agents the country farmer used to be influenced and confused in the choice of the candidate he should support. He, at least, then had a choice. This privilege is now denied him. The wire-pullers of the Bond do the influencing now, and they must be obeyed.

Mr. Theron then continues: 'Was there no one to take the interest of these poor farmers to heart? Yes, there were some; and we ought to cherish the names and memories of men like Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, M.L.A., in the west, and Mr. D. P. Van den Heever, M.L.C., in the east, who, with others driven by true patriotism, came to the front in these dark days to protect the farmers' interests.' Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr's is a name which, if not above suspicion as a disloyal propagandist, certainly is above need of distinctive mention. Mr. Van den Heever is a man who, though professing not to be a rebel, according to the *Standard and Diggers' News*, exults in the fact that some of his sons are. But what is the meaning of this official Bond utterance — 'driven by patriotism to protect the farmers'? Mr. Hofmeyr, a British subject by birth and every qualification (whether loyal or not), can only be driven by patriotism to assist farmers who are British. Or is it

implied that farmers are of the Dutch nationality alone, and that Mr. Hofmeyr is a Dutch patriot?

‘As a means,’ continues this interesting essay, ‘they started “Farmers’ Protection Associations.” . . . There were, however, at a slightly later date, other Afrikanders whose hearts and eyes went beyond, and who saw the necessity of ulterior measures!’ ‘They wanted to rouse, not only the farmer, but also the whole of *the nation*, from political lethargy.’ Candid admissions, truly!

After a fair specimen of lip loyalty from the lecturer, and reference to ‘their honoured Queen’—against whom so many Bondsmen are fighting at the present moment—it is stated, *mirabile dictu*, that the Bond is an organization in which there would be place even for the capitalist! And then the names of Messrs. Reitz and Borckenhagen are mentioned with honour as founders of the Bond in the Orange Free State.

As a benefit accruing from the formation of the Afrikander Bond, we are informed ‘that they have recovered that sense of nationality which strangers had wellnigh extinguished.’ One must pause and consider really what all this amounts to. Who were the ‘they’ alluded to? In point of fact, they were a combination of men of divers nationalities, including a large proportion of descendants of Frenchmen and Germans. The nationality of the forefathers of the former, ‘strangers’ (*i.e.*, they themselves), had, not wellnigh, but absolutely, extinguished. Those of German origin, like the Krugers, Steins, Reitzs, the Hauptfleisches, Fischers, etc., confused themselves with the Dutch.¹ They all were British subjects born and bred,

¹ In addition to the names mentioned above, many families of German origin named as under, speak and profess to feel as if they were ‘Dutch.’ The following names, although in many cases made more like Dutch, by the alteration of a letter or two,

enjoying freedom such as was denied by the land of their forefathers. They meet on British soil, under the British flag, and prate of *their nationality*! Had the propaganda spread by such agencies as they established not accomplished so much harm, the spectacle would have been ludicrous. Its effect has been tragic.

The boast is, then, made that the Dutch language has the same rights as English, which without doubt was an important accomplishment the Bond lost little time in achieving. Their watchword thereupon is declared as being, 'In Parliament, but not in the Cabinet.'

The Secretary, in continuing, says: 'Among Bond members there are some who are impressed with the wrong idea that a committee of superior rank has actual power over the lower ones. . . . Those, however . . . are like children in judging the organization . . . and know very little of its constitution. My reply to those questioning me, based on the Constitution of the Bond, is: "The nature of the Bond is one of charity that serves." It does not allow of any domineering power of one committee or one member over another. It exercises powers of attraction, not of coercion.' The story of the Bond might be summed up in somewhat similar words. It first exercised power of attraction, *then* of coercion. The doom of the Bond is then pronounced by our lecturer friend, its Secretary, who continues in this strain: 'Woe unto any committee, however high its rank may be, which should venture upon commanding to the lower ones!' Mr.

betray their German origin unmistakably; many German refugees and settlers came to South Africa at and about the same time as the French Huguenots, as well as later, such as the Hoffmans, Krieges, Meyers, Hofmeyers, Schreiners, Herzogs, Müllers, Beckers, Greylings, Werdmuellers, Herbsts, Kleinhauses, Holtzhausens, Badenhorsts, Sauers, Esselens, Groblers, Lotters, Krauses, Beyers, etc.

Theron then concludes with an excellent homily on the virtues of co-operation, caution, prudence and zeal, coupled with sound judgment and charity.

From what was written and uttered about the Bond by its founders and promoters in these days of its early growth, it must be admitted much, if sincere, was commendable and attractive; much was good, and all was palatable to its supporters, while some of it possibly was even made to satisfy Jingoese. Again and again intermixed throughout its teaching may be found professions and declarations of loyalty to the Queen and Constitution. In this connection the words of Sir Alfred Milner at Graaff-Reinet forcibly suggest themselves. In his famous reply to the address presented to him by the local branch of the Afrikaner Bond, in which that organization vehemently protested against the charges of disloyalty with which it had been assailed, Sir Alfred Milner said: 'Of course, I am glad to be assured that any section of Her Majesty's subjects are loyal, but I should be much more glad to be allowed to take it for granted.'¹

So much for the Bond professions.

How closely the present aims of the Anti-British party coincide with the avowed object of the Bond when it was first organized, the utterances of the leaders of that party show.²

¹ See Appendix G.

² Judged by its recent works, and the anti-British spirit evinced by its members, the Bond of late, unmistakably, has acted up to the principles laid down by its originators in 1882, shortly after its formation. The policy advocated at that time (as shown by the *Patriot* articles recently translated and republished) was one of strong, systematic, and consistent hostility to England, her trade, her language, and her people. An endeavour has been made to dissociate Mr. Hofmeyr from such a policy, and to make capital out of the circumstance that at first Mr. Hofmeyr was opposed to the Bond, and that Mr. S. J. du Toit, its founder, has changed positions with Mr. Hofmeyr. It is not the past, in this respect,

In the course of an article which appeared in *Ons Land* at least eighteen months ago, and which was reproduced in *South Africa* in its issue of October 15, 1898, the following sentiments are expressed :

‘When one considers the state of affairs in the Cape Colony, it must be confessed the future does not appear too rosy. The majority of the *Afrikaner nation* in the Cape Colony still *go bent under the English yoke* (!). The free section of the two Republics is very small compared to that portion subject to the stranger, and, whatever may be our private opinion, one thing at least is certain, namely, that without the assistance of the Cape Colonial Afrikanders the Afrikaner cause is lost. The two Republics by themselves, surrounded as they are by the *stranger*’ (i.e., British), ‘are unable to continue the fight. One day the question of *who is to be master will have to be referred to the arbitrament of the sword*, and then the verdict will depend upon the Cape Colonial Afrikanders. If they give evidence on one side we shall win. It does not help a brass farthing to mince matters. This is the real point at issue ; and in this light ever Afrikanders must learn to see it. And what assistance can we expect from Afrikanders in the Cape Colony? . . . The vast majority of them (Afrikanders) are still faithful, and will even gird on the sword when God’s time comes.’

with which we are concerned. It is the present. Paul Kruger, too, at first was opposed to the Afrikaner Bond. But that he or Mr. Hofmeyr was opposed to it at that time is irrelevant to the points at issue. Whether, as Mr. du Toit avers, the organization at that time was, in principle, too democratic for either Mr. Dictator Hofmeyr or Mr. Despot Kruger the damning facts remain—and they lend colour to Mr. du Toit’s contention—that by the alteration effected by Mr. Hofmeyr of its Provincial Constitution for the Cape Colony, in 1898, the Bond, like the Government of the South African Republic, became a ‘one man despotism,’ while Mr. du Toit protested against the alteration. Until Mr. Hofmeyr repudiates the sentiments expressed by *Ons Land*, a suspicion of disloyalty will naturally attach itself to his name. But, for sake of argument, even if it be admitted that the leaders of the Afrikaner party at the Cape disagreed with the *Patriot* articles of 1882, the propagation of similar ideas to those therein expressed, with the concurrence of Dutch clergymen in Burghersdorp (that centre of Bondism in 1899), unmistakably proves that the same principles were being advocated to its members even as recently as at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference. *Vide* Appendix H.

The full significance of such utterances as these is realized when it is remembered that *Ons Land* is the leading Dutch newspaper in South Africa, the principal organ of the Afrikaner Bond, and a paper reputedly controlled by the Hon. Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr.¹

In a manifesto issued to 'Free Staters and Brother Afrikaners' by Mr. F. W. Reitz on the eve of the war, the State Secretary of the South African Republic uses the words with which I have headed this chapter. 'Brother Afrikaners! I repeat,' says Mr. Reitz, 'the day is at hand on which great deeds are expected of us! WAR has broken out! What is it to be—a wasted and enslaved South Africa or a free, *united South Africa?*'

The publication of the manifesto above mentioned drew forth a letter from Mr. Theo. Schreiner, which appeared in the *Cape Times* of November 4, 1899. In this letter Mr. Schreiner, brother of the Cape Premier and Olive Schreiner, referred to a meeting between himself and Mr. Reitz, shortly after the retrocession of the Transvaal, when, Mr. Schreiner aptly remarks, 'Great Britain had no intention of making war on the Republics, for she had just made peace; nor any intention of seizing the gold-fields, for they were not yet discovered.' Mr. Reitz, then a judge of the Orange Free State, was busy establishing the Afrikaner Bond. Mr. Schreiner had just refused Mr. Reitz's invitation to join the Bond, giving as his reason the belief that that organization aimed at the overthrow of British supremacy in South Africa.

Mr. Reitz, according to Mr. Schreiner, tacitly

¹ The very title of this paper is a misnomer. *Ons Land* means 'Our Land,' and is a paper published in the capital of the British Colony of the Cape of Good Hope in the Dutch language, and is circulated and distributed, I cannot say subscribed for, throughout the Cape Colony, with treasonable and anti-British utterances such as the above-quoted appearing continually.

admitted that this was the case. Thereupon Mr. Schreiner pointed out that such a result could only be achieved, if at all, after a great struggle, in which the Transvaal would be in the wrong. Mr. Theo. Schreiner, in the course of his letter, wrote :

‘Thus the conversation ended, but during the seventeen years that have elapsed I have watched the propaganda for the overthrow of British power in South Africa being ceaselessly spread by every possible means—the press, the pulpit, the platform, the schools, the colleges, the Legislature—until it has culminated in the present war, of which Mr. Reitz and his co-workers are the origin and the cause. Believe me, sir, the day on which F. W. Reitz sat down to pen his ultimatum to Great Britain was the proudest and happiest moment of his life, and one which had for long years been looked forward to by him with eager longing and expectation.

‘He and his co-workers have for years past plotted, worked, prepared for this war, and the only matters in connection with it in which they are disappointed are, firstly, that they would rather the war had come several years later, so that their anti-British propaganda might more fully have permeated the country ; secondly, that they would have liked to have declared war against England at a time when she should be involved in some great struggle with a foreign Power, instead of at a time when she is free to give all her attention to South Africa ; and, lastly, they are disappointed in finding out that English soldiers can fight.’

On October 2, in the meeting of the Joint Raads, the Chairman declared : ‘Now is the time for the Afrikaners to become free.’¹

Mr. Schalk Burger, candidate for the Presidency of the South African Republic at the last election, Member of the Executive Council, and one of the Boer Generals in the field, said at the Paardekraal meeting, June 17, 1899 : ‘They felt that the *Afrikaner* nation was joined by a blood-bond. . . . They were rejoiced to know that they had the sympathy and co-operation, not only of their brethren of the Orange Free State, *but also of the greater part of South Africa* (applause).’²

¹ *Transvaal Leader*, October 3, 1899.

² *Standard and Diggers' News*, June 19, 1899.

Mr. J. H. Kock, Executive Member of the Government of the South African Republic, and General commanding the Boer forces at Elandslaagte, where he met his death, at the same Paardekraal gathering said: 'He regarded the Afrikanders from the Cape to Zambesi in the light of one great family (hear, hear, and cheers); for although they lived apart, the fate of Africa and the Republics was wrapped up in the destinies of what he called "Afrikanderdom." . . . The Free State Raad had announced that it unanimously agreed with what the Transvaal Government had proposed, and that they would stand by the Transvaal even to the death (loud cheers). Not alone the Free State, *but also the Cape Colony*. The Afrikaner Bond had held meetings to support the proposals. At Aliwal North [one of the towns in the Cape Colony occupied by the rebels at the commencement of the war] meetings had also been held by Afrikanders sympathizing with them, and even in Rhodesia Afrikanders ranked themselves on their side, and that showed that the Afrikanders stood man to man. And when the Afrikaner nation was one they had nothing to fear (loud cheers).'¹

At the same time and place, Mr. Christian Neethling, of Middleburg, South African Republic, who proposed the second resolution, is reported to have expressed the conviction that, 'if the worst came to the worst, the South African Brotherhood would be found standing up as *one nation* (loud cheers). If this was the case they would have nothing to fear (loud applause).'²

At the end of the *Standard and Diggers' News* verbatim report of the Paardekraal proceedings, it is recorded: 'At this stage a venerable non-burgher in the crowd cried out that *all the Afrikanders in the colony* would

¹ *Standard and Diggers' News*, June 19, 1899.

² *Ibid.*

support the men who had erected that monument.¹ This statement was received with renewed enthusiasm, after which Mr. Ben Viljoen carried a hearty vote of thanks to the committee who organized the gathering.'

Mr. A. D. Wolmarans, Executive Member, said: 'Their forefathers had been hunted since they left the Cape; and the *South African nation*, like tame swallows, had been driven out of their nests by wild swallows.'²

In secret session of the Orange Free State Raad, when President Steyn communicated to the members assembled the result of the Bloemfontein Conference, Mr. H. J. Ecksteen said: 'He believed *the time had come for Afrikaners to show that they wished to become an independent nation*.'³

In open Raad, Mr. du Toit said: 'Now, Mr. Chamberlain must remember that when war starts he will have to *fight Afrikanerdom*.'⁴

At Burghersdorp (another town in the Cape Colony occupied by the rebels), at a meeting convened by the Bond, Mr. Van der Walt, a Transvaal burgher, said: 'It did him good to see such a meeting of Afrikaners on British soil! If war should come, the Transvaal would be quite able to defend herself (applause). He prayed the Almighty that the day would come when *the whole of Afrikanerdom would be freed from the foreign yoke* (loud and prolonged applause).'⁵

Numerous examples might be given, all indicating

¹ The monument near Krugersdorp, the site of which was first marked by a pile of stones heaped there by individual burghers on Dingaan's Day, 1880, the day upon which the Boers declared their independence.

² *Standard and Diggers' News*, June 19, 1899.

³ *Bloemfontein Express*, June 6, 1899.

⁴ *Cape Times*, September 8, 1899.

⁵ *Albert Times*, reporting Bond meeting held at Burghersdorp about June 3, 1899. See Appendix I.

the same general idea. It will, however, be sufficient to add the testimony of Sir Alfred Milner as well as that of President Kruger, the exponents of the policies of the respective sides. Sir Alfred Milner, in his despatch of May 4, 1899, expresses the conviction that 'a certain section of the press, not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and constantly the doctrine of a Republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing reference to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which, in the case of war, it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects.'¹

President Kruger, in a message despatched to and published by the *Chicago Tribune*, said :

'Through *Tribune*, wish to thank American friends for sympathy in present crisis. Republic last Monday gave England forty-eight hours' notice within which give assurance dispute will be settled by arbitration or other peaceful means. Notice expires at five to-day. British Agent recalled. War certain. This is fitting end of British policy of force and fraud which has marked all South Africa with blood of Afrikanders. Must now make *South Africa free*, or white man's grave. Republic forces include all nationalities . . . showing not case of Boer against Uitlander, but *all nations against English*.'²

From such evidence it may clearly be seen that the idea was one of hostility towards England, and the establishment of an 'Afrikander nation,' with no place for any Imperial control other than naval protection for the coast. Obviously a foolish dream (unless with the acquiescence of Great Britain), so long as such naval protection could not be afforded by South Africa itself.

Mr. James T. Molteno, M.L.A., credited Sir Alfred Milner with having said, amongst other things, that

¹ Blue-book C. 9,345, p. 212.

² The message above quoted was republished by the *Cape Argus*, November 22, 1899.

he had 'determined to break the dominion of Afrikanerdom.' His Excellency Sir Alfred Milner declared, in reply, that Mr. Molteno's version of their conversation was 'so imperfect and inaccurate as to be absolutely misleading,'¹ and has since denied absolutely the utterance of the words.² Whatever the High Commissioner thought—and here it may be remarked that his words have only been doubted by those who have proved themselves disloyal—it can unhesitatingly be asserted that the 'Afrikanerdom' aimed at by many of the fifty-seven members of the Cape Parliament, for whom Mr. J. T. Molteno acted as representative, is such as should not be 'built up and developed,' as Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman declared, but which it is clearly Sir Alfred Milner's *duty* to destroy.

If all this evidence counts as nothing as to the deliberate and premeditated intention of those who aimed at the establishment of an independent 'Afrikanerdom,' free, and not 'bent under the English yoke,' what shall be said, for instance, to account for the distribution of seditious literature and Mauser rifles amongst Dutchmen in many parts of Her Majesty's colonial territory? This important phase of the question may safely be left in the hands of Her Majesty's Government and the High Commissioner, who I have little doubt must possess absolute knowledge of what has been going on, and who evidently know more than is pleasant for the section now clamouring for Sir Alfred Milner's recall.

However, to go to another source for the 'aims of Afrikanerdom,' we cannot do better than turn to the speech of Mr. John X. Merriman, who now holds office

¹ *Cape Times*, November 22, 1899.

² Blue-book C. d. 43 (January, 1900), p. 240.

as treasurer in the Ministry under the Premiership of Mr. Schreiner.

Speaking at Grahamstown, in 1885, upon issues which, in reality, are precisely the same as those which between times have been allowed to divide South Africa, Mr. Merriman said :

‘ The situation is a grave one. It is not a question of localism ; it is not a question of party politics ; but it is a question whether the Cape Colony is to continue to be an integral part of the British Empire. The question is whether we intend to progress along the lines of freedom, or whether we are ready to take the Transvaal for a model, and have our policy shaped by the Afrikaner Bond. . . . You [his hearers] will have to keep public men up to the mark, and each one of you will have to make up his mind whether he is prepared to see this colony remain a part of the British Empire, which carries with it obligations as well as privileges, or whether he is prepared to obey the dictates of the Bond. From the very first time, some years ago, when the poison began to be instilled into the country, I felt that it must come to this—Was England or the Transvaal to be the paramount force in South Africa ? From the time the Convention was signed the policy of the Transvaal was to push out bands of freebooters and to get them involved in quarrels with the natives. They wished to push their border westwards and realize the dream of President Pretorius, which was that the Transvaal should stretch from the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic. . . . All this time these people [the Boers] had the most arrogant disregard of the British Government. Nobody regrets this more than I do. I was one of those who thought that the British Government had been magnanimous in terminating the Transvaal War. How have they repaid the magnanimity of Great Britain ? They have done everything to flaunt, insult and annoy the British Government. Every right-thinking colonist, whether Dutch or English, must have a feeling of shame at that conduct. . . . Perhaps you think I am saying too much about the Bond, but from the very time when, four years ago, the movement was set on foot, I declared hostility to it. I said it would make people have different sides and places—one colonist who was a Dutchman in opposition to another colonist who was an Englishman. Nothing could be more disastrous. Since then that institution has made a show of loyalty, while it stirred up disloyalty. . . . Some people, who should have known better, were dragged into the toils under the idea that they could influence it for good, but the whole teaching of history went to

show that when the conflict was between men of extreme views and moderate men, the violent section triumphed. And so we see that some moderate men are in the power of an institution whose avowed object is to combat the British Government. In any other country such an organization could not have grown, but here, among a scattered population, it had insidiously and successfully worked. What could they think of the objects of that Bond when they found Judge Reitz¹ advocating a Republic of South Africa under one flag? . . . My quarrel with the Bond is that it stirs up race differences. Its main object is to make the South African Republic the paramount Power in South Africa. That is the reason of its hostility to John Brand—John Brand, the Afrikaner of Afrikanders, a true friend to the English, and one who has governed his State and is jealous of all its privileges. He is as much opposed to the Bond as I am, and the Bond is as much opposed to him. . . . Our connection with England carries its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and I hope I have pressed upon the meeting the necessity there is that the colony act in concert with the Imperial Government. . . . The great question is whether you wish to remain an integral part of the British Empire. Do you want to have another flag here—a German flag or a flag of United South Africa? Of course you say “No”; but if you want to keep the British flag, you must act in concert with the Mother Country. Sacrifices are to be made in this matter, and all of us must make sacrifices. There can be no faction in this matter; it is far too serious. . . . I appeal to you to show your hatred and detestation of the Bond and its abettors, and to show yourself desirous of remaining a part of that nationality devoted to law and order. Do you wish to be members of an imaginary South African Republic or to continue citizens of a colony under the tutelage of a Power under whom every man is regarded as equal before the law, and whose reign is the reign of freedom and order? (long and continued applause).²

Mr. Merriman, a member of the Schreiner Cabinet, and Bond, or Afrikaner, Government, which has so signally failed in redeeming the promise it made at the polls,³ presents an amusing spectacle as the advocate of whole-hearted co-operation and concerted action

¹ Present State Secretary, South African Republic.

² *Cape Times* (reprint), July 10, 1899.

³ The Bond's cry was ‘Progressives and War—Bond and Peace.’

with the Mother Country. This, too, is the same Mr. Merriman who allied himself with the Reform Movement against the Pretoria oligarchy in 1895, and who, the following year, in the House of Assembly, said: 'He, for one, believed these men (the Uitlanders) had very grave grievances . . . nor did he blame the Uitlanders for taking up arms.'¹ Now Mr. Merriman speaks of the unfortunate, deplorable and unnecessary war, apparently oblivious of the fact that the war was forced upon Great Britain because, forsooth, after South African 'influences' had failed to obtain relief, Imperial 'influence' determined to assist its subjects to obtain the redress of grievances Mr. Merriman pronounced 'very grave,' and which he declared justified revolution!

It appears that the Afrikaner Bond, when in power, instead of securing peace, in effect, rather made for war, as the Afrikaner party, after being 'hand and glove' with the Kruger clique, sided with those who caused the war, instead of using influence which, by virtue of their claims on Pretoria, was entitled to consideration. In their disloyalty, as in their professions of loyalty, they were half-hearted, and so, as always happens in such cases, in the end, they pleased neither party.

It is often said that the idea of the dream of Dutch supremacy is but the figment of a distorted imagination. A prominent Cape Bondsman and bitter opponent of Mr. Rhodes, in ridiculing the idea of any conspiracy against British supremacy in South Africa, recently said to me: 'You cannot produce evidence enough to hang a dog, and not half as much as against Mr. Rhodes, who said he wished to eliminate the Imperial factor in South Africa.' But when, ten years ago, Her Majesty's High Commissioner and

¹ Cape Hansard, House of Assembly, 1896, pp. 190, 191.

Governor of the Cape Colony spoke of the 'elimination of the Imperial factor' in Cape politics the case was vastly different. Owing to mistakes made by successive Imperial Administrations through lack of knowledge, and to the shifty policy of a timid Colonial Office, many loyal colonists desired, with Mr. Rhodes and the late Lord Rosmead, the elimination of the Imperial factor in the direct control of South African affairs. But what under a normal and healthy condition might be regarded by loyal sons of the Empire as the highest development of self-government becomes a treasonable and disloyal aim, in the case of British subjects, when it is part of a conspiracy formed by anti-British republicans whose object, to again quote the words of Schalk Burger, is 'a united and free South Africa.' A 'free' South Africa was desired, in the same manner as was an 'independent' Transvaal. Not for what might be implied by the meaning of the term—not for the betterment of the peoples, but for the fulfilment of an aspiration which sprang principally from hatred of England. Not, either, that the Dutch population at the Cape have had occasion to hate, or have always hated, England. History proves the contrary. But since the advent of the Afrikaner Bond a feeling has been engendered and fostered which was almost non-existent fifteen years ago. Hardly had the Bond been organized, when a measure was introduced which has done more harm to the cause of union in South Africa than any other law passed since the granting of responsible government to the Cape.¹ I speak of Law

¹ The Constitution Ordinance Amendment Act, 1882, had the effect of greatly lowering the standard of representatives in the Legislature. And it cannot be urged that it improved the representative system. It was a retrogressive step; and those in favour of the law are bound to acknowledge this, as, if its adoption were to enable representatives to understand the proceedings in Parliament who could not otherwise have done so, it shows that the law

No. 1 of 1882. By granting equal rights to the Dutch and English languages disunion has been promoted and classes kept apart. The early Dutch population at the Cape saw the dangers of allowing two languages to divide the people, so by their inconsiderate attitude towards the Huguenot settlers not only effectually extinguished their language, but their nationality, and at the same time successively assimilated the foreign refugees with the Dutch colonists. Now the descendants of these same people, by the influence of the language question, are, and have been, assailing British rights and interests, and are increasing disunion amongst the general population. The exclusion of the

was to enable an uneducated, unintellectual and non-progressive class to represent the constituencies. For no one only acquainted with the *patois*, or Dutch vernacular, of the Cape can claim to be well educated or cultured, as it has no literature. The Dutch *patois* spoken in South Africa must not be confused with the language of Holland. In the example of Canada, so often quoted, the case is different. French is a language with a literature, so even if a member of the Canadian Legislature did not understand English at all, it would not follow that he was uneducated. Another ill effect is that with representatives in Parliament at the Cape, as now, understanding 'the taal' only, many are unable to follow the English speeches, so the most intelligent remarks and arguments on all the important debates are lost to them. Thus the wire-pullers of the Bond and misleaders of the Afrikaner party have a following more easily led than if they were capable of forming decided opinions of their own. So the town and country parties are kept apart, to the detriment of the country; and the town members, as well as many of the Progressives generally, not being able to follow what the country members say, are unable to appreciate the feelings and grievances of the farmer members, who only speak Dutch. A lack of sympathy between the parties results, and, as is so often witnessed, Bondsmen are left speaking to the empty benches on the Progressive side. Many of the Bond members are very unprogressive. It may seem incredible, but some so-called Afrikaner members of the Cape Legislature, like Paul Kruger, can barely sign their names.

Dutch language in Parliament before 1882 caused no great hardship to the community generally, and what inconvenience did exist was rapidly decreasing; but now, by permitting the use of the Dutch language in the Cape Government services, and by making it a *sine quâ non* for the Colonial Civil Service examination, British subjects in that part of our Empire are placed at a disadvantage.

So far from the idea of Dutch supremacy being an idle dream, as a matter of fact Afrikaners were exceedingly near fulfilment. It is inconceivable that the Republics would have launched their ultimatum at the British Empire without some definite understanding regarding the assistance to be furnished by the Afrikaners at the Cape—the assistance and support, according to the Bond organ, upon which all depended. It can be seen, then, that it was not a matter of the franchise, not a matter of granting reforms, nor, as has ingeniously been put forward, the difference between a five and a seven years' franchise. But it was, as President Kruger frankly admitted in his cable to the *New York Tribune*, a struggle for supremacy in South Africa by a combination 'against the English.' Something went wrong, something miscarried, and the Cape Colonial Afrikaners did not exactly rise to the occasion. As one result, Boer prisoners (Afrikaners) at the Cape called those who they said failed them in their promised support 'cowards and traitors'—'traitors,' they said, 'to Oom Paul as well as to the Queen.'¹ The explanations have yet to follow.

Let us meanwhile supply a hypothesis. Assume, to illustrate the idea, that the Natal Ministry had not so persistently pressed for reinforcements; assume the

¹ See Appendix J. See also Chapter IV., p. 63.

six thousand odd British troops from India had not been despatched to Natal, and that the Ministry there, with its colonial resources, had been as indifferent as the Bond Ministry at the Cape: it follows, then, that the Cape garrison would have been weakened to strengthen that of Natal, and the retreat from Dundee, if such had been possible, would have been followed by the fall of Ladysmith and Maritzburg. Then, not only, as was the case, would Naauwpoort and Stormberg have been evacuated, but, under the single hypothesis put forward, the De Aar and Orange River positions would have been so weakened that it is practically certain the Boers could, and would, have advanced to Hex River. In that case, there is absolutely no doubt that the Midland and Western Province districts would, as the Northern had already done, have joined the Boer forces, and that, for the moment, the South African colonies would have passed from our dominion. This is no idle dream or extravagant assumption. The British Indian troops saved the Cape in the same manner that British troops from the Cape saved India about forty years before, when that portion of the Empire was sore pressed.

Thus, we see that, when the anti-British party counted upon the necessity arising (as it would have arisen under the circumstances) of Great Britain having to fight inch by inch from the coast, and to have sent the vast force necessary to reassert her supremacy in South Africa, and when they built their hopes on the assumption that, before her supremacy was regained, England would have been content to relinquish the struggle, the 'aims of Afrikanerdom' were not altogether imaginary. For there was the precedent of the American War of Independence before their eyes, and, rightly or wrongly, the anti-British party in South Africa believed

it would have been possible to have bargained for a compromise.¹

It is true Afrikanders acknowledge their existence as a 'nation' is dependent upon European naval protection. At the same time, they are sufficiently good judges to recognise which protection would be most effectual, as well as sufficiently well informed to know that it would not be other than British.

The plans of Afrikanderdom failed. Its aims were not realized, although for this, be it remembered, no thanks are due to the Bond Ministry. But what shall be said of that great far-seeing statesman who faced

¹ Since the above was written, the *Cape Argus*, under the heading of 'Kruger to McKinley,' says: 'The *New York Journal* publishes the following letter from President Kruger. Writing from the Government Office, Pretoria, under date October 19, the President says:

"I send my greetings to the President and people of the United States. The main question in dispute between this Government and England was as regards the franchise." (This is hardly reconcilable with a previous despatch to the *Tribune* (America), in which Mr. Kruger infers it is no 'Uitlander' question, but an anti-English design.)

Here follow—to the *Journal*—many statements which, if not absolutely false, at all events put the case in a specious manner. After declaring that Great Britain forced the war—overlooking the fact that the Transvaal's independence was guaranteed by England, and that the British Government had pointed out that, without war, the Transvaal State would rather strengthen its independence by widening its base—Mr. Kruger's letter concludes:

'The great American nation, which had more than a hundred years ago to fight the same British nation to secure their liberty, will know how to sympathize with a little sister Republic, far away though it be, who has now to fight a mighty Empire in order to maintain its own independence.—PAUL KRUGER.'

The *Journal* said the letter above quoted was obtained by a correspondent with General Joubert's army. It also printed a note from Mr. Reitz to its correspondent, stating that 'President Kruger desired him (Mr. Reitz) to request the *Journal* correspondent to send the above message to America' (*Cape Argus*, January 25, 1899).

the problem? By the foresight of Sir Alfred Milner the Empire has been saved from peril. Had the Bond's aims been realized, had the High Commissioner at the Cape of Good Hope allowed the plans of the so-called 'Afrikander party' fully to mature, the struggle, when it came, might have shaken the very foundations of the Empire.

CHAPTER IV

THE AFRIKANDER UITLANDER

Pretoria's inconsistency—South African sympathy in 1881—Its result—Ingratitude of the Transvaal—Signs of the times—Colonials an important section in the Transvaal—Tribute to Uitlanders by Mr. T. Schreiner—Also by Mr. Merriman—Blood-ties—Thickest between Cape Dutchmen and the Uitlander—Cape Dutch and Boer not near related—Hollander tactics—A repudiation—Cape Colonists in Transvaal unfriendly to Pretoria—Why so many espoused the Transvaal's cause—Mr. Rhodes the Afrikaner's friend.

ONE of Pretoria's greatest inconsistencies is its treatment of colonial Afrikaners. It is an undeniable fact that the strong feeling of sympathy towards the Transvaal shown by the Orange Free State and the Cape Colony influenced the British Government in arriving at its determination to give back the Transvaal to the Boers in 1881.

After many years of blissful ignorance, we have recently been told that magnanimity did not prompt the retrocession.

The Duke of Devonshire, in December, 1899, at York, declared :

‘As one of, I believe, the only three surviving members of the Administration who were responsible for the Convention of 1881, I must take my share in whatever blame can be imputed to it for our action. The only two surviving members of the Administration, Lord Kimberley and Mr. Chamberlain, have made their statement as to the causes which produced that policy. I do not differ directly from either of them ; but I should like on my own behalf to add this, that I believe the motive which actuated most of the

members of that Cabinet, and certainly which, so far as I can remember, had the principal influence on my own mind, was that in a further prosecution of the war against the Transvaal Republic we should not have had the opinion of the great majority of the British people at our back.¹

Whether the Duke of Devonshire alluded to any extent to the feelings of British subjects in South Africa, we can only surmise, but it is known that not only burghers of the Orange Free State, but British subjects from the Cape Colony, strongly sympathized, and even actively assisted, the Transvaal in its struggle in 1880-81. Probably it is owing to the fact that such conduct was overlooked by Great Britain that so many British subjects, enjoying the greatest freedom and every right under British colonial rule, have casually become rebels and joined the Boer ranks during the present war. However, be this as it may, the Transvaal nineteen years ago received practical proof of sympathy from a large section of the colonists² and Free Staters.

¹ The *Times*, December 15, 1899, p. 4 (weekly edition).

² Some little time ago, when the colonial Dutch were feeling the effects of President Kruger's unfriendly policy in the way of taxing their produce, etc., a prominent Bondsman, and member of the Cape Legislature, in visiting Pretoria remonstrated with the President, and pointed out that such treatment was not just in return for what they had done for the Transvaal in 1881. Reference was made to the sum of £3,000 which was subscribed by Cape Dutchmen in 1881 for their brothers fighting for freedom in the Transvaal. President Kruger is reported as having retorted that £3,000 was not worth mentioning, to which the Bondsman replied that £3,000 in 1881 meant more to them than hundreds of thousands to the Transvaal later on. After argument President Kruger's final reply was, 'If you come to dictate to me, there's the door!' My informant regarding this incident is a Western Province Dutchman, who has very good sources of information at his disposal. In conversation with Sir Henry de Villiers in this connection, he urged that the above rather disproved my contention that the colonial Dutchman was able to influence Pretoria. But it must be remembered that what the Cape Dutch party could

It has even been said that President Brand, in a private communication, intimated to the British authorities that if the war were further prosecuted he would be unable to continue to restrain his burghers. If this be so, possibly this was one of the 'other' considerations which influenced Mr. Gladstone's Administration in 1881.

But notwithstanding the sympathy shown and extended by the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State during the former war, the Transvaal up to 1898 treated the burghers of those countries¹ who went to reside in the South African Republic as aliens and 'outsiders.'

The Transvaal taxed the produce from the farmers of the Western Province of the Cape Colony in the shape of brandy, wine, fruit, and tobacco. It closed the Drifts to their exportations, yet the Cape Dutch talk of their brothers and friends across the Vaal, and Mr. Reitz and the late Mr. Borckenhagen, promoters of the Bond and of disunion in South Africa, speak of 'Afrikanders irrespective of nationality, so long as they have the interests of South Africa at heart.'

The truth is, that neither the Transvaal Government nor the Afrikaner party at the Cape has the real interest of the other at heart, but as political factors, each with a common desire, they have been useful one to the other. It is difficult to determine, as events have occurred, which party has been more 'left,' to borrow a colloquialism, by the other. One thing is certain: it is matter for congratulation to Great Britain that something miscarried, and that after war broke out

have done in the latter eighties, when the Transvaal was more dependent, and what it could do after the South African Republic had fattened on many years of greedy gain, when the tail thought it could wag the dog and the master of the dog as well, are two very different matters.

¹ As showing the unfriendliness of the Transvaal even to Free Staters, see Appendix M.

last October, instead of whole-hearted co-operation, recriminations were witnessed.¹

In another small matter we are afforded an indication of the direction of the wind, which I venture to predict, before the final settlement is arrived at, will be blowing a perfect hurricane.

The matter to which I allude is that regarding some negotiations which were reported as being likely to be carried out early in January last. It is understood that, as usual, Mr. Hofmeyr kindly consented to mediate.

However, as the Bond party at the Cape had so disappointed the expectations of their friends in the Republics, that republican organ and rabid anti-British paper, the Bloemfontein *Express*, in the bitterness of its anguish, remarked, 'he (Mr. Hofmeyr) could keep his olive-branch to himself,' adding that if Mr. Hofmeyr had done his duty the situation would have been very different.²

¹ See p. 56 and Appendix J.

² *Vide Cape Times*, January 27, 1900. Since writing the above I have extracted the following from the *South African News*, the Bond party's English organ printed in Cape Town. In its issue of January 31, 1900, under the heading of 'In the Boer Capitals—Interviews with the Two Presidents,' it says: "The following accounts of talks with the Presidents of the two Republics will be read with interest. Mr. Steyn's remarks anent "Cape Colony politicians of the African party" will be noted as showing the absurdity of the "conspiracy" theory.' (I rather think it points to it, and to the non-fulfilment of their part by the Cape conspirators.) 'Laffan's correspondent at Pretoria, writing on December 2, says: "The President (Steyn) expressed vigorously his contempt for the tactics of Sir Alfred Milner. He said: 'That they should have thought we were such cowards as to stand idly by and see men of our own nationality butchered hurt me most of all.' After a while he added forcibly: 'Never again shall I be a party to, or shall I sign, any Convention with the English.' He referred also, and with some bitterness, to the Cape Colony politicians of the African party as men whose *sole idea of assistance was to get up a subscription for the widows and orphans. Our friends there are our greatest enemies. We can do without them.*"'

It is stated that Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr is displeased that Pretoria did not wait till the effect of the Bond propaganda had further permeated the colony. Yet a little time, and we shall know more.

But although the Republics have much to thank the disloyal-hearted colonial Afrikaners for, and although at the last the action of the latter-named did not prove such an important factor, nor have the effect of realizing the *Ons Land* dream of Afrikaner supremacy, yet, on the other hand, the loyal colonial Afrikaners, or South Africans, as they prefer to term themselves, in the South African Republic have been an important factor in the Transvaal question, ever since the Uitlanders first began to clamour for their rights. They were very prominent in the National Union and Reform Movements, and have given a good account of themselves and been well represented in the fighting line during the war. Indeed, it might with truth be said that, but for the action of colonials in the South African Republic, as well as in the Cape Colony, it is problematical whether the Transvaal might not have been able to have chosen its own time for the tussle (which was inevitable so long as the aims of Afrikanerdom spelt antagonism to British supremacy), for Cape Colonists on the Rand and the South African League did much to force the issue when they were convinced that force alone would settle it.

In many ways the Uitlanders, as a class, have been misjudged and misunderstood. And the existence of the colonial section of that class—always an influential and determined section—has often been overlooked. That section working with the South African League—it was the League's own work—was in a measure responsible for the Uitlanders' petition to the Queen,¹ and to that

¹ See Appendix K.

document is attributable Imperial intervention at the particular time it occurred.

Nearly all the colonials, as, indeed, the majority of the general body of Uitlanders, went to the Transvaal 'to stay.' The idea may be prevalent in the minds of newcomers, as the desire, that they may rapidly become rich at the gold-fields and return to their homes in whatsoever part of the world they come from ; but in practice the Uitlander, as a rule, goes to the Transvaal to stay. He becomes possessed of interests in that country, and, as a rule, in the natural course of events will live and die there.

It is so often alleged that the Uitlander has no real interest in the country. Others there be who imagine the Uitlanders, as a body, are very wealthy people, who wish the British Government to fight their battles so that they may become more wealthy still. As a matter of fact, the man who has no interest in the country, and the millionaire, or even the very wealthy, are the exceptions.

Mr. Theo. Schreiner, brother of Mr. W. P. Schreiner, in the course of a letter published in the *Cape Times* of August 30, 1899, writes thus, under the heading of 'The Uitlanders':

'From personal knowledge I can testify that many of the movers at Johannesburg in the present appeal to England are steady-going, sober-minded business and professional men—Christian men, too, in many instances—the very last to become revolutionists ; men whom any Government should welcome as of the very best quality of citizens, such as are the backbone of a nation. These men, some of whom are colonial born and connected by birth and marriage with Dutch families, have been attracted to the Transvaal by the prosperity which the existence of great and permanent mineral wealth always produces. Those who believe that a Higher Power created and located that mineral wealth with some wise and beneficent purpose cannot but believe that the same Higher Power intended that the men whom that wealth should lead to permanently settle down in the country should become part and parcel

of its people, and should take their share in its government equally with those already resident there. Anyhow, these men have thus settled down in the Transvaal, are rearing their families there, mean to live and die there. They cannot, and dare not, without suffering a deterioration of character and of much of their prized inheritance from past generations—the ideals of justice, freedom, liberty—consent to remain political helots any longer.’

The above is a very fair statement of the case. And when it is remembered that so many of the Uitlanders are South Africans—persons desiring to make the Transvaal, that one part of South Africa (their own country), their home—the injustice of Pretorian policy can be realized; and at the same time it can be seen how the Transvaal alienates from itself those who would prove its best friends.

Mr. J. X. Merriman, Mr. W. P. Schreiner’s colleague in the present Bond Ministry, in the course of the debate on the Charter and the Raid, spoke feelingly in the interests of those whom I call Afrikaner Uitlanders.

‘He said, he did not think because Jameson had made his Raid . . . it did away with the situation of what he might term the real grievances of the Uitlanders. They might call them, perhaps, sentimental grievances; perhaps they were sentimental. He saw that one of the leaders said the majority did not care a fig for the franchise! Now, that was not the case of the people who went into the Transvaal from the colony. It might be the case with the capitalists; what did they care about the franchise? They did not care so long as they could amass wealth. But people like Mr. Wessels,¹ a Cape man bred and born, who went up into the Transvaal to throw his lot in with the Transvaal, and who no more dreamed of upsetting the Republic and hoisting the Union Jack than the Stars and Stripes; people like the hundreds of the Boers—by whom he meant those who cultivated the soil—who had gone up there from the colony, like the hundreds of young Afrikaners who had gone up there with a view of making the Transvaal their home, found themselves treated as pariahs. Those were the people to whom this franchise grievance was a real grievance. . . . Those people wanted to feel that they lived in their own country, and a great many members in the House felt that it was an injury

¹ *Vide* Appendix A.

that a line should be drawn across South Africa, and that the moment they (who were born in South Africa) went across a river they were no longer citizens. There was a strong South African feeling—a feeling that was an immense reality—on this subject. Those were the people who had grievances. Then there were other grievances, such as those affecting education, which were sentimental grievances also, but still they were felt.¹

As far back as April, 1896, I addressed a letter from Johannesburg to the editor of the *Cape Times*, which appeared in that journal headed ‘Blood-ties—which the Thickest?’ I remarked, *inter alia*:

‘As a South African with the whole of South Africa at heart, and as one dependent upon its prosperity, I should like to remind those who this week voted in the majority on the so-called “peace motion” of the duty they owe their kith and kin, and to those who, although residents in this State, might almost be called fellow-colonists. The Cape’s duty was certainly not to encourage this Government in their hostility towards South Africans generally, and I take it the amended motion does this. I appeal through your columns particularly to South Africans who are Dutch, as so often in the colonial Dutch press the well-known phrase “Blood is thicker than water” has been made use of, and I ask, Is the blood relation between the Cape Colony and the Transvaal thicker on the side of the Boers than that of the Uitlanders? I speak as a representative colonist here . . . and I strongly maintain that the blood of the colonials in this State is thick with those of their near and immediate relations in the colony, and thicker by far, and in closer sympathy, than that of the Dutch party at the Cape and their far-removed Boer connections in the Transvaal. With the Free State it is different. And why, I ask, should our Dutch friends at the Cape morally support this Government against their own immediate and near relatives in the Transvaal? I know many here, whom I could name, Cape Dutchmen—Uitlanders—treated and made to feel like aliens, who with me would be glad to see this Government overthrown, so that at least South Africans could obtain rights which are not denied Dutchmen in any British possessions. . . . The Dutch representatives in the Cape Parliament have in their heart of hearts no true sympathy with Pretoria (they know how their practical sympathy in the past was rewarded), but they think this is a suitable opportunity to push their anti-British, non-progressive Bond principles. . . . Why cannot they

¹ Cape Hansard, House of Assembly, 1896, pp. 190, 191.

(South African members in the Cape Legislature), like men, regardless of interests, office, or pay, stand up in the House and fight for the rights of South Africans in this State?—rights which are allowed by the British Government to the most anti-British Dutch subjects at the Cape. It only requires the sacrifice of party and personal interests, and the maintenance of just principles, to unify all South Africans, and to discourage the damnable discord disseminated by and from Pretoria. It would be no use my posting this direct, addressed to you, nor in this Free Republic is it advisable for me to sign my name, so I will subscribe myself—SOUTH AFRICAN.'

Two years later the opinions I expressed about the feeling of colonial Afrikaners resident in the Transvaal were confirmed by an incident which occurred in July, 1898, which is worth recording.

A party of time-servers, Hollanders and officials, held a meeting, which was presided over by Mr. H. J. Louw, a son-in-law of one of the Bond members of the Legislative Council of the Cape Colony, and drafted an open letter to Afrikaners, care of Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, in which they expressed sympathy with the Bond party at the Cape, and voiced sentiments calculated to create the impression that colonials or Afrikaners were well pleased with their position in the Transvaal. As this letter was given prominence to by *Ons Land* in Cape Town, a number of Cape Colonists—a large proportion of whom were Dutch—sent a counter-manifesto to the 'Colonial-born Electors of the Cape Colony,' also to the care of Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, of which the following is the full text :

'FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN,—Our attention has been drawn to a letter received and published by Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, purporting to represent the sentiments of Cape Colonials resident in Johannesburg on the forthcoming elections. We desire to draw your attention to the following facts :

- '1. That the meetings at which this letter was drafted were private, and in no way representative.
- '2. That the meetings were held in a Government building—to wit, the Circuit Court House, Johannesburg.

- ' 3. That the meeting was attended by Government officials and by persons not colonial-born.
- ' 4. That the sentiments expressed in the letter cannot be taken as the sentiments of influential Cape Colonists resident in the South African Republic.
- ' 5. That we, as Cape Colonials, are not in sympathy with the present Government in Pretoria, nor with its supporters at the Cape, and we resent the untenable and false position in which we are placed in this State.
- ' 6. That we do not yield to the signatories of that letter in our desire for union and prosperity throughout South Africa, but we believe that union and prosperity will be best assisted by the return to power in the Cape Colony of members pledged to progressive legislation, and not by the return of men pledged to the reactionary principles preached by the leaders of the Afrikaner Bond.'

There were sixty-seven signatures to the first open letter. Of these, fourteen were those of Government officials, while the majority of the remainder were well-known devotees of the Transvaal Government. On the other hand, more than 300 representative and influential colonists resident in Johannesburg signed the second letter, and each signatory, in addition to his name, gave his former colonial address. This was a spontaneous effort of Cape Colonials in Johannesburg. Neither the South African League nor any other organized body had anything to do with the matter,¹ nor were any of the Reformers given an opportunity of subscribing to the manifesto. Indeed, by their oaths they were unable to do so. The list of those who signed their names included leading professional and business men in Johannesburg, amongst whom were sons of very prominent Bondsmen at the Cape. As a matter of fact, the father of one who signed is one of those ten as representing the 'Moderamen' of the Dutch Reformed Church in South Africa who put his name to the recent appeal, which was published as a

¹ See Appendix L.

supplement to *Ons Land* and cabled to England ; and when this gentleman expostulated with his son, by letter from the Cape, he was answered by a retort to the effect that if he came up to the Transvaal to live there himself he would know all about it, and then hold very different views !

Yet in the face of all this Mr. Dieperink, Member of the First Volksraad for Witwatersrand, in June, 1899, had the cool effrontery to inform the Cape public, through the columns of the *South African News*, 'that there was the best of harmony between English colonials and the Transvaal.' Sons of the best Dutch families at the Cape and of prominent Bondsmen were regarded as Uitlanders in the Transvaal, and made to feel as strangers in the land.

Notwithstanding the close relationship and ties between the Cape Dutch and so many of the Uitlanders, the Afrikaner party at the Cape, repeating, parrot-like, the cry that 'Blood is thicker than water,' has refrained from opposing an oligarchy which was denying political rights to their own kith and kin.

With few exceptions, colonials, and until recently even Free Staters,¹ were made to feel as aliens. As a rule, if we except persons specially favoured in order to further the Republican aims, the only South Africans who became burghers did so either for the sake of official position or from business considerations. And the Afrikaner party at the Cape, notwithstanding their cry about blood-ties, as though the Dutch had a monopoly in such relationship, have ever been careless and indifferent regarding their immediate relations, yet professedly concerned about distant connections.

At this point I cannot but anticipate an objection which I feel sure will be raised against my remarks, on account of the circumstance that many South Africans

¹ See Appendix M.

or Dutch colonists have eventually been found fighting on the side of the South African Republic, although I assert that before 1899, as a rule, they were hostile to that State. This occurrence, it may be urged, disproves my contention that before the war the colonial Afrikaner did not side with the Pretoria oligarchy.

Let us look more closely into the matter. New-comers or Uitlanders, who have obtained burgher rights sufficient to entitle them to fight for the Republics, may be classed as follows:

(a) Those who became burghers prior to, say, 1890, about which time the Government of the South African Republic began to place disabilities in the way of the enfranchisement of newcomers. Under this category, of course, are included those whose burgher rights were secured by the British Government under Article XII. of the Convention of 1881, or Article VII. of the Convention of 1884.

(b) Those who for services rendered the State legitimately acquired burgher-rights—for instance, as a reward for services in the field in campaigns against natives. Under this head, also, may be included those who obtained the franchise for the part they played at the time of the Jameson Raid.

(c) Those who became burghers—prior to September 29, 1899, to suit their own purposes—*i.e.*, generally either for the sake of official position, business considerations, or in consideration of their political aims or views.

(d) Those Free Staters, including some who originally migrated from the Cape Colony or Natal, who were enabled to acquire burgher-rights after the Raid, about the time the 'Closer Union' idea, it might be said, necessitated it.

(e) A large section, some of whom individually might come under classifications *c* and *d*, who became

naturalized, and therefore (although not entitled to possess full franchise qualifications) were neither 'fish, fowl, nor good red herring,' and being able to claim no other allegiance were under the obligation to fight for the Republics.

(f) Those who became burghers under a *Volksraad besluit*, hurriedly passed, in accordance with an Executive Council's resolution to enfranchise all strangers who were willing and prepared to do active service in defence of the Republic. This law was passed on September 29, 1899 (twelve days prior to the declaration of war), as Mr. A. D. Wolmarans explained, 'to save a man from being treated as a rebel because, while being a British subject, he went to the front.'

With reference to naturalization in the Transvaal, it has for years been President Kruger's plan to insist upon naturalization as a step to be taken long before the franchise could be obtained under the ordinary franchise laws. This would be fair enough if full franchise privileges were certain, even after a reasonable probationary period. But the franchise laws ever since the Transvaal Government determined to exclude Uitlanders from political rights have always been hampered by impossible conditions. Thus, by his policy President Kruger has succeeded in ensnaring many, who were thus under the obligation to fight for the State although they could not possibly enjoy full privileges.

Amongst those living in the Transvaal at the time war broke out were many South Africans—persons not too well informed or enlightened—whose domestic ties or interests influenced their final decision. On the one hand there was loss and ruin staring them in the face. On the other, promises of gain and tempting inducements were held out to them if they would fight on the side of the Transvaal. It was pointed out to such that if they survived, whichever way the issue turned, they

would be at no disadvantage after the war, but, it was urged, if they deserted the so-called 'Afrikander-National cause,' and the Transvaal was in a measure successful regarding the final settlement, their future would be ruined. Another section through systematic misrepresentation as to the aims of the British Government were fully persuaded that England merely wished to grab the gold-fields. In support of this theory the Raid was played for all it was worth. So with the idea that the Transvaal could hold its own against England, many were persuaded to throw in their lot with the Boers against Great Britain.

Amongst those South Africans who, under classifications *e* and *f*, became burghers, a considerable number proceeded from the Midland, Eastern and Western Province districts, for the same reason that prompted so many rebels in the Northern and North-Western districts to join the enemy, *i.e.*, the plain and simple desire to drive the British out of the land. As the result of propaganda sedulously spread throughout South Africa by the Bond, its press, its pulpit, and certain of the colleges and schools, such an idea was entertained. Doubtless many erred through ignorance and evil influence, or a wrong conception of the position, and as the result of instigation and misrepresentation, have vague and indistinct memories of the 'abolition of slavery' and 'Slagter's Nek,' but their knowledge of the Transvaal question as it existed before the Bloemfontein Conference dates from the Jameson Raid. There was also a considerable number of rebels amongst the better educated from the Northern districts, as there was a small number, too, from the Western Province, who by their belief in, and connection with, the idea of successfully combating British supremacy readily joined the Boer side once the struggle began. For instance, Mr. Stiglingh, the

Bond Candidate for Parliamentary honours who opposed Mr. Rhodes at the polls at the Barkly West election, gleefully joined the enemy. About a year before this man challenged Mr. Rhodes in the Courts to prove that his election expenses were contributed to by the secret service funds of the Transvaal, and because—owing to circumstances which need not be entered into here—this was not proved in the Courts, much capital was made out of the fact by Mr. Rhodes's detractors and the Bond. Now the same individual who aspired to become a member of Her Majesty's Colonial Parliament becomes one of Her Majesty's 'registered-voter-rebels' instead.

With ultimate success assured to the anti-British combination, and the struggle raging, it is painful to reflect upon the extent to which disloyalty and rebellion would have spread in the Cape Colony.

But all this does not alter the fact that (without the position which Mr. Reitz's ultimatum created) during all the long years before and since the Raid, when President Kruger held the destiny of South Africa in his hand, the majority of colonials in the Republics were not disposed in a friendly way towards the Pretoria oligarchy or the Transvaal State. And that Republic, which, as before remarked, owed its very existence to the sympathy and support it received from the Cape Colony and the Orange Free State in 1881, persisted in treating the people from those parts in an unfriendly way.

There is ample evidence of the lively interest taken by some colonials—those who harboured no anti-British aims—on behalf of their relatives and friends in the Transvaal during the last seven years. But I would even go further. That feeling, I believe, influenced Mr. Rhodes in a way few recognise. I cannot but help thinking, not without reason, that it was

only when it became evident to Mr. Rhodes that (owing to President Kruger's fixed determination to go his own way, and not to co-operate with the general body of Afrikanders at the Cape) he became involved in schemes to hasten his desire of a United South Africa; and this for the good of that same Afrikander party which since the Raid has been instigated to hound him to destruction. Evidence exists that when the Reformers—with whom, but for the bungling of some of the Raiders, it is probable, in the minds of the public, Mr. Rhodes would never have been associated—had created a dead-lock at Pretoria at the end of 1895, it was Mr. Rhodes's idea that Mr. Hofmeyr should, with the High Commissioner and himself, have gone up to Pretoria to 'straighten things out.' If such were the case (and it is far more probable than that Mr. Rhodes would have planned such an impossible undertaking as the Raid in the way it was attempted), the inclusion of Mr. Hofmeyr in the party points to the desire on the part of Mr. Rhodes that, when a reconstruction was arranged, the Cape and the Afrikander party—which he and Mr. Hofmeyr at that time led—should have had a voice in the rearrangement.

I suppose the full facts regarding the Raid will never be wholly known to more than two or three, and I possess no special facilities for forming opinions other than the possession of public documents concerning it. But it seems inconceivable and unreasonable to think that the Raid as so many picture it, or as it occurred, can be attributed to one whose whole policy for years has been for the benefit of colonial Afrikanders.

CHAPTER V

THE CULPABILITY OF THE BOND CABINET

Ministers' oaths and obligations—The *Times* on Mr. Schreiner's opportunity—Mr. Schreiner professedly an Imperialist—Ministers' opposition to Imperial aims—Mr. Schreiner's neutrality—The Ministry and the Raid—The Raid responsible for the formation of new political parties—Mr. Schreiner as an opponent of the Transvaal—Mr. Schreiner (later) on franchise reforms—His opposition to Sir Alfred Milner—Mr. Schreiner on treason—The statutes on the same subject—The Premier and the Ammunition Question—The Premier and colonial defence—The Cape Government's apathy—The colonial force's inferior equipment—Mr. Schreiner recognises his true interest—The Premier and his 'protest'—Mr. Sauer's creed—'The Commissioner' at Dordrecht—Kroonstad assaults—Imperial control—Cabinet tyranny—Conclusions—The Astronomer Royal's testimony.

'I PROMISE and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty.'

So runs the oath taken by all members of the Parliament of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, and which therefore is sworn to by the Cabinet Ministers.

In this connection it is interesting to compare the old form of oath with that now in vogue.¹ To the lay mind it appears that the oath in its present form is sufficiently comprehensive.

For whatever opinion may be entertained as to

¹ See Appendix N.

whether the Bond Ministry have been false to their oath (as it obtains at present) or not, certainly they would be unable with truth to contend that they 'defended Her Majesty to the utmost of their power against all traitorous conspiracies whatever which had been made against her person, crown, and dignity, or that they had done their utmost to disclose and make known to Her Majesty all conspiracies and attempts against her or her crown,' especially as the oath was specifically taken without any 'equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation whatever.'

The Bond and Pretoria have proved themselves past-masters in the matter of secret reservation, equivocation, and prevarication.

Notwithstanding their obligations, so close an observer as Mr. Edward Dicey has recently written: 'It is, too, a matter for satisfaction that there has been as yet no overt action on the part of the Cape Ministry which, in as far as the public are aware, calls for any direct action on the part of the Imperial Government after the war.'¹ This question at a later date, I assume, will be a matter for serious consideration by the Crown. It is sincerely to be hoped that after the settlement the Bond Cabinet will have justice done to them. Their friends cannot desire more.

Shortly before the Bloemfontein Conference, the *Times*, in the course of a leading article on the colonies, remarked:

'Whatever may be the indiscretions committed in the ranks, it is, however, to the leaders of a party that it is right to look for a declaration of party policy. This is how Mr. Schreiner defined the situation in one of his late speeches: "My position is that I am the first Premier of a Ministry whose policy is on the lines of a South African party. By this I do not mean an Afrikaner Bond. It is an error to speak of us as a Bond Ministry. . . . Our party

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, November, 1899.

is the South African party. . . . There is not the least principle of disloyalty in this doctrine of self-government—nothing of the cutting of the painter or severing the connection. I claim to be a true Imperialist, and I wish it to be known as widely as possible.” . . . Mr. Schreiner has made a public profession of Imperialism. . . . The approaching crisis in the Transvaal is likely enough to furnish the occasion for putting profession to the test of practice.¹

Mr. Schreiner desires the declaration that he claims to be a true Imperialist to be as widely known as possible. Mr. Hofmeyr’s friends claim that *he* is one of our greatest Imperialists. It seems preferable to judge such Imperialists by their works and doings. So, to enlighten those in our other colonies or the old country who have not had the opportunity of observing South African affairs so closely as those on the spot, I desire to show—as I honestly believe to be the case—that the Bond Ministry, by its passive disloyalty, has not only encouraged open revolt in the Cape Colony, but has, from a military point of view, increased the difficulties of the Imperial Government.

Instead of strongly denouncing disloyalty—notwithstanding their profuse expressions of allegiance—the Bond Ministry and their followers (or, more truly, that body to whom they owe their place) have aided the party in South Africa whose aims are directly antagonistic to British supremacy south of the Zambesi, thereby opposing instead of supporting the Crown.

Although recent events have convinced many who before the war were sceptical as to the ‘aims of Afrikanerdom,’ and although less is heard now than formerly of the ‘little State of herdsmen,’² yet as responsible Ministers and prominent Bondsmen in South Africa, as well as such as Mr. Stead in England, talk of ‘the absurd struggle (*sic*) for paramountcy in South Africa,’ it may serve some good purpose

¹ The *Times*, May 16, 1899.

² Mr. Stead in *Review of Reviews*, July, 1899, p. 26.

to consider and carefully note the attitude of the Bond Ministry during the recent crisis. When the issue was forced, and British interests were in such serious danger, let it be remembered which side was taken by Her Majesty's responsible Ministers at the Cape.

Prior to the Bloemfontein Conference political aims, it might be said, were but matters of opinion. But when war seemed imminent, or was declared, the duty of Her Majesty's Ministers was clear. So long as they held office they were Ministers of the British Crown first, and Bondsmen afterwards. There was logically no middle course. They were either to aid the Crown or its enemies. The plea of apologists for the Bond Ministry, that as Bondsmen they were obliged to consider their party in such circumstances, is no more valid than one founded upon religious or other distinction. There is no ignoring the fact. They were Her Majesty's Ministers—and were either loyal or disloyal.

In influential quarters Mr. Schreiner and the company he keeps have been given credit for professing to desire to pursue a policy of neutrality or 'aloofness.' Knowing the influence of the leaders of the Dutch party over their followers (when earnestly exercised), with this opinion I cannot agree. But what shall be said when it is found that this attitude of neutrality has not been maintained? And what when assistance has been given rather to the other side? Mr. Schreiner has undoubtedly been placed in a difficult position, but the position is one of the Bond's creation, and Mr. Schreiner appears to have become enslaved to his party.

Allusion has been made to the responsibility of the Bond Ministry and the Afrikaner party since the Bloemfontein Conference, but it should be remembered

that their responsibility dates from even long before the Raid. From the time when so many Cape Colonists began to be numbered amongst the Uitlanders in the Transvaal, the responsibility of the Afrikaner party for the present trouble commenced. Had the Afrikaner party in the Cape Colony thrown their whole weight from the first on the side of the Uitlanders, South Africa would have been spared the horrors of war. And it should have done so, for the Cape was so largely represented amongst the new population. It was the fruit of the seed sown at the birth of the Bond which prevented it.

The Cape Ministry, whether called by Mr. Schreiner 'Bond' or no, is certainly not free, and is a jumble of inconsistencies. Had there been no Transvaal question, it would have been an interesting and amusing study to have watched its natural disintegration. The wish to further the aims of Afrikanerdom may have been the main idea which, amongst some of its members, affected all other considerations. But disappointed ambition, personal feeling and dislike, were the influences played upon by the Cabinet-framer and political 'boss' of the Bond, the Hon. Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr.

The wire-pullers of the Afrikaner Bond, fearful and jealous of Mr. Rhodes's influence, past and prospective, with the Afrikaner party, since the time of the Raid, have had one idea, and that was 'to destroy Rhodes.' But seeing that that gentleman rose above his troubles, they have contented themselves with endeavouring by every possible means to destroy his influence by swamping the Progressives at the polls. This same Afrikaner party now seek to discredit Sir Alfred Milner.

By the continual mention of the Raid, and by misleading the untutored Dutch as to the nature of Mr. Rhodes's association with the Raiders, and by a

campaign of calumny in the inspired Transvaal and Bond press, the simple-minded and unthinking have been taught only to see in Mr. Rhodes the enemy of Afrikaners. By such means, and by the influence of the Bond, with its various powers of persuasion and coercion, those Afrikaner members of Parliament who would otherwise again have associated themselves with Mr. Rhodes have been restrained. Instead of accounting for the assistance afforded the Reformers by Mr. Rhodes 'with his purse and influence,' and reconciling such assistance, and his connection with the movement, and the probable co-operation by Chartered forces (under very different conditions), with the declared aim of many years' patient work, and instead of recognising that those years of labour had been given ungrudgingly in the cause of a United South Africa, the sordid motive has been supplied that it was financial gain to himself and friends that made Mr. Rhodes consent to become compromised and entangled in the movement which is generally asserted to be responsible for the Raid. For the Raid, *as it occurred*, except for his own general admissions, Mr. Rhodes has not been proved responsible. Recognising that the past was irrevocable, and that, no matter whose the fault, his 'apple-cart had been upset,' Mr. Rhodes accepted and acknowledged responsibility for all. Instead of endeavouring to justify himself, and explaining, he suffered for mistakes other than his own.

But the Raid, however regrettable in itself, proved a godsend to the Afrikaner party. It closed up the ranks of rival factions in the Transvaal. It eclipsed such questions as the Church dispute, which in that State threatened to divide the burghers. As well as creating a diversion, it gave the Afrikaner party an advantage, which they quickly seized. But, although

by the Raid attention was diverted from the pressing need of reform within the Transvaal, the primary cause which was responsible for the position which rendered such an incursion possible still remained. The danger to the peace of South Africa resulting from misrule within the Transvaal and studied antagonism to British supremacy increased. And slowly but surely the while the 'aims of Afrikanerdom' were shaping themselves. The Raid was the single drop necessary to separate the constituent elements. The result was 'Bond and Progressive.' Owing to the subsequent attitude of the leaders of the Afrikaner party, whatever ills may be attributable to the Jameson Raid, it had the effect of clearing the issue, and drawing attention to the position. To the Jameson Raid can be traced the formation of the distinct political parties which now divide the electorate at the Cape. Before 1896 it was the 'Ins' *versus* the 'Outs,' with the Bond holding the balance of power, but shirking responsibilities as principals. Now, the Bond is of itself a recognised and responsible party. And there is no use blinking the fact that recently it has not only been Bond *versus* Progressive: it has been Afrikanerdom *versus* Imperialism; it has almost been (in fact, it *was* until last year, when the Imperial Government tackled the question in earnest) Kruger *versus* Rhodes. And whether Mr. Rhodes, after the Raid, should have been willing, as his detractors suggested, to weaken the Progressive party by withdrawing from the arena of active political life at the Cape or not, is neither reason nor excuse why prominent politicians now ranking themselves with Bondsmen, members of the present and former Cabinets, and, above all, British subjects, should transfer their influence from the Imperial to the Afrikaner side. To suit their own purposes, and to gratify petty personal considerations, it

can be seen how, under the influence of envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness, or of the party to which they owe allegiance, members of the Schreiner Ministry have gone back upon their convictions.

In 1895 Mr. Schreiner was willing and agreeable to go to war with the Transvaal over the opening of the Drifts.¹ Mr. Merriman, in 1885,² in no measured terms denounced the Bond, its abettors and all their works. In 1895³ and in 1896⁴ he still opposed and denounced the oppressors of liberty and justice and enemies of progress and reform (*i.e.*, the clique at Pretoria, whose aims were identical with their co-workers the Bondsmen of the Cape); and now⁵ Mr. Merriman, the oldest Parliamentary hand at the Cape, is associated with these same Bondsmen in office under the Premiership of Mr. Schreiner, one of the youngest of all Cabinet Ministers.

Did the Raid immediately transform the positions of right and wrong, liberty and oppression, and change the very meaning of the words? Or was Mr. Merriman conscious that, as the Progressives would have 'none of him,' he would be obliged to drop into political oblivion unless he allied himself with those who failed to 'co-operate with the Mother Country'?

It is noticeable that, generally, the Schreiner Ministry has, when interests clashed, rather aided the party whose cry has been 'Africa for the Afrikanders' than the Imperial cause. It is interesting to note and consider the actions of individual members of the

¹ See Appendix O.

² See Chapter III., p. 51.

³ In 1895 Mr. Merriman wrote a private letter (which, whether a privileged communication or no, I assume was none the less sincere) in which he expressed sympathy with the Reformers against the Pretoria oligarchy.

⁴ See Cape Hansard, House of Assembly, 1896, pp. 190, 191.

⁵ March, 1900.

Cabinet in particular cases. Regarding the primary question of reform in the Transvaal, the Governor of the Cape Colony plainly stated that 'the case for intervention is overwhelming,' and that no settlement could be considered 'adequate and satisfactory' which did not give immediate and substantial representation to the Uitlanders; yet when the Government of the South African Republic, after consultation with the Cape delegates,¹ submitted their franchise proposals to the Raad on July 7—proposals unknown in detail to Mr. Schreiner—that gentleman, on the evening of the same day, authorized the statement that 'his Government regarded the proposals as adequate, satisfactory, and such as should secure a peaceful settlement'; and at the same time Mr. Schreiner made the further announcement in the Government organs that 'this Government is convinced that no ground whatever exists for active interference in the internal concerns of that Republic.' The delightful simplicity of the Premier's statement was emphasized by the circumstance that he himself, through Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt, had for weeks before, with President

¹ Mr. Hofmeyr and Mr. Herholdt were despatched to Pretoria as special delegates from the Cape to show that the Bond Ministry could exercise greater influence over Mr. Kruger than Sir Alfred Milner. Had they secured the 'irreducible minimum,' the Bond Government would have 'crowed,' but they failed. Beyond witnessing the firing from the fort at Dasspoort of big and small guns, shortly afterwards to be used against the Government they represented, they did little worthy of note. The Schreiner Cabinet is as follows :

William P. Schreiner, Q.C., C.M.G., Prime Minister and Colonial Secretary.

John X. Merriman, the Treasurer.

Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, Commissioner of Public Works.

Dr. T. Nicholas German Te Water, without portfolio.

Albertus Johannes Herholdt, Secretary for Agriculture.

Richard Solomon, Q.C., Attorney-General.

Steyn, been 'actively interfering in the internal concerns of that Republic,' with a view to reforming its system of representative government. The further absurdity and inconsistency of Mr. Schreiner's declaration is seen by comparing his words at that time with his utterance during the previous session of the Cape Parliament. When the member for Victoria East pressed for consideration of the 'Cape boys' grievances, Mr. Schreiner said that if Mr. Garrett's allegations were correct it was an affair for the Imperial Government, and that the Colonial Government could not interfere. It must be remembered that the franchise proposals above alluded to were vague and unsatisfactory, and were declared by the semi-official Pretoria paper *De Pers* (or *The Press*), on the following day to which they were submitted to the Raad, to be such as it failed to understand, and to contain statements 'which were irreconcilable and incongruities which are puzzling in the extreme.'

In connection with Mr. Schreiner's opposition to Sir Alfred Milner regarding the franchise proposals, it is evident that *he* does not agree with Mr. Merriman's dictum before quoted, that when combating the Bond, or Afrikanerdom, it is necessary to co-operate with the Imperial Government.

Under ordinary circumstances, it is admitted, the Premier of the Cape Colony may hold views widely divergent from those of the Governor and High Commissioner. But when the issue of peace and war between the Empire (of which the Cape Colony is but a part) and another country trembles in the balance, and the Prime Minister of Her Majesty's Colonial Government virtually sides with those about to become the Queen's enemies, the border-line of treason is reached.

In the course of a debate in the House of Assembly

on the Ammunition Question, Mr. Schreiner remarked: 'Some organs of the press here and at Port Elizabeth had made accusations against the Government almost amounting to treason. Such charges,' he added, 'rolled off him like water off a duck's back.' But in the light of facts the charge does not seem to have been wholly unfounded. Under the statute law of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 'if any person shall within the colony wilfully deliver, or cause to be delivered, to any person whomsoever any gunpowder, arms,' etc., 'with the purpose, design, or knowledge that the same should or would be conveyed to and made use of by the Queen's enemies . . . such person shall . . . be deemed and taken to have committed by such delivery an overt act of High Treason, and shall upon conviction suffer death as a traitor.'

Mr. Schreiner allowed large quantities of arms and ammunition to be delivered to the Orange Free State when we were on the brink of war¹ with the South African Republic, well knowing that that State had a treaty of alliance with the Orange Free State, and that, as was the case, in the event of war, the ammunition would be used jointly by the burghers of the two Republics against Her Majesty's forces. Therefore Mr. Schreiner's only alternative to being open to the accusation of High Treason is that he had no knowledge that those to whom he was forwarding arms and ammunition would become the Queen's enemies, as he expected and hoped for a peaceful settlement. However, at the time arms and ammunition were

¹ On August 28, 1899, Sir Gordon Sprigg, in the course of his speech on the Ammunition Question, said, 'We are what may be called on the brink of war,' at which date ammunition was still being forwarded by the Cape Government Railways to the Free State.

being allowed passage through the Queen's dominions and over Her Majesty's Colonial Government's railways, so imminent did hostilities appear that the Portuguese Government, it will be remembered, at that time refused to allow war stores destined for the South African Republic to pass through Delagoa Bay.

It surely is not unreasonable to expect that the action of the Government of a British colony should not be less friendly than that of a foreign Power. And here an important question suggests itself: Was it not the fact that the Cape Government allowed war stores passage through its territory that made the Portuguese Government see the uselessness of stopping importation through theirs? Let it be granted, for sake of argument, that Mr. Schreiner *was* of opinion that war would not result: this does not absolve him from his responsibility. Why did he not take Sir Alfred Milner into his confidence? When the Ammunition Question was raised in the House of Assembly, Mr. Schreiner, by implication, admitted that the High Commissioner had not been consulted in the matter, although the assurance was wrung from him that no further permits for the removal of munitions of war would be granted without the concurrence of Sir Alfred Milner. In Mr. Schreiner's endeavour to justify his action, he dragged in the Customs Union Convention, and alluded to his unwillingness to infringe the provisions of that agreement. But if the question was of sufficient importance, as Mr. Schreiner implies, to give rise to such considerations on his part, why did he not share his responsibility with the High Commissioner? On the one hand was action calculated to aid the Queen's enemies, on the other—a delicate point in high politics. Although, in deference to that gentleman's cognizance of law, one hesitates to assert that the action taken by Mr. Schreiner, Q.C., was treason-

able, he cannot be excused for not consulting Her Majesty's representative. This is the very charge which was made by Mr. Rhodes's bitterest enemies against him at the time of the Raid. 'Why did he not,' it was urged, 'take the High Commissioner into his confidence?' It must be admitted that, although such a question is reasonable, Mr. Rhodes's position as Premier of the Cape Colony, as managing director of the Chartered Company and De Beers Consolidated Mines, and as an owner of large Transvaal interests, was one of extreme delicacy, involving as it did not only so many conflicting interests, but the entanglement of his colleagues and superiors. In Mr. Schreiner's case there were no such delicate considerations.

It is in some respects somewhat misleading to attach too much importance to dates with reference to the despatch of arms and ammunition to the Republics; for although the matter was discussed in the House of Assembly about the end of August, and although war was not declared until October 11, yet from the time of the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference (early in June) war was imminent, and from that time the Republics were adding largely to their stores of war material and provisions. Knowing what we do know now of subsequent events, of the battle at Belmont, and the stand the Boers made in that vicinity, it is interesting to note that Mr. Schreiner, in the course of his allusion to the importation of ammunition by the Free State, admitted that ammunition was sent to Belmont, where it had been temporarily detained by the Cape Government, owing to an informality, 'a few weeks' before August 25.

The question naturally suggests itself, Why was the Orange Free State accumulating ammunition near Belmont at that date? A glance at the map and the rail-

way lines gives rise to unpleasant thoughts in the light of later occurrences.

Closely allied to the Ammunition Question is that of Colonial Defence. There is no doubt that in this matter the Schreiner Cabinet deliberately evaded and neglected its duty, and, whether intentionally or no, unmistakably played into the hands of the anti-British combination.

Had the Cape Ministry co-operated with the Imperial authorities from the first, and acted with the same promptitude as the Natal Ministry, the railway might have been kept open to Mafeking, and certainly neither Vryburg nor Modder River Bridge need have fallen into the enemy's hands. Had Kimberley and Mafeking depended upon the Colonial Government for their defence, they at the commencement of the war would have shared the fate of Vryburg. Mr. Schreiner is the Ministerial head of the Defence Department of the Cape, and when the bands of Boer marauders overran the northern districts of the colony in the early stages of the war, the colonial forces, as regards equipment, were utterly unfit to take the field. The Cape Volunteers were as eager to go to the front as those of Natal, and it was the fault of neither the officers nor the men that they were unable to move with the first advance of Imperial troops. They could not possibly have done so, even if it had been desirable or necessary.

It has been officially recorded that 149,000 rifles have recently been imported into the South African Republic,¹ and it was well known for many months prior to the war that, in the words of one of the anti-British party, 'there were enough guns in Pretoria to arm the Afrikaner nation.' Notwithstanding this and the known fact that burghers in both the

¹ C. 9,530, p. 9.

Republics—to say nothing of Dutchmen in the colonies—possessed rifles equal to those of the British troops,¹ the Colonial Volunteers, when war broke out, were still in possession of the Martini-Henry, a rifle quite outclassed by that of the Boers.

The *Kimberley Advertiser*, three months before the war, in the course of its criticisms of the Blue Book on colonial defence, pointed out how unprepared the colonial forces were for any emergency, and how, 'if they were pitted against any enemy but badly-armed natives, they would be, by reason of inferior armament and inadequate equipment, hopelessly outclassed.' The Lee-Metford rifles which were issued to the volunteers after war broke out were in store in the colony for more than a year before hostilities commenced. Possibly, as was said of the 2·5 cannon which, no thanks to Mr. Schreiner, eventually arrived in Kimberley in time to materially strengthen the defence of that place, it was considered an 'inopportune moment to move guns about the country, considering the unsettled feeling and existing tension.' It thus appears that the Cape Government approved of the conveyance of guns and war material about the colony for the use of the Republics, but not for Her Majesty's forces! The 2·5 guns above mentioned were sent to Kimberley in direct disobedience of Mr. Schreiner's instructions; and further, although hardly credible, it is nevertheless true the Colonial Government sent no ammunition for the guns in question. Had it not been for the Imperial Government, the guns at Kimberley would have been useless for want of it.

Mr. Schreiner all this time was drawing remunera-

¹ The author heard Dr. T. N. German Te Water (Bond), Minister without portfolio, allude to the British forces as the 'other side,' and claim (with apparent satisfaction) superiority for the Boer rifle.

tion as a Minister of the Crown, and had interests to protect in relation to which his responsibility was as that of a trustee. This being so, it is no excuse that he did not expect war. And in this connection, surely, the Bond leaders at the Cape, holding secret and open communication with the governing clique at Pretoria, were as well informed as Mr. J. B. Robinson in England, who declared that he knew war was certain after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference.

So sensitive was the Cape Ministry that a communication was sent by the Government from Cape Town to the effect that Civil Servants at Kimberley were to hold aloof from warlike preparations, as it was the desire of the Cape Government to remain neutral in any struggle that might take place.

In the closing weeks of 1899, and subsequently when it was evident that the British Government was determined to enforce its policy and prosecute its military operations to a successful termination even after reverses, and when the Empire declared itself so unmistakably in earnest, Mr. Schreiner, it must be admitted, by his proclamations exhibited some appearance of loyalty; but there exists such a studied consideration of the susceptibilities of the Afrikaner party that the effect of his exhortations to the disloyal waverers amounted to next to nothing.

A striking commentary on the times is the fact that Mr. Schreiner considered it necessary to precede the Governor's proclamation of martial law within certain areas of the colony by apologizing for and excusing its necessity. In the Premier's prefatory telegram to all resident magistrates and Field-Cornets, Mr. Schreiner alludes to 'the present unhappy war, and these deplorable hostilities.' But it is in the Prime Minister's extraordinary 'Protest' addressed to President Steyn that he reveals his sublimest simplicity. After ex-

pressing his 'surprise and regret that the Free State commandoes had invaded and annexed colonial territory,' Mr. Schreiner says he can scarcely believe such action had President Steyn's sanction, and that he must 'protest' and remonstrate against it. Mr. Schreiner then pathetically adds that 'the people of this colony have not deserved such treatment (!), and may thereby be misled into conduct for which they may suffer very heavily.' Had Mr. Schreiner any understanding with President Steyn, the non-fulfilment of which excited surprise? Whether or no, this was clearly a case where prevention was better than cure, and useless formal protests in no way released Mr. Schreiner from his responsibility for the guarding of interests it was his highest duty to protect. Mr. Schreiner's ambiguous utterances, and his previous telegrams and actions, certainly lend colour to the aspersions which are freely made as to the genuineness of his loyalty to the Crown. But of this, no doubt, the Imperial Government possess certain knowledge. A bad impression was created by Mr. Schreiner apparently waiting until the Republics' case seemed hopeless before he remembered his duty towards his Queen.

Whatever doubts may exist as to Mr. Schreiner's loyalty, there is no mistaking Mr. Sauer's attitude. His was the winning side. According to the official accounts of his speech to the Dordrecht meeting, it was to his and his hearers' interest to remain loyal. Mr. Sauer is loyal, 'for he himself hath said it.' And whether he consented to allow coal or railway-carriages belonging to the Government of Her Majesty's Colony of the Cape of Good Hope to be appropriated before the war, for the use of those about to become the enemies of his Queen, he, like Gilbert and Sullivan's hero, if not to, for the sake of, his credit, 'remained an Englishman.'

It is difficult to treat a man seriously who is so insincere as the Honourable Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, but, by the semi-official report of the address Mr. Sauer delivered to the meeting, 'composed principally of Dutch-speaking Afrikaners residing in the district of Woodhouse,' it appears that he 'was "conferring" with the inhabitants as to their duty in view of their trying circumstances.' Mr. Sauer is reported as having spoken for three-quarters of an hour, so much must have been uttered which did not find its way into print, and which, doubtless, would have proved interesting reading to his critics.

However, from what *was* reported, it can be learnt *inter alia* that Mr. Sauer was glad to give the meeting advice; that he was persuaded that mere numbers would be of no avail to the Republics against the British Empire; that, although many of his hearers would not agree with him, England must and would be victorious; that he sympathized with the Dutch, and that everyone knew his opinion about this 'unnecessary war'; and last, but not least, that he was certain that if they remained loyal the British Government would be bound to pay them compensation. Possibly Mr. Sauer knew his hearers best, and was fittest judge of the choice of words. The unpleasant fact remains, however, that four days after this Cabinet Minister made his remarkably sympathetic speech, and, if I mistake not, the very day after his passage through the town on his return journey, whether owing to his reported or unreported utterances I know not, the Boers entered Dordrecht, where they were enthusiastically met and welcomed by Mr. Sauer's friends.

Regarding the Kroonstad assaults, the Bond Government showed itself a ready apologist for those of whom any civilized Government should be ashamed.

When the matter of the assaults at Kroonstad,

Orange Free State, made on British subjects travelling to the Cape Colony for refuge, when the Republics were at peace with the colony and Great Britain, was brought to Mr. Schreiner's notice, he assumed a very indifferent attitude, and in this matter, also, appeared too ready to take the part of those hostile to Great Britain and her subjects. The question was brought before the notice of the Government in the House of Assembly on October 10, 1899, by which date accounts of the assaults had already appeared in the public press. On the afternoon of that date Mr. Schreiner publicly stated that neither the Government nor the Railway Department had any information regarding the alleged treatment. Considering that particulars of the assaults were spoken about and known by the public some time previously, and that even sworn declarations had been made and handed to the Imperial authorities on the previous day, it seems strange that the Premier of the Cape should, with all the sources of information available to him, have been so ignorant of what had occurred, or that he should have been so ready to make light of the occurrence.

The cause of the assaults was that the refugees left the trucks or carriages for the purpose of obtaining sustenance on their long and painful journey. For this they were lashed and assaulted by armed Boers of the Free State, although they offered no provocation, and although no state of war existed between the Republics and Great Britain.¹ Women in the crowded trucks, in some instances, gave birth to children, passengers were spat upon, and in one case, of which I have particulars, the father of a thirsty child was beaten back to the train, only to witness the death of his child from thirst, although water was obtainable at the station at which he endeavoured to procure it.

¹ Blue-book Cd. 43, pp. 107-112, 142, 143.

It is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss fully whether, considering all things, it has been advantageous to British interests that a 'Bond' rather than a 'Progressive' Government was in power at the time of the outbreak and continuance of hostilities. With a loyal Ministry the border districts could have been enabled to defend themselves, but probably in that case the Bond opposition would have influenced the Western districts for ill. One thing is certain, and that is, that by the proclamation of martial law¹ over so great a portion of the Cape Colony, and by the military control exercised in the administration of the railway, postal and telegraphic departments, the power to thwart Imperial desires has been so greatly reduced that, however unwilling some members of the Ministry have been at times to co-operate with the Imperial authorities, their power to effectually hinder the Home Government has been reduced to a minimum. And by the Bond Ministry remaining nominally in power constitutional opposition by the Afrikaner party throughout the country has been rendered almost impracticable. But in other departments of the civil administration a species of what the *Cape Times* calls 'Cabinet Tyranny' has been possible. This much is known, that by using the civil administrative power always possessed by the party in office, rebellious and party aims have been furthered. In fact, it has gone so far as to be an

¹ Great noise is being made by the section in the colony which has proved itself disloyal over certain cases where, owing to the exigencies of the position, hardship in individual instances has been suffered by some of the Dutch population. Possibly cause of complaint exists in some cases. But you cannot make omelets without breaking eggs. And, after all said and done, the hardships suffered by the comparative few about whom such capital is being made is out of all proportion when compared with the losses and hardships, to say nothing of indignities, suffered by loyal British subjects in the Cape Colony through the action of rebels.

absolute breach of privilege. And to such an extent has disloyalty flourished, that in and around Cape Town it has been necessary to guard posts of importance by night and day, to say nothing of the almost entire railway system within the colony.

In concluding this chapter, I think I cannot do better than reproduce the words of a level-headed, observant and trusted Imperial servant, who has lived in the colony long enough to have formed mature opinions. On the occasion of the Scottish gathering last St. Andrew's Night (November 30, 1899), Dr. Gill,¹ the Astronomer Royal of the Cape, in proposing the toast of 'His Excellency the Governor,' observed that :

'In the history of the British colonies no Governor had ever been placed in greater difficulties ; but in spite of a support of the most shamelessly feeble character, and in spite of a want of understanding at home, His Excellency had not only had to originate and carry out a policy, but he had to instruct the whole nation in the dangers which threatened, and the means which were necessary to remove that danger.

'When His Excellency came to this colony he found it honey-combed with sedition. He found a canting loyalty, which aimed at the overthrow of British supremacy in this colony, and not only in this colony, but in South Africa as well. He thought, personally, that it was a very good thing that the Republics had declared war. There had been a mighty lot of misunderstandings in this country, a mighty lot of mealy-mouthed loyalty, that did not mean loyalty at all, and a mighty working to overthrow the power of Englishmen (and Scotchmen) in this country—first of all, to bring them into contempt with the native population ; secondly, to deprive them of all political power ; and, thirdly, to deprive them of all material power. Sir Alfred Milner had had the greatest difficulties to contend with. They had had a Minister² who had gone to the front, but it was a remarkable fact that since that Minister had gone to the front the accessions of colonists to the ranks of the rebels had been tenfold greater than they were before he went. Yet Sir Alfred Milner had carried out his work in the face of innumerable difficulties.'

From the foregoing it will be seen that the aims of Afrikanerdom have in no inconsiderable measure

¹ Now Sir David Gill, K.C.B.

² Mr. Sauer, *vide* p. 93.

been directly, as well as indirectly, furthered by paid Ministers of Her Majesty's Crown Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.

In the future, with the further evidence which doubtless will be at the disposal of the historian of these times, it will be possible to pronounce a clearer or more decided judgment; but at present, to the average loyal British subject in South Africa, who has merely noted the actions and utterances of the Bond Ministry as revealed by the public press during the present crisis in South Africa, it seems clear that Her Majesty's responsible Ministers of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope have not only been false to their trust, but even guilty of disloyalty to their Queen.

CHAPTER VI

BOER APOLOGISTS

Transvaal independence guaranteed—Imperial policy—As propounded by Mr. Chamberlain—And Sir Alfred Milner—No conspiracy against the Republics—Factionous spirits and petty spite—Boer apologists—Mr. Stead—Mr. Bryce—The Transvaal and the Drifts Question—Transvaal armaments before the Raid—The Free State and treaty obligations—Steyn's duplicity—'The Transvaal never responsible'—Britain always made to appear the aggressor—The *South African News*—Its 'refutation' of the conspiracy 'theory'—The Bond's half-hearted repudiation—And its most recent policy—The Dutch Church and the conspiracy—The Moderamen's manifesto—Truth must prevail—A prophecy.

IN one chapter of a small volume like this it would be impossible in detail to deal comprehensively with all the various pros and cons put forward by Imperialists or Boer apologists with reference to the conspiracy 'theory,' and other allied questions, so it will be my endeavour to confine myself to the statements of some of the most eminent of those who espouse the Boer cause in England, as well as in South Africa, particularly where their remarks have reference to the 'aims of Afrikanerdom,' and the desire of the so-called Afrikaner party to undermine and destroy British supremacy in South Africa.

But before commenting upon the denials by Boer apologists of the existence of any conspiracy on the

part of the Afrikander National party in South Africa against the paramount Power for the benefit of those who, like Presidents Kruger and Steyn, on the other hand, allege that there existed a desire on the part of the British Government to dominate the Dutch population, or to destroy the independence of the Republics, it may not be out of place to recall to mind the words of the chief exponents of the Imperial policy.

When Mr. Chamberlain gave utterance to his weighty words on the occasion of the farewell dinner to Sir Alfred Milner, who, as the representative of the British Government, was about to leave England to study and face the South African problem; when Sir Alfred Milner met President Kruger at the Bloemfontein Conference; and when, after the failure of that Conference, Sir Alfred Milner read his reply to the deputation of prominent South Africans which waited upon him at Cape Town on his return—all these were occasions particularly suitable for a plain and candid declaration of Imperial aims. And the aims *were* clearly declared.

Mr. Chamberlain, in the course of the speech above alluded to, declared that ‘the common interests of the two races (in South Africa) were immeasurably greater than any differences which unfortunately existed.’ At a later period in his speech Mr. Chamberlain’s remarks showed, not only that the policy of the Imperial Government was to advance and further the welfare of all parties—Dutch and English alike—but also indicated that, so far back as March, 1897, he must even then have had full knowledge of the aims of the Afrikander party.

In speaking of the idea of an independent federation of States, in which Dutch influence would be predominant, Mr. Chamberlain said :

'It is an aspiration which cannot be accepted by the people of this country, and until it is frankly abandoned there cannot be a final and satisfactory settlement. But short of this, we are ready now, as at all times, to give the fullest and most favourable consideration to the wishes and sentiments, even to the prejudices, of all parties in South Africa, and to co-operate with them in all measures for the good of the whole community.'

Had the leaders of Afrikanerdom only recognised the full import of these words, and frankly abandoned their illusive dream, peace would have been assured, and the two races might have furthered their common interests by the peaceful development of South Africa for the benefit of all of its inhabitants. The British Government determined to break the dominion of 'Afrikanerdom' only when 'Afrikanerdom' challenged British supremacy.

In his opening remarks, Sir Alfred Milner, on the first day of the Bloemfontein Conference, in emphasizing his conviction that by the friendly consideration of the Uitlander and his grievances by Pretoria differences could in time be amicably settled, said :

'It is my strong conviction that if the Government of the South African Republic could now, before things get worse, of its own motion, change its policy towards the Uitlanders, and take measures calculated to content the reasonable people among them, who, after all, are a great majority, such a course would not only strengthen the independence of the Republic, but it would make such a better state of feeling all round, that it would become far easier to settle outstanding questions between the two Governments. I know' (continued Sir Alfred Milner) *'that the citizens of the South African Republic are intensely jealous of British interference in their internal affairs. What I want to impress upon the President is, that if the Government of the South African Republic, of its own accord, from its own sense of policy and justice, would afford a more liberal treatment to the Uitlander population, this would not increase British interference, but enormously diminish it. If the Uitlanders were in a position to help themselves, they would not always be appealing to us under the Convention.'*¹

¹ C. 9,404, pp. 14, 15.

On the following day Sir Alfred Milner said :

‘As to the question of the independence of the country, I remain firmly convinced that the things I am urging upon the President are calculated to strengthen it. Of course I may fail to convince the President of that ; but I protest absolutely against the view that he is defending the independence of his country, and that I wish to take it away.’¹

To the deputation of colonists above alluded to, Sir Alfred Milner replied :

‘No doubt it is a difficult business to get different races to pull together inside one body politic. That is the problem all over South Africa. But it is solved in other parts of South Africa more or less. It would be solved altogether, and for ever, if the principle of equality could be established all round. It is the one State where inequality is the rule which keeps the rest in a fever. . . . I see it suggested in some quarters that the policy of Her Majesty’s Government is one of aggression. I know better than any man that their policy, so far from being one of aggression, has been one of singular patience, and such, I doubt not, it will continue. But it cannot relapse into indifference.’²

Such evidence as is afforded by these statements of Mr. Chamberlain and Sir Alfred Milner,³ coupled with the declarations of members of the Imperial Cabinet, including Lord Salisbury himself, and the consideration of what has occurred, should convince any but the prejudiced, or ‘the factious spirit which would sacrifice national interests to secure the defeat of an opponent or a personal triumph,’ that England’s aim has not been the destruction of the independence of the Transvaal or the oppression of any one class.

The Cape Colony, as well as England, contains factious spirits who would and have sacrificed their country’s interests to secure the defeat of an opponent. But even below such as these we have, amongst the conspirators and their co-workers, those whose only ‘national interest’ is a rebellious aim, and who do not

¹ C. 9,404, p. 23. ² C. 9,415, p. 17. ³ Refer also to p. 188.

hesitate to stoop to insinuate that England's leading statesmen and soldiers are thieves, liars, or rogues;¹ while the editor of the *South African News* writes, as he did in his leading article of January 29, 1900, of 'Mr. Chamberlain's stupid incompetency,' and that 'whether Sir Alfred Milner finishes his term or leaves South Africa before his term is up, no courtier in the press or out of it can hide the fact that he has been a colossal failure.' Sir Alfred Milner's offence is that he has seen behind the canting loyalty of the Afrikaner Bond, and the falseness of their thankless hearts. And if, as in the case of his two great predecessors, Sir George Grey and Sir Bartle Frere, Sir Alfred Milner be recalled in consideration of the exigencies or immoralities of party politics, or should his policy be reversed or even modified, greater trouble than ever will be in store for South Africa. Enough has been sacrificed in the past through studying the susceptibilities of an unworthy class. *In the future it is to be hoped that Loyalists will merit some consideration.*

In considering Boer apologists in England, it must be remembered that many like Mr. Montague White, Mr. F. R. Statham, and Dr. Clark, are no more disinterested than Dr. Leyds. Such as Mr. Labouchere and Mr. Stead must have been in Mr. Chamberlain's mind when he spoke of 'the factious spirit which would sacrifice national interests to secure the defeat of an opponent or a personal triumph.' They, too, are not worthy of serious consideration. Poor Mr. Stead, with all his enthusiasm! If he be sincere, he *is* in a quandary. An admirer of Mr. Rhodes; a hater of Mr. Chamberlain; a champion of liberty and justice; a devotee of the Boer cause; a friend and former co-worker of Sir Alfred Milner and Mr. Garrett, but an enemy to their policy; a reputed lover of truth;

¹ Strong words these, but the insinuations have been freely made.

an admirer of Olive Schreiner; the 'little State of herdsmen's' apostle of conciliation, and one who indeed seems to imagine himself a veritable prince of peace.

Under the heading of 'Five Points,' the *South African News* printed the following in its issue of January 26, 1900 :

'Here are five points about the war, as sent to a correspondent by the Right Hon. James Bryce, M.P., who is, we believe, the only man of Cabinet rank in either Government or Opposition who has been right through South Africa and looked into the problem for himself :

'(1) That the idea of a general Dutch conspiracy is absolutely baseless, unsupported by evidence, and, in fact, an afterthought ; (2) that the war might have been avoided by a little more skill and a common share of patience ; (3) that the actual and recorded course of events justified the Transvaal in believing we meant to strike, and their weakness therefore fully explains their striking first ; (4) that the Boer preparations for war since 1895 show not (a) that they meant to attack, but (b) that they expected to be attacked by ourselves, as after the Raid they well might ; (5) that the action of the Free State was no surprise—we knew of their treaty obligation—or, at any rate, ought to have been no surprise.'

These statements having escaped me in the home papers, I will assume that Mr. Bryce is correctly reported, although only on the evidence of the *South African News*.

Statements of so eminent and distinguished a writer as Mr. Bryce command respect, and, in agreeing to differ with the right hon. gentleman, I can do no better than say that, at least, 'I may claim my right to state my view,' to use the words of Mr. Bryce himself at the Imperial Institute last December.¹ And in claiming this right I will go even further in my demand for consideration, and state that, though possibly in a general way less keen an observer than the

¹ The *Times*, weekly edition, December 15, 1899.

right hon. gentleman, yet I claim to have a far greater and more intimate personal knowledge of South African conditions and affairs.

(1) With regard to the assertion of Mr. Bryce, 'That the idea of a general Dutch conspiracy is absolutely baseless, unsupported by evidence, and, in fact, an afterthought,' I am content to allow my readers to judge. At all events, the evidence I adduce is principally afforded by the conspirators themselves. I may hazard the opinion that after the conclusion of the war further damning evidence will accumulate.

(2) 'That the war might have been avoided by a little more skill and a common share of patience.' This I concede in full. But Paul Kruger has ever lacked common-sense and patience, except when others have had to do the waiting. Although cunning and persistent, President Kruger is not a clever man. Mr. John Mackenzie, Sir Charles Warren, Mr. Rhodes, Mr. Chamberlain, and Sir Alfred Milner, have each in turn out-generalled Paul Kruger. It is when dealing with weak men or those who, unconscious of his duplicity, are foolish enough to trust him, that he has 'scored.' We Uitlanders, many of whom have personally witnessed his 'tantrums' in the Raad,¹ know

¹ An amusing but pitiable incident occurred on November 30, 1898. President Kruger desired a railway past farms in which he was interested, lying between Pretoria and Rustenburg, while the most desirable line to Rustenburg was the extension from Krugersdorp. By the Krugersdorp - Rustenburg line the Rustenburg farmers would have been placed in close touch with the best markets, and would have connected with the Main Reef line of railway running from Krugersdorp to Boksburg, between which the great gold deposits of the Witwatersrand lie. The previous session the Raad had decided that their decision should be dependent upon the memorials received from the Rustenburgers themselves. Fourteen hundred burghers memorialized for the Krugersdorp extension, and about nine hundred for the Pretoria line. President Kruger, the man who says the voice of his burghers is supreme, on

of his 'patience.' On the other hand, for evidence of the patience of the British Government, I am content with that of Sir Alfred Milner,¹ Mr. J. Rose-Innes, Q.C.,² and Mr. Solomon,³ none of whom, by fair-minded

this occasion remarked that had every memorial been in favour of Krugersdorp he would have opposed it. He declared it was impossible, on account of an understanding arrived at with the Free State, and called upon the Executive Chamber walls to witness his statement. Mr. Van Wyk denied that the Free State Convention prevented the Krugersdorp extension, and thought the best markets should be tapped. He said he happened to have seen the Free State Government independently, and they denied entertaining any objection to the Krugersdorp route. When the Chairman, who sided with Paul Kruger in this jobbery, was appealed to and asked whether the Free State had been written to on the matter, he evaded the question, and made some allusion to a verbal assurance. Mr. Dieperink, who doubted the statements of the President and Chairman, desired that if there were any correspondence on the matter between the Governments, it should be laid on the table. Why, he asked, could it not be produced? He, too, said he had discussed the subject with the Free State Government's representative; and he also had a verbal assurance, but of quite a different nature to that of the Chairman! Hereupon Mr. Loveday, in following up his contention that there was no objection to the Krugersdorp line, which was the natural route, asked Mr. State Secretary Reitz, who had subsequently entered the Raad, whether the Free State really objected to the building of the line from Krugersdorp. Mr. Reitz emphatically declared there was no objection on their part whatever. Pressed further, Mr. Reitz repeated his assertion, and stated that he was present when the subject was discussed between the two Presidents. President Kruger then vehemently controverted the statement of Mr. Reitz, and threatened resignation. If he were untruthful he had better resign, and so on. It was his old game—bluff and bullying, but the resignation never 'comes off!' Mr. Reitz then explained that 'he did not know that His Honour had spoken on the matter in the morning, otherwise he would never have dared to contradict him, but he was unexpectedly called into the Raad?' (*Vide Standard and Diggers' News*, December 1, and *Star*, November 30, 1898.) Such was the lying and jobbery practised by the highest officials of the State.

¹ p. 191.

² p. 28.

³ p. 27.

critics, can be called 'Rhodesite men'—a term coined by the *South African News*, and applied to all those who differ from themselves.

(3) Mr. Bryce says 'that the actual and recorded course of events justified the Transvaal in believing we meant to strike, and their weakness therefore fully explains their striking first.' If by a determination on the part of the British Government to secure rights and obligations due under the very conditions under which self-government was restored to the Transvaal (even, as a last resource, at the cost of a war)—if by this Mr. Bryce means 'we meant to strike,' and if, after all the promises from the British Government that the independence of the Transvaal would be maintained if it fulfilled its obligations, it can still be said that, in requiring their fulfilment at any cost, 'we meant to strike,' then, in common fairness, Mr. Bryce is right. Once the Republics meant to challenge British supremacy by force of arms, they cannot be blamed for choosing the most advantageous time and opportunity. But believing, as I am forced to do, that 'Afrikanerdom' intended to challenge British rule in South Africa when the favourable time offered, such shams as the Industrial Commission in 1896 and the Bloemfontein Conference in 1899¹ are

¹ It is apparent to those acquainted with Pretorian methods that President Kruger never intended to give a fair franchise at the Bloemfontein Conference. President Kruger went to Bloemfontein to see what he could *get*, not give. A story is told which, whether true or not, is a good one, and probable, considering how much has been conceded to him in the past. It is said that President Kruger, in chuckling to some friends on the eve of the Conference over his past successes when he met British Administrators, counted them on the fingers of his hand, and, beginning on his fourth finger, said: 'First there was Bartle Frere, then Robinson, then Loch, and then Robinson again; and now there's Milner.' After having come to his first finger for 'Robinson again,' owing to the loss of his thumb there was nothing to count upon. He paused awkwardly,

not only indefensible, but justified the British Cabinet in determining to obtain a final settlement of questions which, considering British interests in South Africa, could not have been allowed further to remain undecided; and by the exercise *on the part of the Transvaal* of 'a little more skill and a common share of patience,' the difficulty could have been settled peaceably.

(4) 'That the Boer preparations for war since 1895 show not (a) that they meant to attack, but (b) that they expected to be attacked by ourselves, as after the Raid they well might.' Yes, '*since 1895,*' but the intrigues with other Governments before and during 1895, the planning of forts for Pretoria, and the importation of German officers, *all before the Raid*, are what require explanation, and could only be taken as menacing acts towards the paramount Power in South Africa. The warlike preparations of the Transvaal could only have been indulged in with the idea of fighting Great Britain—Great Britain, the Power to whom the State first owed its being—the Power by whom its independence was restored—and the Power by whose protection and indulgence its independence had been maintained, and by whose Government it had again and again been further guaranteed. England desired rights for her subjects in the Republic such as she freely gives to Dutchmen in her own colonies, and pledged herself to maintain the independence of the Transvaal. The Transvaal preferred to fight rather than abandon class legislation and principles which were a disgrace to a Republic, and were at variance with the first principles of true republicanism.

then seriously said: 'Ah, yes! now there's Milner. Well, we will see.' We did.

Some misapprehension exists regarding Boer armaments and the time they first assumed alarming proportions.

The arming of the Transvaal to any alarming extent, or the arrangement of preliminaries for this, dates not from the Raid, but from the time of the Drifts Question.¹ When Great Britain demonstrated that even if the employment of force were necessary the Transvaal could not be allowed to violate her treaty obligations, and when Pretoria was forced to open the Drifts for the importation of oversea goods, then it was that the Government of the Transvaal awoke to the fact that Great Britain was determined to dispute any claim of paramountcy in South Africa but her own. And when, later, the repeal of the Aliens' Immigration Law was demanded, and the naval demonstration at Delagoa Bay was made, President Kruger became alarmed as well as convinced that at last 'Afrikanderdom' would have to contest the position to which it aspired. These were the considerations which largely influenced the further arming of the Transvaal, although even prior to the Raid intentions had been made apparent which would have justified remonstrance from the paramount Power. The Raid furnished an excellent pretext for what, in furtherance of its consistent policy, the Transvaal would otherwise have done. The Transvaal Government knew after the renunciation and denunciation of the Raid by Great Britain that it could never be repeated; indeed, immediate steps were taken to render a similar undertaking impossible. Pretoria, nevertheless, not only made

¹ It will be remembered that the then Cape Cabinet, which included Mr. Schreiner, unanimously pledged themselves to the Imperial Government to assist and co-operate with Great Britain in whatever military operations were undertaken to enforce the British demands. See Appendix O.

great capital out of the incursion, but never lost an opportunity of hinting at the possibility of its recurrence. Thus the excuse and pretext for much which otherwise was indefensible was seized by the Transvaal, and the Raid made responsible for all.

Monsieur C. Boissevain, who assumes the right to speak as one having authority, in his open letter to the Duke of Devonshire published in the Amsterdam *Algemeen Handelsblad* of January 7, 1900, in support of his contention that the Boer armaments were insignificant prior to the Raid, quotes Major White's memorandum referring to a visit he made to Pretoria in 1895, and says: 'That is surely conclusive evidence.' This conclusive evidence, however, is somewhat shaken by General Joubert, who boasted that the real armaments of the Transvaal were kept a profound secret, and that such as Major White saw were exhibited only to deceive.

Monsieur S. Léon, the artilleryist and eminent French engineer who was wounded by the Kimberley sharpshooters shortly before the siege of that place was raised, landed at Cape Town early in 1895 on his way to Pretoria in connection with fortifications and armaments for the Transvaal Government.¹

It cannot thus be said that the Raid was responsible for the visits of such experts, nor the contemplated erection of forts in 1895 to cost many hundreds of thousands of pounds,² as the Raid did not take place till December 29, 1895. Yet on the face of these facts Boer apologists assert that the Raid was responsible for the forts! This is an important question, as such

¹ Monsieur Léon was the agent of the Creusot Works. The late Colonel Villebois de Mareuil, General with the Boer forces, I am informed, in a letter to *La Liberté*, extolled Monsieur Léon, and said he was one of the ablest artillery officers that he had ever seen.

² See Appendix B.

forts and armaments could only have been thought of for use in defiance of Great Britain.

(5) 'That the action of the Free State was no surprise—we knew of their treaty obligation—or, at any rate, ought to have been no surprise.' Mr. Bryce is not the only one who has gone wide of the facts in this connection.

After considering the evidence available, it will, I believe, be admitted that the British Government up to the last had ample justification for the belief that the Orange Free State would not have sacrificed its independence by taking the fatal step it did.

Sir Alfred Milner cannot be blamed if he thought that Mr. Steyn and Mr. Fischer were sincere in their desire to co-operate with the Imperial Government to maintain peace, rather than act with the South African Republic to further its hostile aims. But now it is impossible to come to any other conclusion than that Messrs. Steyn and Fischer were playing a double part all the time, or that Mr. Steyn's influence and support had been secured by Mr. Kruger long before even the Bloemfontein Conference.

Apart from secret undertakings or considerations, the only known binding obligation the Orange Free State can urge in defence of the action taken by its Government was the Treaty of Bloemfontein.

In 1897 the Potchefstroom Treaty was superseded by the so-called Closer Union Treaty, which was signed at Bloemfontein on March 17 of that year. The principle contained in the former treaty, requiring the one State to assist the other when their cause was just, was again acknowledged, although the wording was slightly altered.

Under Article II. of the new treaty the Republics were bound to support each other only when *the inde-*

pendence of the two States was threatened or assailed, and, even then, there was no binding obligation, unless the cause was just.¹ The independence of neither State was in reality threatened nor assailed; and the resistance of claims made by the British Government on behalf of the Uitlanders—claims which were acknowledged by Afrikanders as valid and fair—cannot by any stretch of imagination be called by the Republics a ‘just cause’ for war.

The two articles bearing upon the question are so ingeniously framed that the treaty itself is made as little responsible for any action which might be taken by either State as is the construction placed upon the articles, or as little responsible as any underhand agreements or undertakings which might have been in existence or agreed upon in connection therewith. It was ever thus with Boer diplomacy.²

But, again, Sir Alfred Milner cannot justly be blamed if he read the Bloemfontein Treaty in its most reasonable light, and if he thought that, taken in conjunction with the following telegram, which President Steyn sent to Mr. Schreiner a few weeks before the declaration of war by the Republics, the evidence was stronger in favour of the Free State abstaining from war than of its rushing headlong to extinction.

On August 28 President Steyn telegraphed to Mr. Schreiner as follows :

‘With reference to the discussion regarding the importation of arms and ammunition for the Orange Free State, I believe that no assurance from my side is necessary to contradict the ridiculous, false, and malicious reports that there exists in the mind of this Government or this people any intention or contemplation of taking up weapons in any aggressive or offensive manner against the British Government or any British colony or territory. It is now still, as always, a fixed principle that the Free State will

¹ See Appendix P.

² See Appendix Q.

never have recourse to weapons otherwise than when attacked, or in defence of its precious rights or in support or in fulfilment of its obligations. I utter only the desire of the whole of the people when I say that no means will be left untried by me to preserve peace in South Africa and advance fellow-working in harmony in regard to that matter. I see no reason why those points of difference between the British Government and the South African Republic cannot be settled by peaceful methods, and I remain of the conviction that to have recourse to arms upon differences such as those which exist would be to commit an offence against civilization !¹

And when forming an opinion as to the justification of the Government of the Orange Free State in its consenting to become involved in a death-struggle in which it had everything to lose and nothing to gain, an important consideration is the circumstance that more than one half of the population of the country were against 'closer union' with the Transvaal, or war itself, although in its Raad a majority was influenced by President Steyn and declared itself in favour of both these evils. The responsibility for the consequence of President Steyn's actions may be measured by the ruin and misfortune he has brought upon an independent and peaceful State, not in the cause of liberty and justice or for the good of its inhabitants, but for the furtherance of his political aims. Aptly has Mr. Steyn been called the 'villain of the piece.'

It will be observed that Mr. Steyn said, 'It is now still, as always, a fixed principle that the Free State will never have recourse to weapons otherwise than when attacked, or in defence of its precious rights or in support or in fulfilment of its obligations'; and in the Closer Union Treaty it is stipulated that resistance is to be offered and mutual support given 'in case the independence of the *two* States may be threatened or assailed, unless the State which will have to extend

¹ Cape Hansard, House of Assembly, 1899, p. 332, and Blue-book Cd. 43, p. 28.

such support points out the injustice of the case of the other State.' And in the famous ultimatum it is asserted that 'having regard to the occurrences in the history of this Republic which it is unnecessary here to call to mind' (presumably the Raid, which had been discountenanced, denounced, and repudiated by the Imperial Government), 'this Government feels itself obliged to regard this military force in the neighbourhood of its borders *as a threat against the independence of the South African Republic.*'¹

From this it will be seen to what subterfuges had Mr. Reitz to resort, so that his Government 'felt itself obliged in the interest not only of this Republic, but also of all South Africa' (!), to justify his declaration of war,² and yet the Moderamen representing the Dutch Reformed Church imply that Great Britain is responsible for the war.

A careful comparison of the Closer Union Treaty, the correspondence between the Republican leaders and Great Britain, and the ultimatum itself, shows how carefully the Boers' political plans were laid for war, with the ultimate view of blaming Great Britain for the result; and the first part of the manifesto nominally issued by the Moderamen of the Dutch Reformed Church last February, as well as revealing the hand of the Bond dictator, bears evidence of collusion with the Republican schemers.

¹ At the time the Boer ultimatum was launched the number of Imperial troops in South Africa did not exceed 9,000 of all ranks, a number insufficient, as it proved, to guard even the Cape railways from rebels within the colony, while the number of armed burghers ready to take the field at a moment's notice numbered over 40,000.

² Note the use of the words, 'of all South Africa.' Mr. Reitz gives the whole game away by using these words. 'Afrikanderdom' and the Transvaal evidently regarded themselves as the Power responsible for all South Africa.

Mention has frequently been made in this volume of the *South African News*. An apology is almost due to my readers for quoting or mentioning such a print so often. But I do so for various reasons. Whenever any evidence against the 'Afrikander National,' or anti-British party, is found by a Loyalist in the *South African News*, similar feelings are experienced as would be by an Uitlander who saw his grievances admitted by the Pretorian *Volksstem*, the *Standard and Diggers' News*, or the Bloemfontein *Express*. It is obviously preferable to quote their own organs. And considering that in the same manner *Ons Land* represents and propagates Bond inspired opinions, to be read in the country by the Dutch Afrikander population in the Cape Colony, the *South African News* does, though possibly in a less decided tone, amongst the town and village Bondsmen, so it can be understood that its utterances are not without their significance. The *South African News* undoubtedly takes a 'lead' from the wire-pullers of the Bond.

Recently I had a conversation regarding what I designated the 'aims of Afrikanderdom' with a Bondsman who is intimately connected with the *South African News*.¹ My contention was that sufficient evidence to prove an anti-British conspiracy existed. A day or two afterwards I was interested to observe, in its issue of January 10, in the shape of a leading article in the *South African News*, under the heading of 'Three Points,' a laboured refutation of what is called the conspiracy 'theory.' The gist of the article was that, according to the *News*, there were three points which should convince 'English fellow South Africans' that they should 'urge Britain to offer possible terms before attempting the invasion of the Republics.' This after the invasion by the Republics of British territory!

¹ *Vide* p. 53.

The first point was the sincerity of the so-called Republicans. If a man breaks into your house, destroys and lays waste your possessions, let it all pass; he is sincere. This reminds one of George R. Sims' 'Bold Bad Man,' who exclaimed, 'And when I go marauding, you can bet I *do* maraud.' Such is the doctrine of the *News*.

'Secondly, we appeal,' says the *News*, 'to South African Britons (*sic*) to dismiss from their minds for ever the stories of a Dutch conspiracy.'

Thirdly, it was urged that, as the subjugation of the Republics was such a huge task, 'all South Africans, English not less than Dutch, should steadfastly press for the offer of possible terms before the invasion of the Republics is attempted.' Then arbitration is again advocated.¹

Other portions of the article in question will receive notice elsewhere; meanwhile, it is particularly interesting, and to the point, to consider its second portion. The *South African News* then gives its reasons why Britons should dismiss for ever the idea of a Dutch conspiracy. In brief, they are as under, to which I append my remarks in parallel columns.

The S. A. News, Jan. 10, 1900:

(a) 'The devoted loyalty of the Dutch Cape Colonists, more especially during the five or six weeks preceding the arrival of our armies here, whereas had there been the least truth in the conspiracy theory those colonists would have risen against Britain.'

This 'devoted loyalty' was exemplified by the 'Dutch Cape Colonists' in the districts of Vryburg, Barkly West, Taungs, Herbert, Phillipstown, Colesberg, Albert, Aliwal North, and Herschel, going over to the Boer side wholesale, while a good sprinkling went from other parts. The Bond press proved itself disloyal, while thousands

¹ See Appendix R.

of 'Dutch Cape Colonists' remained passively antagonistic, and watched the course of events. The 'Dutch Cape Colonists' rose against Great Britain whenever they had opportunity of joining hands with the two hostile States. And so loyal were the 'Dutch Cape Colonists' that every mile of the railways of Her Majesty's Colonial Government had to be guarded day and night against the hostile acts of the evil-disposed of those same colonists, who, notwithstanding these precautions, on many occasions damaged the line. The *News* says that if there had been the least truth in the conspiracy theory the 'Dutch Cape Colonists' would have risen against Great Britain. As 'Dutch Cape Colonists' *did* rise against Great Britain, according to the logic of the *News*, they must have been in the conspiracy, and if they were 'in' it a conspiracy must have existed.—Q.E.D.

(b) 'The Navy Vote.'

By a careful study of the debates and proceedings on the Naval Contribution Bill, the devoted loyalty of these 'Dutch Cape Colonists,' it will be seen, resolved itself into the whole-hearted support of Mr. Schreiner alone, who of all the Afrikaner party was the only one who spoke decidedly in favour of the motion brought forward in Parliament. (See Appendix S.)

(c) 'The consistent action of the Afrikaner members who have been in the majority in

The consistent action of the Afrikaner party for years past is thoroughly in accord with the

Parliament these many years past.'

declared aims of Afrikanerdom and with the idea of overthrowing British supremacy. The Afrikaner members are dominated by the wire-puller of the Bond, Mr. Hofmeyr.

(d) 'Mr. Hofmeyr's splendid services to the Empire.'

These, unfortunately, are not specified sufficiently.

[In reply to a letter I addressed to the editor of the *South African News*, in which I requested to be informed what the services were to which he principally alluded, I was told (*vide South African News*, January 15, 1900):

'Principally his services at various South African and Imperial Conferences, his efforts to draw the Empire closer by means of a Customs Union, and his services in averting war over the Banjailand Trek. More generally, his constant efforts to elevate and advance his countrymen by means of education, and his sparing us and our descendants incalculable misery by taking the line he has in native policy—opposing the vicious proposals, such as that to permit farmers to lash their servants without taking them before a magistrate, which Mr. Rhodes and other self-styled Progressives supported by speech and vote. Best of all, by fighting Mr. Rhodes when he found out his true aim and character, and thus showing the permanent European dwellers in South Africa that, unless they wish to become the chattels of a few powerful cosmopolitan financiers, they must rouse themselves, and fight those men, and keep on fighting them.'

It is to be regretted that the Bond is so swayed by personal aims that the policy recommended by its organs should be to fight a man rather than a policy. But briefly let us consider these additional reasons which are supposed to indicate that Mr. Hofmeyr has rendered such valiant services to the Empire.

Mr. Hofmeyr's services, according to the official records, appear to have been directed in securing for the colonists at the Cape, the majority of whom he has declared to be Dutch, an all British cable and

advantages in the way of trade facilities or protection. The Bond evidently prefers British cable communication, etc., for the same reason as it prefers British naval protection—because it considers it the best in the market. It may be remarked that at the London Colonial Conference Mr. Hofmeyr spoke against the idea of an ocean penny postage. He stated that many of the colonists never communicated with Europe. Thus, it appears to be the Afrikaner rather than the Empire that Mr. Hofmeyr desires to serve. Mr. Hofmeyr's 'services' at the time of the Banjailand Trek show that he was averse to the Transvaal becoming involved in complications with Great Britain at a time when neither 'Afrikanerdom' nor the Transvaal was prepared for the contest. So he rather approved of the Transvaal securing a substance in Swaziland for a shadowy claim in the North. Regarding education, Mr. Hofmeyr and the Bond have not endeavoured to 'elevate and advance their countrymen by means of education,' but to 'educate' them by means of *Ons Land*. Through the means of this seditious Dutch organ he has 'educated' and misled the back-country farmer, so that he looks upon the British Government as an evil to be combated, and the Jameson Raid as the beginning of the Transvaal trouble.

Regarding the Strop Act, Mr. Rhodes desired a more efficient and serviceable labour law. The Bond itself, in its declaration of principles (Art. IV., Sec. C), declared itself in favour of an efficient Masters and Servants Act. Mr. Rhodes's desire was to supply this.

In connection with native labour, Mr. Rhodes is one of the few South African politicians who has faced the Native Question, and is one who can claim credit for effecting good and practical results. Witness his Glen-Grey Act. Mr. Rhodes, too, has reason to be

well satisfied with the success and progress of his native policy in Rhodesia, and also with the working of his system in De Beers Consolidated Mines at Kimberley. Regarding the assertion that Mr. Hofmeyr's best service is that of fighting Mr. Rhodes, this may be so. Paul Kruger's best service has been to consolidate an empire. But in the declaration of the *News* its 'game' is revealed. From personal conversation with Cape Bondsmen, I am aware, without this further admission, that one of the aims of the Bond leaders, and of its organ the *News*, is to 'fight Rhodes and keep on fighting him.' 'We must crush him,' said to me one not unconnected with the *News*, one day, 'as we would crush a reptile.']

(e) 'Mr. Reitz's offer to waive the Free State Presidentship in favour of that uncompromising Imperialist and fine specimen of God's Englishman, Sir George Grey.'

(f) 'The wonderful progress of the English tongue both in and out of Parliament during the last dozen years, and so forth.'

'But if all these were non-existent' (continues the *News*) 'there are two other reasons which, we submit, must banish the conspiracy "theory" from the minds of men who are capable of being convinced by facts. We do not remember these reasons being publicly stated hitherto in this controversy.'

'The first is that the Transvaal offered to send a commando to the rescue of British settlers in Rhodesia in 1896, when they were attacked by savages.'

Mr. Reitz, even if he made the offer, had no authority to do anything so unconstitutional. However, if the offer were made, unless there were some remote chance of its acceptance and sanction by the Raad and burghers, the alleged 'offer' alone hardly disproves the fact that a conspiracy existed.

Had the editor of the *News* said the 'Dutch tongue,' he would have spoken more truly.

The South African Republic may have desired ultimately a finger in the Matabeleland pie. But the 'offer' was as if Mr. Rhodes, at the conclusion of

the war, should offer Oom Paul a cottage on Groote Schuur estate in which to end his days. Had the *News* stated that when the settlers in Rhodesia in 1896 were attacked by savages, these same savages in many instances were armed with rifles bearing the mark of the Government of the South African Republic, procured through Transvaal officials, and that they had been instigated in their rebellion by persons intimately connected with Transvaal officialdom, that paper would have aided those not conversant with the facts better to understand the true position.

‘The second and infinitely the most important of the many reasons is that after the Raid both Republics passed resolutions through their Raads asking Britain to abolish the Chartered Company and assume direct control of Rhodesia. Consider the significance of that request. We are told that the South African Dutch aimed at driving the English into the sea, yet so far from that being the case that (*sic*), in the most direct and official manner possible, the Republics asked—nay, implored—Britain to come further into Africa—to come officially and permanently into Rhodesia.’

This ‘most important’ reason fails to disprove the conspiracy theory. President Steyn says he evacuated Bloemfontein for strategic reasons. If he even invited Lord Roberts to come to Kroonstad, that is no proof that it is not his intention or desire to rout him or drive him out of the country eventually. As a matter of fact, after the Raid such motions as alluded to were introduced in the Legislative Assemblies of the Cape Colony, Transvaal, and the Free State, but not Natal. That is, in all parts of South Africa which proved anti-British when the trial came. However, these debates, as the records show, savoured more of personal attacks on Mr. Rhodes and his interests than against a principle or corporate body. Possibly the Transvaalers would prefer to fight Imperial rather than irregular colonial or Chartered forces.

‘How can any fair-minded nation talk of a conspiracy in face of such facts?’ asks the *News*. To which I reply, How can one give up the idea for the sake, or in the face of, such arguments? ‘If we deal with Dutch South Africa on the basis of belief in such a conspiracy,’ continued that print, ‘our final and disastrous failure in South Africa is just as sure as the rise of to-morrow’s sun.’

In a sense the opinion of the *South African News* counts as nothing, but in as far as the opinions quoted at such length may fairly be considered as a public and official refutation of the conspiracy ‘theory’ by some of the conspirators themselves, it will be acknowledged that they are worthy of notice. If these pro-Boer intriguers and apologists can inspire no better refutation of the conspiracy ‘theory’ than the above production, judgment, I fear, will go by default. In their floundering they cut a sorry spectacle.

But, to consider the matter from another standpoint, assume, for sake of argument only, that no anti-British conspiracy has existed, and that the Bond favours no such idea. Why does it not come forward boldly and openly, and in denying the imputation denounce the proposition? Why is the Bond’s attitude so persistently unfriendly to the paramount Power,¹ and why so persistently favourable to the anti-British party opposing that Power? And why does that institution harbour amongst its members ministers of religion and members of Parliament, men who desire to ‘throw off the yoke’?—the ‘yoke,’ *Ons Land* openly declares, under which the majority of the Afrikaner nation in the colony go bent. Why do the utterances and actions of the Bond’s leading members lend colour to the supposition? Why do its organs, like *Ons Land* and the *South African News*, give evidence of their dis-

¹ See Appendix T.

loyalty by cunningly devised but seditious utterances? And, last of all, why does the Bond now, while the war is raging, frame resolutions for consideration at the approaching Bond Congress which are calculated to embarrass the Imperial authorities?¹ In short, if the Bond is loyal, why is it disloyal?

The *South African News* of January 31, 1900, under the heading of 'The Conspiracy Theory—Mr. Balfour shatters it completely,' gives prominence to the following, which, by the vague way it appears, may either be the letter of the London correspondent to the *Leeds Mercury*, dated January 10, or its own London letter. However, by the headlines, which undoubtedly are those of the *News*, an example is afforded of what the defenders of the conspirators have to resort to in their endeavour to disprove the existence of a conspiracy. And here it should be remarked, with reference to the word 'conspiracy' itself (although it be known that private, exclusive, and secret meetings of Afrikaner Bondsmen have often been held), with 'Afrikanerdom' imbued with the one idea, resulting from the spread of Bond propaganda, when it only needed the political leaders to create a 'position' in which by united action the Afrikaner party could throw off the yoke, a conspiracy, in one meaning of the term, was superfluous. Where a large body have a common desire or aim, it might be said there is no necessity to 'conspire.' They act, after having laid plans. Without splitting straws, the Bond's desire was to free the whole of Afrikanerdom from the foreign yoke. But to return to the columns of the *News*.

'After the fatal exposure,' so the letter runs, 'in the House of Commons of Mr. Chamberlain's culpable diplomatic bungling, it became evident that the Colonial Secretary was going to rely,

¹ February, 1900. See Appendix T.

when the day of reckoning came, on the theory of an Afrikaner conspiracy throughout South Africa. . . . This pretty scheme Mr. Balfour incontinently shattered by declaring that he and the Cabinet had never dreamed that the Orange Free State would join the South African Republic in a war against England.'

In the previous pages I think it has been demonstrated that the weight of evidence was strongly in favour of Mr. Balfour's declaration that the Orange Free State would not join the Transvaal in a war against Great Britain. Its treaty obligations, as well as the obligation entailed by the President's written word, were good foundations for Mr. Balfour's belief.

On March 1, 1900, a supplement was printed in the English language and circulated in the Dutch newspaper, the Cape Bond organ, *Ons Land*, headed 'The Dutch Reformed Church and the Boers.' About the same date it was published in the *South African News*, and, according to the statements of the press, was cabled to England. If so, it would be interesting to learn the history of the contribution towards the expenses incurred to the cable company. The production contains between seven and eight thousand words, which surely would not be defrayed by the Reformed Church funds.

It is a case of history repeating itself. Nearly twenty years ago, when the suitable moment offered, representations were made to invoke the sentiment of a conscientious and influential section calculated to side with the pious Boer. The document above alluded to was evidently 'nursed' until the tide of war turned against the Boers. Then, as another attempt, this manifesto was issued to enlist the sympathy of a sympathetic class. The cloven foot is revealed in the tail (to use a devilish bad simile), when we read: 'It rests with the Christians of England to make themselves heard.' It is devoutly to be hoped that the

‘Christians of England’ will not be misled by persons who have aided the Queen’s enemies.¹

As the Moderamen of the Dutch Church have elected to bring in the question of the missionary and the native in the Transvaal, it may be as well to remind the ‘Christians of England’ of the matter before alluded to regarding the treatment of natives by the Boers. The State Attorney of the Transvaal, Mr. Smuts, in open Raad declared that it was not a dishonouring sentence if a man should be convicted of flogging a native to death! If the Christians of England could but have been made aware of the details of the injustice of the treatment of natives by the Boers in Swaziland and the Northern districts of the Transvaal, they would have risen up and demanded that under the Convention, on that question alone, Great Britain should interfere and intervene, although the treatment of its natives by the Transvaal would have been a matter of ‘internal affairs.’

Near the top of the third column of the first page of the Moderamen’s manifesto will be found quoted the words, ‘It is therefore unreasonable and immoral to rake up the past,’ and yet about three-fourths of their whole production is nothing but raking up the past, and a plausible one-sided statement, containing many suppressions of truth and suggestions of falsehood.

Much might be written regarding the partisanship of the political parsons whose names figure at the foot of the Moderamen’s manifesto. It may, however, be sufficient, at this juncture, to refer them to Matt. x. 26.

Although this is not the place in which to reply in full to the manifesto in question, yet under the

¹ The present is not the time to reveal all that is known. But when the final settlement of accounts is made, at least one of the signatories of the Moderamen’s manifesto will be revealed as an enemy of his Queen.

particular head of 'Accusations' much is written which cannot be allowed to pass without comment in this chapter. Here, again, it might be said some of the aiders and abettors of the conspirators are on their defence.¹

Let them be heard. Again I must resort to parallel columns :

MODERAMEN'S MANIFESTO.

'ACCUSATIONS :

(a) *Conspiracy.*

'Meanwhile, accusations have been freely made against the colonial and republican Dutch which, in our opinion, cannot be borne out by fact.'

'It has been said that, before the outbreak of hostilities, a combination against Her Majesty's Government existed among the Dutch-speaking of the Queen's dominion.'

'No proof for such an assertion has been forthcoming ; not a trace of such a conspiracy has been found to exist.'

'Knowing South Africa intimately, coming into daily contact with its people, speaking on behalf of thousands and tens of thousands of our church-members, we maintain, without fear of contradiction, that the paramountcy of Great Britain was unchallenged and undisputed by Her Majesty's subjects of Dutch extraction before the war.'

The accusation is against the anti-British, and the justness of the accusation is being, and will be, borne out not only by statements of fact, but by criminal convictions.

Yea, and more : this combination included members of Parliament, some of whom have not only shown strong sympathy with those about to become the Queen's enemies, but have even joined the rebels.

Many traces exist. As regards proof, the present is hardly the time to boast.

The Moderamen show either that they are thoroughly out of touch with those for whom they profess to speak, or that they speak falsely. (*Vide* Appendix I.) If Her Majesty's subjects, of any extraction, had challenged her supremacy by overt action 'before the war,' they would have been promptly arrested as rebels, as many have been, *and convicted*, since the war.

¹ I speak not without reason.—F. W. B.

'The proposal carried by a Dutch majority in the Colonial Parliament to contribute £30,000 per annum to the strengthening of the British Navy met with universal approval, and may confidently be considered as an indication of Dutch loyalty to the throne.'

'And the fact that the colonial Dutch petitioned for peace before the outbreak of hostilities should not be forgotten. Strange, surely, that those who were so eager for peace are now considered plotting against Her Majesty's authority in South Africa.'

'To the very last the President of the Free State acted as mediator. Only when every effort had failed he and his people joined the ranks of their Transvaal brethren.'

'Truer words were never penned by Sir Alfred Milner than when he wrote in June, 1897: "I have no doubt the same loyalty has been displayed in other parts of the Empire; but *it appears to me* to be of peculiar interest under the special circumstances of this colony and in view of recent events" (the Jameson Raid), "which, as you are aware, have caused a feeling of considerable bitterness amongst the different sections of

It is a deliberate untruth to say that the proposal met with universal approval. It did not. And that the grant was carried does not prove loyalty on the part of the Dutch majority. (See Appendix S, on 'Naval Contribution Bill.') On the contrary, overt acts of treason and rebellion are far stronger indications of 'Dutch loyalty' to the throne.

It is, however, not strange, but perhaps natural, that those who *were* plotting and were disconcerted by Sir Alfred Milner's astuteness before the plot had time fully to mature, now desire a peace which may enable the plot to be rehatched.

This mediator's biased mind and violent partisanship are shown by the remarkable production he published simultaneously with the expiration of the Transvaal ultimatum, when no proposals were before the South African Republic. (See Appendix U.)

Sir Alfred Milner's words are sufficiently guarded, and the testimony was not unqualified, as can be seen from the words I have italicized. But the question is this, Which carries most weight—an early or amended opinion? Even five months before the war Sir Alfred Milner wrote: 'A certain section of the press' (the section alluded to happens to be a section of the *Dutch* press), 'not in the Transvaal only, preaches openly and

the community. All I can say is that, *as far as I am able to judge* (1897), these racial difficulties have not affected the loyalty of any portion of the population to Her Majesty the Queen. . . . It was impossible to doubt that the feeling of loyalty among all sections is much stronger *than has been sometimes believed.*'

'This testimony we heartily endorse, because we are convinced that attachment to the British throne has hitherto been a characteristic of the colonial Dutch.'

'Moreover, when we consider the patience with which the large and overwhelming majority of the Dutch, even in districts where martial law has been enforced, has borne the trying irritations and annoyances to which they have been subjected since the beginning of the war, to speak of an organized conspiracy in our opinion is the height of absurdity.'

'Sympathy with kith and kin in the Republics is surely no proof of disloyalty. The absence of such sympathy would be unnatural in the highest degree. Condemnation of the policy of Her Majesty's Government which has led to the war we share with hundreds of Her

constantly the doctrine of a Republic embracing all South Africa, and supports it by menacing references to the armaments of the Transvaal, its alliance with the Orange Free State, and the active sympathy which in case of war it would receive from a section of Her Majesty's subjects;' and since that date it has been His Excellency's painful duty to report to Her Majesty's Government that all the border districts have risen in rebellion.

The later testimony I have above quoted is the more convincing, being founded on further observation and maturer judgment. If the attachment to the throne is a characteristic, why do the Dutch papers advocate throwing off the yoke?

This is mixing up cause and effect. Martial law was only enforced in districts where, owing to the rebellion of these subjects, the proclamation was necessary. Obviously, the opinion of Boer sympathizers, when at the same time they have strong anti-British tendencies, is worthless.

One of the kith and kin of one of the signatories of the manifesto was in the Transvaal. He was an Uitlander—an alien. This son of one of the rev. gentlemen of the Dutch Reformed Church wrote: 'I am not in sympathy with the Government at Pretoria, and

Majesty's loyal subjects in the United Kingdom. But holding this opinion is surely no indication of disaffection, nor can it be honestly regarded as the outcome of an attempt to undermine the influence of Great Britain in South Africa.'

'Freedom of conscience and freedom of speech are considered to be the birthright of free nations. Have British subjects in South Africa no right to their opinions, and the free expression of them,¹ without being

resent the false and untenable position in which I am placed in this State.' When the 'republicans' are 'backed up' through thick and thin, and Great Britain is said to be always in the wrong, the inference is obvious, whether a man be an Irish Nationalist or a Dutch Reformed minister.

Then, according to this, the Transvaal has no claim to be designated a free nation. Freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and freedom to the press is granted to all in South Africa, Dutch and English alike, under

¹ To such an extent did the Afrikaner party avail itself of free institutions that on the very last day of the Session, on June 24, 1897, Mr. Van der Walt asked the following questions, presumably in the interests of 'Afrikanerdom':

- (a) The number of Imperial troops in South Africa.
- (b) How many had arrived during the subsequent twelve months.
- (c) How many were on the way.
- (d) And whether it was the intention to station any at Kimberley or Mafeking.

The acting Prime Minister supplied the required information, which was to the effect that there had been an increase of 2,000 odd troops during the year over the former total; that the number in South Africa was 8,785; that there were no reinforcements on the way; and there was at that time no intention of stationing troops at either of the places named. The political position at that time was grave and unsettled. Mr. Van der Walt got his information. So did the Republics. Mr. T. L. Grahame, Q.C., M.L.C., and a former Attorney-General of the Cape, at Claremont, on March 30, in the course of his allusions to rebel members of the Cape Legislature, thus spoke of this same Mr. Van der Walt: 'Then there was another gentleman, Mr. Van der Walt. He had been a member of Parliament since 1884, if not longer. He was one of the most loquacious men in the House, and he was never so

accused of disloyalty to their Queen and her throne?

'As if to emphasize the loyalty of Dutch colonists, Mr. Chamberlain himself at the South African dinner on May 21, 1896, quoted with approval the address to Lord Rosmead, signed by sixty-five members of the Cape Parliament, in which they stated as their profound conviction "that there need be no apprehension whatever of the existence of any spirit of hostility in the minds of the Afrikaner people against England if South Africa be left to work out its own destiny." They pleaded strongly for "a policy of moderation and conciliation, which alone can secure the real progress and true happiness of South Africa." These words have not yet lost their meaning, and may be pondered by all who have the welfare of South Africa at heart.'

British rule, but these are denied by the Transvaal alone of all South African States and colonies.

It would be interesting to hear Mr. Chamberlain on the loyalty of the Cape Dutch at the *next* South African dinner. However, regarding addresses signed by members of the Cape Legislature, an address signed by fifty-eight members of the Cape Parliament was handed to Sir Alfred Milner for transmission to Her Majesty the Queen on September 28, 1899. The second paragraph of the reply sent to the petitioners stated that 'Her Majesty's Government, in their policy towards the South African Republic, have not been unmindful of the sympathies and interests of Her Majesty's subjects of Dutch descent in South Africa. One of the main objects of that policy has been to secure for the non-Dutch inhabitants of the Transvaal similar rights and privileges to those enjoyed by the Dutch in the Cape Colony, and to maintain that equality between the white races which prevails everywhere else in South Africa.'

eloquent as when he was protesting the loyalty of the Dutch-speaking inhabitants of this country. When the [Boer] commandoes arrived at Colesberg, he welcomed them and he made a speech. He told them that, as an old member of the Cape Parliament, he had experienced the tyranny of the British Government, and welcomed the Vierkleur, and said the time had arrived when every Afrikaner should fight shoulder to shoulder.' For other free 'expressions of opinion,' refer to Appendices I and V.

‘To the loyalty of the colonial Dutch before the outbreak of hostilities we bear willing testimony, and we solemnly declare that we have never met with the slightest trace of a conspiracy to oust the British from South Africa.’

‘Whether our people will continue to resist the severe strain upon their loyalty after the indignities to which many of them have been exposed since the commencement of the war we cannot undertake to predict.’

‘We sometimes fear—and our fears are not altogether unfounded—that, unless wiser and more conciliatory counsels prevail, the Dutch of the Cape Colony, hitherto as loyal as any of Her Majesty’s subjects in any part of her Empire, may be driven into disaffection. The issues of this war are not in our hands, but we pray that the Almighty may so guide Her Majesty’s Government in the future that a people hitherto strongly attached to the British throne may not be forced into dislike and distrust of British rule.’

However *willing* the testimony may be, it carries no weight. Such testimony may be very necessary for the misguided flock after the war.

They had not resisted it up to the date of the manifesto.

From men who should be leaders of thought and opinion such words seem dangerously near to encouraging or inciting rebellion; and it is a remarkable and significant fact that a few days after the distribution of the manifesto here quoted, although the Republican forces were diminishing through adversity and discontent, a fresh outbreak of rebellion in the North-western districts occurred.

This, then, is the refutation of the conspiracy ‘theory’ by the leaders of the Dutch Reformed Church—‘co-workers with the conspirators.’ As in the case of the *South African News*, it is not for the weight of their arguments that such utterances should be considered. But it is to such quarters in South Africa that we look for a weighty refutation. What shall be said when strong evidence for the prosecution is met by such a defence?

I venture to predict that when all is made known and revealed after the war, more proofs of united and concerted action on the part of the anti-British party all over South Africa will be forthcoming than will please those who now are so ready to come forward and declare that no 'traces' even exist.

CHAPTER VII

THE PAST, PRESENT—AND FUTURE

FROM a review of the foregoing pages, together with the evidence in the Appendix, the unprejudiced reader will, I believe, admit that strong evidence, even now, exists of a conspiracy to oust British supremacy in South Africa. An inquiry will, I have no doubt, furnish further damning proof. The conspiracy culminated in war, which occurred the first time an Afrikaner or Bond Ministry assumed the responsibility of office.

The British Government had no design on the independence of the Republics. It was only when the Transvaal had abused the independence given by Great Britain after the defeats of her forces in the field in 1881, and after that State failed, of its own motion, to initiate its promises of reform, that the Imperial Government had no alternative, in the interests of the Uitlanders, of South Africa, and of the Empire, to interfere.

It will be seen, too, that constitutional action and earnest prayer for redress of grievances and the granting of the elementary rights of citizenship were the means adopted by the Uitlanders years and years before the Raid. After years of constitutional agitation, led by South Africans, to obtain such rights as might enable the earnest, respectable, and law-abiding

citizens that they were to become burghers of the South African Republic, and about four years *before the Raid*, Mr. Esselen, a prospective candidate for the Presidency, later a Judge of the High Court, and since that time State Attorney of the South African Republic, plainly told one of the largest meetings of Uitlanders ever held in the Transvaal that they were being kept out of their rights by a man (President Kruger) who was 'fooling' them, and, further, that they were being kept out of these rights to enable a few, 'a greedy few, to rule this country for their own ends.'

The rights desired by the Uitlanders are freely given to Dutchmen in all the British Possessions in South Africa, and the men pleading for them were willing to undertake the obligations as well as receive the privileges of full burghership, notwithstanding President Kruger's declaration to the contrary. Hope deferred made the heart sick. Revolution sought to procure what constitutional means had failed to obtain. But the conditions were unfavourable. Then by the precipitate and unauthorized action of a subordinate factor, who by his impulsive action appeared as a principal, the Uitlanders were compromised.¹

Then followed the betrayal of 1896. After that the three years during which Paul Kruger was on his trial. Eventually, when constitutional effort and human patience were exhausted, as a last resource, the Uit-

¹ Much has been condemned as incompatible with honour in connection with the attempted revolution. But it must be remembered that when once such an undertaking is entered upon, in certain cases deception is a necessity. It is not a case of 'do evil that good may come'—I know the context—but to those not involved it is a question of, 'Ask no questions, and you will be told no lies.' As well might a robber when asked divulge his plans to a constable and expect success as a revolutionist acknowledge his intentions.

landers adopted the only course open to them. They appealed to that one quarter from whence alone help could come.¹

After this, at the Bloemfontein Conference, President Kruger, as usual, tried promises, subterfuges, and bargaining. Finding the British Government in earnest, and that it was impossible to wheedle Sir Alfred Milner with vague promises, naturally a deadlock ensued. Had Sir Alfred Milner given President Kruger further time to temporize, the result would have been fatal. President Kruger never offered other than an impossible franchise. The result was the same as it will ever be when ignorance and prejudice endeavour to dominate a more enlightened majority. Few fights for freedom have had so good a cause as that which England took up when she acted on the petition of her subjects in the Transvaal.

But to turn to a sadder picture. The poor old Cape Colony—my home! How my heart feels for you in your shame! As the Empire's poet said to me, 'The Cape has made the very word "loyalty" to stink. Men now seek no longer to be "loyal"—but only to be "white."'

The Cape Colony is British by every right—British by conquest, British by treaty, and British by purchase—but through Dutch sentiment and the traitorous action of a few has been *made* disloyal. Thank God a remnant is left! There be some righteous. It is for them to see the stain removed. There must be no compounding this felony.

England's sons in South Africa with 'white' hearts

¹ With reference to the Uitlanders' petition to the Queen, it is alleged by many that the signatures were spurious, and were paid for at so much apiece. This charge has been refuted by Mr. Wyburgh, the President of the South African League. See Appendix K, and Parliamentary Blue Book C, 9,345, p. 224.

have been to the fore, and the Cape, notwithstanding its dark blot, with Natal has drained its manhood for the struggle—so let our sons not reproach us without discrimination.

Our lessons from the bitter experience of the past are that, although both races must live together in the country in the future, the same consideration must not be shown to those who are unworthy. Having been given every consideration in the past, and having abused the trust placed in them, a different policy should now be demanded by the Empire. Let the policy be just, but let not treason and disloyalty flourish under it. The press, the pulpit, the Legislature, colleges and schools, have all by their influence spread the flame. The evil must now be checked.

The present is none the less important than the future, for on it, of necessity, the future depends. On the one hand are Conciliation Committees, on the other Vigilance Committees. All are putting forward the views of the parties they claim to represent. On the British public and the voice of the Empire the verdict depends. Let the jurors, therefore, seek for light, and may they realize the sense of their responsibility! Each side may claim a hearing—even rebels are allowed a defence—but there is one important fact to be borne in mind in connection with those who plead the cause of the accused. The members who attended at the office of the *South African News* on March 12 last, and those who have joined the Conciliation Movement throughout South Africa, are in a general sense tainted with disloyalty. With the Bond and the pro-Boer and anti-British party in the colony, they have every right to make themselves heard—in their defence. They may endeavour to refute the conspiracy theory; they may endeavour to excuse or justify the Transvaal; they may palliate dis-

loyalty and plead their own case; but at present they possess no right to claim a hearing in the Settlement.

At the first meeting of the Conciliation Committee alluded to above, Mr. Albert Cartright, editor of the *South African News*, claimed responsibility for having called the meeting. He complained (as others do) of the terrible ignorance existing in other countries of the true state of affairs in South Africa. 'It would,' he said, 'be the duty of the committee when formed to disseminate correct information.' Of this beware. For the present not only is it advisable for political parties in England to stand together and back up the Government's military policy till the end be attained, but they must support with all their strength Sir Alfred Milner at the Cape. The South African Conciliation Committee-men speak of him as 'a colossal failure,' and insinuate he is untruthful. Are these people to be taken as authorities, and disseminators of 'correct' information? Do the words of representative men like Sir Alfred Milner, the Archbishop of the Cape, Mr. Rhodes, Sir Gordon Sprigg and Dr. Gill, the Astronomer Royal at Cape Town, and the expressed views of the Wesleyan, Congregational, Baptist, Lutheran, and Presbyterian denominations, count as nothing, that the Cape Conciliation Committee-men profess to hold the 'correct' view?

In considering the present and the future, and the subtle influences at work, let us take a lesson from the past.

Sir Bartle Frere was sent, as Governor and High Commissioner, to the Cape with Confederation as his watchword, and came as one of England's greatest Proconsuls. After grasping the South African situation thoroughly, he became convinced that the danger to the peace and welfare and unity of Southern Africa

was the Zulu power and the despotism of Ketchwayo. Owing to the policy this despot pursued, England was left no alternative but war. The loyal British in South Africa strongly supported Sir Bartle Frere. Subtle and insidious influences were set in motion in South Africa and England against the Governor and his policy, and with the swing of the political pendulum in England, in consideration of party politics Sir Bartle Frere was recalled against the wishes of loyal British sentiment at the Cape. His policy was reversed, and his prophecy regarding the Transvaal¹ is now being fulfilled by the war raging in South Africa.

Sir Alfred Milner was sent as Governor and High Commissioner to the Cape with Confederation the ultimate aim of Imperial policy, and came as one of England's most promising Proconsuls. After grasping the South African situation thoroughly, *he* became convinced that the danger to the peace, welfare, and unity of Southern Africa was the dominion of 'Afrikanderdom,' and the despotism of Paul Kruger. Owing to the policy this despot² pursued, England was left no alternative but war. The loyal British

¹ Sir Bartle Frere, twenty years ago, wrote: 'Any attempt to give back or restore the Boer Republic in the Transvaal must lead to anarchy and failure, and probably, at no distant period, to a vicious imitation of some South American Republics, in which the more uneducated and misguided Boers, dominated and led by better-educated foreign adventurers, will become a pest to the whole of South Africa, and a most dangerous fulcrum to any European Power bent on contesting our naval supremacy or on injuring us in the colonies.'

² Mem. for Conciliation Committee-men: 'Despot—a ruler invested with absolute power, or *ruling without any control from men, constitution, or laws*' ('The Comprehensive English Dictionary,' by John Ogilvie, LL.D.; London, Blackie and Son, 1893). President Kruger repeatedly ruled without control from the Grondwet, or written Constitution of the Transvaal.

in South Africa strongly supported Sir Alfred Milner. Subtle and insidious influences are being set in motion in South Africa and England against the Governor and his policy—let it be regarded, lest with the swing of the political pendulum in England, in consideration of party politics, he, too, may be recalled against the feeling of loyal British sentiment at the Cape, or even his policy be modified, else trouble and war for our children is in store. All depends upon the immediate future, and the loyal sentiment of the Empire must prevail over Boer sympathizers, wherever they be. One thing is sure: If no reaction of feeling sets in, it will not be for lack of energy on the part of pro-Boer intriguers, and the persistent way they are endeavouring, and in some cases succeeding, in misrepresenting the true position.

Some years ago, as the outcome of a conspiracy, and as an unauthorized part of the whole, a body of men acted contrary to the law. These men were sympathizers with a good cause. They were removed from local influences, tried at Westminster, and justice was meted to the offenders.

Now a conspiracy has been on foot, men have acted contrary to the law, and subjects rebelled against their Sovereign. These men were sympathizers with a *bad* cause; they sided with injustice and oppression. Let them be removed from local influences, and let them be heard at Westminster, and may justice be meted to the offenders. Meanwhile, with so many of the registered voters of the Cape in arms or under arrest, and even members of the Legislature siding with the rebels, it appears impossible to convene Parliament. If estimates cannot be passed, again the Motherland may give her offspring aid. If, to enable the Cape Colony to tide over her troublous times, Great Britain comes forward and suspends the Con-

stitution for a breathing space, 'true men' will be relieved. And it is apparent that the false men cannot be allowed to dominate the Legislature.

It would be absurd, as indeed presumptuous, for one who claims to write as 'one of the rank and file' to offer suggestions for the pacification, reconciliation, and unification of South Africa. These questions may well be left to the statesmen of the Empire, whose intellects and energies will be taxed to the utmost in furnishing their solution. But in a humble way, as a South African, I have in these pages tried to remove certain misapprehensions, and put forward the views I am sure are held by all those who desire 'to continue citizens of a country under the tutelage of a Power under whom every man is regarded as equal before the law, and whose reign is the reign of freedom and order.'

Since the foregoing chapters were written, important events have occurred in South Africa, none of which, however, necessitate, I deem, the alteration of the foregoing text. Bloemfontein and Pretoria have been reached; the Free State annexed; the 'People's Congress,' as a meeting of Bondsmen style themselves, has met and passed resolutions; and the Bond Ministry (now that the Afrikaner party has shot its bolt) has 'disintegrated.' The breaking up of the Bond and the disintegration of the Schreiner Cabinet are not the only predictions which have been fulfilled since the preceding pages were penned.¹

¹ In this connection I would refer those who desire confirmation of much which I have referred to in Chapters III. and VI. to two remarkable and excellent letters or articles which have since appeared in the *Times*, May 24, 1900, and *Daily News*, May 21, 1900. In the former, under the heading of 'The Orange Free

Regarding the future, it is obviously a foregone conclusion that the annexation of the South African Republic must follow that of the Orange Free State, and that there will be no more fatal 'retrocessions.' For although the People's Congress, aping the Afrikaner Bond, may pass resolutions claiming to represent 'the opinions of the majority of Cape Colonists,' and although it may be asserted by the Bond clique, which frame them, that no peaceful settlement is possible if the independence of the Republics be not restored, the circumstance remains (apart from others, important enough in themselves) that true Britons in South Africa, as well as in other colonies, who are deserving of the greater consideration, claim to be heard ; and such know well that anything short of annexation would be fatal to South Africa itself, as well as to the Empire.

With the resolutions and speeches passed and made by persons attending the People's Congress at Graaff Reinet, on May 30 last, before me now in London, and with the knowledge of much which occurred at the stormy meetings of the Ministry and the Bond leaders held during the second week in June in one of the committee-rooms of the House of Assembly at Cape Town, little, I think, need be added regarding the 'aims of the Bond' or the 'culpability of the Bond Cabinet.'

The usual kind of talk indulged in at Bond meetings was adopted at the People's Congress. Amidst up-

State and President Kruger's Policy,' the aims of the Bond are disclosed, and in the latter it will be seen how Messrs. Kruger and Steyn have been preparing and planning for the contingency they assert was forced on them by Great Britain. Mr. Fraser's testimony is valuable regarding 'closer union.' It was on this question that he and Mr. Steyn contested the last Presidential election in the Free State. Mr. Fraser was always averse to the union, seeing the possibility of ruin to the Free State.

roarious cheers the Raid was alluded to as 'the stone thrown into the water on January 1, 1896,' and what was being experienced now 'were the ripples against the banks!' It was said: 'The war was for revenge. . . . Amajuba must be wiped out.' A trade boycott was recommended. 'Could a man shake hands with a man who had killed his brother?' 'After the treatment of the Transvaal in this matter, was it possible that they could live happily in friendship together?' These and other such things were said,¹ but no allowance is made for the fact that colonists have been killed by rebels within their own borders, and that the colonists were not the aggressors, and that ours has been the greater loss.

But the question is another one. These rebels who have surrendered; these rebels at heart; these registered voters, who have been, or are, up in arms against the Queen's authority; all these, with the ungrateful but pitifully misled Dutch republicans—these will be living with *us* in the future. It is not, nor should it have been (although it almost *was*), the British element living on sufferance, as it were, amongst the Dutch. It is that those elements which have been made to contribute so largely to cause the war will be living in British South Africa—Southern Africa, which was British even while the independence of the Republics was acknowledged. They are of us, and not we of them.² And whatever may be considered

¹ *Cape Times* (weekly edition), June 6, 1900.

² Not content with preaching treason in the Dutch press, and obtaining equal rights for the Dutch language, so far had Dutch influence permeated that recently, upon the relief of either Kimberley or Ladysmith it required almost a riot to procure the hoisting of the British flag over the Houses of Parliament at Cape Town, and the Dutch word 'Mei' was substituted for 'May' in a Government postal stamp. Such are the small straws which indicate the direction of the wind. It has even been asserted in

necessary for the future Settlement, that fact must be borne strongly in mind, for the sake of the ultimate good of the Dutch themselves, as well as a necessary provision for future peace. It is from the past, and recognising the character of the people, that British policy must be guided.

Regarding the 'Settlement' and the future, no clear line can be laid down by individuals. The future depends upon the future. But general principles can be acknowledged. Leniency once was mistaken for weakness. The retention of the Dutch native Commissioners in 1877 brought trouble in its train. Unduly and wrongfully withholding the promised representative system of government after the annexation accentuated discontent. Thus now, from these experiences, we may avoid repeating mistakes. South Africa must be ruled firmly as well as justly. The greatest discretion should be exercised in the appointment of officials, for on this much depends. And, as soon as the temper of the people allows, the Orange River Colony and the Transvaal should fall into line with the Cape and Natal, as Rhodesia will in time, and enjoy the benefit of a representative system of government.

The desirability or otherwise of separating the offices of Governor and High Commissioner has for long been a fruitful source of debate, but to my mind it appears to have been not altogether disadvantageous that the High Commissioner of South Africa during the recent troublous times should have been so closely in touch with the late Ministry—a Ministry of which Loyalists were distrustful.

And when thinking of Sir Alfred Milner (whose

the public press that the words 'on service' had been substituted for the ordinary form 'on Her Majesty's service' on Government stationery in the Cape Colony !

services the Empire can never sufficiently reward), one cannot imagine other than he as the one necessary man possessing the requisite knowledge, sound judgment, and tact, as well as meriting the respect of all true men capable of independent opinion, holding the position of High Commissioner over all the South African colonies and dependencies. It has even been urged in print that, as David was not allowed to build the temple for Israel because he had made great wars and shed blood abundantly, so Sir Alfred Milner should not be the medium of building up the South African Commonwealth. It is urged that it is not for one who destroys to build. All this may be very fine-sounding, but it is not practical politics. We have had good men at the Cape before, and 'swapped' them ere the stream was crossed, with fatal results. Sir George Grey and Sir Bartle Frere have been sacrifice enough. Let the Mother Country, then, leave South Africa one of her best and proved servants, for she owes her much, and what trouble South Africa has given can be traced to the mistakes of the Mother Land.

Is it not meet that he who has been instrumental in awakening and instructing the nation to the sense of its responsibilities and obligations should be allowed to complete the task which has presented itself? Sir Alfred Milner, too, has earned the support and respect of the Uitlanders of the Transvaal. The Transvaal will play a most important part in the future of South Africa, and the body hitherto called 'Uitlanders' will still be in the majority there as compared with the Dutch population. And the conflicting interests of at least three parties in the Transvaal—the new population, the old burghers, and the capitalists—will require masterly handling. With the steadying influence of Sir Alfred Milner as High Commissioner, say at

Bloemfontein, one can picture the pacification and unification of South Africa proceeding surely with the new era of prosperity and rapid development which must follow—a development which should be natural and uniform, and should not be allowed to be retarded by the selfish policy of any one or other of the individual colonies. If ever a country required a wise administrator with a knowledge of finance, South Africa will after the conclusion of the war.

As these pages go to press a later mail from the Cape brings detailed accounts of the meeting of the Bond Congress, which commenced its sittings at the Paarl on June 15 last. The proceedings differed little from the usual style. But, like certain of the proceedings in open Raad, of old, in the Transvaal, the speeches were made for publication. Mr. Malan, of *Ons Land* fame, reminded the meeting assembled that ‘the eyes of the world were on them at that moment.’

The Bond desires an amnesty for its friends, the enemy. It passed resolutions, framed in committee, expressing ‘its deep disapproval of the policy of the Imperial Government, which has led to the sanguinary and unrighteous war,’ and urged ‘a speedy restoration of a permanent peace *which can only be secured by leaving the Republics their independence unimpaired,*’ and further urged ‘most strongly, in view of the many complaints and grievances of colonists, . . . the appointment of a Parliamentary inquiry to make an investigation as to the manner in which, during the war, private property, personal liberty, and the constitutional rights of the subject had been dealt with,’ and that martial law should be repealed.

Hardship necessarily must have been endured by rebels and suspects, as well as by Loyalists, but, again, I can only repeat, ‘You cannot make omelets without

breaking eggs,' and this omelet was not of our ordering.

These Bond proceedings, with the usual canting professions of loyalty, are nauseating. To one who lived for weeks at the Paarl, as I did, when the issue *appeared* most doubtful, and who knows how disloyal at heart are so many of those now professing, as the Chairman dared to say, to be 'as loyal as any subjects of Britain anywhere in the Empire,' the spectacle is revolting. However, the moral is plain; and that is, that so long as a glimmering of hope of success to this party remains regarding their aims, so long will the agitation continue. Once let these 'loyal subjects of Britain' become convinced that their game is 'up,' and they will settle down to the inevitable.

The Bond originated in the Paarl. May this eighteenth Annual Congress at the same place prove one of the last ever to be held, and may Dutch and English alike in South Africa, whose 'common interests are immeasurably greater than the differences which unfortunately exist,' shun organizations run on race lines. Good though I believe the South African League to be—and necessary while the Bond exists—it were better for South Africa in the future if it, with the Bond, were to dissolve. Neither Bond nor League is needed; the necessary 'Bond' is the bond of good-fellowship and mutual interest, the studying of which will prove far more beneficial than the encouragement of antagonistic political institutions run on race lines—as of necessity they will be run. Let the leaders of each consider the matter—later.

Mr. Schreiner, the late Premier of the Cape Colony, is one on whom recently all eyes have been turned, and is one who from some quarters has drawn unstinted praise.

For a few months past, it is said, he has been co-

operating loyally with Sir Alfred Milner for the just punishment of rebels. For this, I should think, none desire to rob him of credit; but when in South Africa a few months previously I wrote of the culpability of the Cape Cabinet, when the future was dark and uncertain—indeed, so dark that I thought it inexpedient even to publish what I had written—it was different to the present time.¹ The number of British troops under arms in South Africa exceeds the total of male civilian inhabitants, and Mr. Schreiner's is not the only apparent conversion. I think it can be fairly said that when the issue was dark and uncertain no acts of Mr. Schreiner's could have justly prevented the Afrikaner party, had it achieved its aims, from still claiming him as its own, just in the same way as now it may be urged his acts entitle him to the support of the side which undoubtedly must be predominant. It is not unreasonable that he should be judged by his acts at a time when his influence was most required. Mr. Schreiner is said to possess an 'analytical mind,' and is by many credited with honesty of purpose. I may in this connection be allowed to say that, not being personally acquainted with that gentleman, or being swayed by personal considerations, I have formed my opinion by what has publicly transpired. Like Mr. Rhodes, at all events, Mr. Schreiner is not above criticism, and I trust, as I sincerely hope, my criticism has been fair. I have meant it to be so.

In this volume I have endeavoured to show that influences in the Cape Colony might at one time have prevented war by persuading President Kruger to adopt a more reasonable attitude towards the Uitlanders, and a less hostile one towards Great Britain. In the *Cape Times* of June 2, 1900, under the heading of 'A Wail

¹ July 9, 1900.

from St. Helena,' a letter, as under, appears, addressed to the editor :

'SIR,—‘The following extract from a letter of one of the Boer prisoners, a leading Pretorian, and one who undoubtedly knows what he is writing, may interest some of your readers. The letter is written from St. Helena. “Here I am, a six months’ prisoner, a blessed exile, and Heaven knows when I shall see my home and hearth, and whether my poor wife and children will live to see my return. And all this through Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr, that pup Malan, and that cursed Afrikander Bond.”’

The letter is signed by ‘Loyal Colonist,’ under whose *nom de plume* the editor of the *Cape Times* makes the following comment : ‘We have been favoured with an inspection of the original letter from which the above extract is taken. It is unquestionably a genuine document.’

Here we get the truth in a nutshell. Mr. Jan Hendrik Hofmeyr reputedly controls the Bond organ, *Ons Land*; ‘that pup Malan’ is its nominal editor. And thus, in the bitterness of his soul, from an Afrikander prisoner who has risked his all for the Boers, we get confirmation of the truth. On the Bond and its dictator the responsibility for all the ruin and misery in South Africa rests. And of its leaders it may be written, ‘They knew their duty, and did it not.’ Theirs is the neglected opportunity.

APPENDICES

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

ADVOCATE WESSELS' TESTIMONY

SINCE writing the text of Chapter I., I have been enabled to procure a copy of Mr. Wessels' 'Amphitheatre speech.' The reporter has summarized his words at the impressive period I alluded to. A report of this speech will be found in the issue of the *Cape Times* of July 16, 1894.

Mr. Wessels said he had great pleasure in seconding the proposition so ably and eloquently laid before them by Mr. Leonard. He asked them to forbear with him, as he was no politician. He had never in his life addressed so large or important a meeting. He had spoken in public, but generally to three judges, or one judge and an intelligent jury. (Laughter.) If he could not rise to eloquence, it was not that he did not feel with them. He had been told that the platform of the National Union was an Imperial platform. If that were so, or if he believed it to be so, he would not be standing on that platform to-night. It had been said that the National Union was run by a small Johannesburg clique. He was not a Johannesburger, he was a Pretorian. (Hear, hear, and applause.) He could assure them that everything that had been done in the past by the National Union had met with his approval. (Loud applause.) He could assure them that he looked upon the National Union at the present time as the voice of the Uitlander. He wasn't an Englishman, and therefore not an Imperialist. He had not one solitary drop of English blood in his veins. He was an Afrikaner. (Loud and continuous applause.) He was, perhaps, more Afrikaner than the members of the Raad who called themselves Afrikanders. Yes, more Afrikaner than the President of the Republic himself. For centuries and centuries his ancestors had been living in Africa. He was truly a son of the soil. He was in many respects more Boer than many Boers, even more Boer than Mr. Tosen. (Loud laughter.) He had been educated in England; he had learnt his profession in England; he was acquainted with English sentiments; he was acquainted with English traditions, and these had been cultivated in him through Englishmen. If he were not therefore

grateful to the English nation, he would only be a base wretch. He stated it might be thought that the English army was not so strong as those of other nations ; it might be that the navy of England was not so invincible as some people imagined, but notwithstanding that, if there was anything to love, it was the English nation. (Loud cheers.) It was not England's army or its navy that made the English nation lovable, but its love of fair play. He stated that he was an Afrikaner. The Afrikanders were not such ignorant persons as they were made out. Afrikanders born south of the Vaal River, or born north of the Vaal River, had some sentiments as regards justice. There was no real difference between the new and the old population, but there was a clique which wanted to make a difference. Let them look the position squarely in the face. All the Voortrekkers were friends of his forefathers. There were hundreds of Wesselses in the Free State. All these men were of the same descent, all from the Cape Colony or Natal. They were of the same race, had the same manners, the same religion, the same language ; but now the burghers said that because they had been the first to cross the Vaal River, and because they cleared the country of Kaffirs and beasts, that therefore other people should have no vote. What an argument to use ! It might have been an argument for the old original Voortrekkers ; but they knew that the Voortrekker welcomed the stranger, and sought the stranger. (A Voice : And made the stranger shut up. Laughter.) But there were people in the Raad who refused the aliens a vote, who could not use that argument, for they had never cleared forests or killed beasts, even a wild buck. (Laughter.) They must remember that a son of a burgher, a boy of sixteen, had a vote ; and he at least could not say he was a Voortrekker. But in any case, how could an argument of that sort apply in a Republic ? How could they admit hereditary principle in a Republic ? He might just as well say that his sisters, and his nephews, and his aunts had cleared the land of beasts and Kaffirs. (Laughter.) They could dismiss that argument. Then they had the other argument, which was constantly used, that they were the people who drove the English out of the country. He respected them for having regained their independence—(cheers)—and if there was one feeling in the National Union, it was that it respected them for having done that. (Cheers.) He was sure the object of the National Union was not in any way to see the British flag once more floating in the country. (Cheers.) He was convinced the object of the National Union was only to see good government in the country. (Cheers.) He went further. It was an untrue argument, it was a lie—(cheers)—and it was not the reason these men had for keeping the Uitlanders out of the franchise. If it were truth, was it to be conceived that it would be advanced now only, when the men in 1882, the year after the war, thought the ultimate limit for franchise was five years ? (Hear, hear.) If men at that time thought five years was enough, was it to be conceived that the argument could be true now ? He said emphatically that they knew it was a lie. (Cheers.) What, then, was the reason these men refused the

Uitlanders the franchise? It was selfishness and fear that the newcomer would have the majority, and would control the country. Not the fear of giving the country over to the English, but fear that it would be the Uitlander who would rule in the land. (Cheers.) They advanced the argument that they were afraid that the newcomers, being largely British, would vote for giving the country back to the English. ('No, no!') That might apply with raw Englishmen, but not with one born in South Africa. No; what they feared was, that they would not be able to 'work the shekels.' (Laughter and cheers.) He did not hesitate to say that the Boer who did not want the Afrikaner to be one of them and have a voice in the affairs of the country was simply afraid that his pocket would not be full. He had heard it said they were anxious to get the Afrikaner into the Volksraad—nothing would please them more than to work with their brothers from the Free State, the Colony, and Natal, who were born in Africa; but what was their further answer? 'Class legislation.' They said they could not do it because it would be unfair to Englishmen and Germans, and unfair to everybody else. (Laughter.) The members of the Raad said that if there was anything they did not love it was 'class legislation.' The one political principle, as it were, the very foundation of their political creed, was that they would have no 'class legislation,' and those same men were constantly appealing to their ancestors; they were constantly telling the public who their ancestors were, and what their ancestors did, and on June 18, 1855, those ancestors passed a law saying that a person born in South Africa should have a vote. Those coming from Europe had to reside in the country one year, and pay 200 rix dollars, and then they would be entitled to vote, but those born in the country were entitled to vote immediately. Their dread was apparent, and that was why they went in fear of class legislation. For what was their legislation but class legislation? Was not their legislation on coolies class legislation? And then there was the transport-riders. The worthy Mr. Wolmarans was constantly jumping up to protect the transport-rider. I may not (Mr. Wessels continued) prune my roses on Sundays, while a transport-rider can do as he wishes. He is allowed to ride transport on Sundays, and the argument is that Mr. Wolmarans is afraid the transport-rider may have to pass his Sunday in the veld, while he might be profitably spending his time in church. They were afraid (Mr. Wessels proceeded) to give the vote to an educated Afrikaner for fear he might get the reins in his own hands and legislate so that everybody could come in and participate in the franchise. He could not understand their argument, so absurd was it. (Hear, hear.) They said, 'We won't have you because you are enlightened'—(laughter)—and at the same time their own Grondwet says that they wished to be recognised as an enlightened country. (Laughter.) They repelled enlightenment, sought darkness, and then they said, 'But we are such a great people!' (Renewed laughter.) He was perfectly certain that was not the flag of the country—it was the flag only of a certain section of Government, and of the Raad. (Hear, hear.) The Raad was only composed of twenty-four men, and Mr. Leonard

had eloquently pointed out to the meeting to what dangers the country was exposed which had so small a Legislature. The danger to personal property and personal liberty was immense. (Applause.) It would be far from him to say that any single man of the Raad had ever been bribed. (Laughter.) He would say, however, that there was an immense possibility of such a thing occurring. (Renewed merriment.) The Raad was constantly telling them that because in America and France strangers coming into the State cannot obtain the franchise till after a certain term of residence, therefore they should not be admitted to franchise in this country. He would freely admit that the Raad could find precedents for its action if it desired. Personally he could find precedents for everything and anything if he liked. (Laughter.) That was the sort of exception that a lawyer would use, but certainly not the sort of exception that a man of honest convictions would use. (Loud and prolonged applause.) In a country like this, gentlemen, where the new population is rapidly outnumbering the old, things are different to that which prevails in countries like England and America. There a comparatively small number of people come in, whilst here they are coming in shoals. To reduce the argument that only the people who shot the lions and Kaffirs are entitled to rule to an absurdity: suppose for a moment that it came to pass that only one burgher was left, one monumental burgher would be entitled to call himself the Kaiser of the Republic, and the only man entitled to a vote; if he did, the result would be that he would be cleared out. (Loud laughter.) All that was wanted was that Uitlanders should stick together. It was no use mincing matters. (Applause.) If that policy were persisted in blood would be shed in the streets of Johannesburg — (loud applause) — and who would be to blame? (Cries of 'The Government' and 'The Raad.') He repeated the question, Who would be to blame? It would not be the Uitlanders, it would not be the strangers, who sought by every possible means to obtain a voice in the affairs of the State; not the men who tried to protect themselves, and obtain freedom for themselves, but the fatal thirteen in the Raad. (Tremendous applause.) The argument of the rifle is a nasty one; it is an argument which I have heard used by burghers in Pretoria, but God forbid that it should come to that. He was perfectly certain that by organization, and by standing together as one man, they could prevent a drop of blood from being shed. There were remedies, and these remedies were not far to seek. He did not wish the Raad immediately to pass a law admitting everybody to the franchise, but still they could conciliate or show a spirit of conciliation. There is, he said, something unlucky in the number thirteen, and it is thirteen ignorant men in this land that rule the destinies of this State. These thirteen ignorant persons can raise the batteries of Johannesburg. Everyone present must combine to strengthen their hands in the obtaining of the franchise. Some new question might crop up. Yesterday it was the commandeering question; to-morrow it might be some other question. Capitalists at present are standing aloof, but capitalists perhaps are not aware that a law may at any moment be passed

making it impossible for anyone, except he be a burgher, to hold property in the State. He saw some people laughing at this, but he might inform them that such a law was actually passed in 1855 by the ancestors of the present Boers. He said that those men, who had not the courage to speak out their convictions, should be shunned, regarded as outcasts, people who were unfit to live in a free and independent Republic. (Great cheering.) He said aliens should form themselves into an Uitlanders' Defence Association, and send a monster petition from every town in the State to the next Raad asking for representation for towns. (Hear, hear.) If that were done, he was confident that an improvement would result. That was not sentiment, it was practical politics. (Cheers.) They should ask the Raad to give back to the towns the representation which they had of old, and which this autocratic Raad took away. If that were done, a new and more liberal element would come into the Raad. And why should not the towns demand representation, seeing that the towns bore the burdens of the State? The true freeman in the country was the man who worked with his hands, and upon him the salvation of the country would eventually depend. He was certain that if these men, and men representing them, got into the Raad, a new era would dawn for this land. What sort of a constitution had they? They had a constitution on paper. What was the use of saying that this was a free and independent Republic, and that the voice of the people was the law of the land? The voice of the people! Yes, a voice on paper. Then it was said that they had a Second Raad, but that Raad was as powerless as if they lopped off every limb and tore every tongue from their mouths. (Great cheering.) The Second Raad might vote that a bridge should be thrown over a river, but they might just as well vote to construct a bridge from Africa to America, for the Second Raad had no money and no control over money. The Second Raad was an impotent, imbecile body. (Cheers.) There were men in that Raad who, although of Boer descent, were more liberal than members like the Tosens and the Lombaards of the First Raad—(cheers)—but the ridicule of it! To the First Raad was entrusted the independence of the State. (Cheers.) Political apathy at a juncture like this was a crime. (Loud cheers.) They were a mixed population in this country—English, Dutch, German, and French. Each one of those countries could call to mind traditions of freedom. In each one of those countries free political discussion was the order of the day. Even in Germany, an empire, Socialists had the strongest say. With traditions like those they could not allow their freedom of speech to be burked—(cheers)—therefore there must be no such thing as political apathy. Who were the people who were politically apathetic? First of all, the Court minions. (Much laughter.) The gentlemen who assembled at six o'clock in the morning at the President's house to obtain some favour for themselves or their friends. (Laughter.) The subsidized men who procured—(loud laughter and cheers)—those favours were a worthless crowd, and need not be reckoned with. The next was the large capitalist. (Hear, hear, and cheers.) It was a pitiful thing there were so many large

capitalists. (Loud laughter.) If the capital was more equally divided, there would be less political apathy. These men stood like misers over their hoards, and were afraid to utter a voice, and went skulking through the streets of Pretoria. In other countries—in England, for instance—capitalists were in the vanguard of freedom. Here they were barely like the curs that followed a leader. Were they wise, and did they not see the sword hanging over their heads? Did they not know that the capital they annexed might be annexed by somebody else? Did they not know that the fatal thirteen at Pretoria might deprive them of it? The sooner they awakened to the danger their capital was in, the better for themselves. Then there was another and a very large crowd of people who said they did not meddle in politics because it was too much trouble, and they preferred their comfort lying on a sofa reading a novel and smoking a cigar. He had hoped, at any rate, one of those classes would be aroused from its political apathy, and exclaim :

‘A land of slaves shall ne’er be mine,
Dash down yon cup of Samian wine.’

(Ringing cheers.)

ADVOCATE WESSELS FIVE YEARS LATER

The following is the full text of Advocate Wessels’ letter read at the great meeting of unenfranchised, at Johannesburg, June, 1899.

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UITLANDERS’ MEETING.

PRETORIA,
June 8, 1899.

DEAR SIR,

I have been requested to propose the following resolution at your meeting on Saturday : ‘That the franchise proposals submitted by His Honour the State President at the Bloemfontein Conference are, in the opinion of this meeting, wholly inadequate, and will not satisfy the just demand of the unenfranchised population of this country.’ I thank you for the honour, and I must express my deep regret at not being able to propose the motion or to attend the meeting. As I am not a political character, I feel sure the Uitlanders of Johannesburg will excuse my absence. The reason of my absence is that I have business engagements that prevent me from preparing a speech adequate to the occasion. Not being a politician, I cannot speak without first thinking out carefully what I wish to say, and arranging the matter in proper form. This I consider due to every well-informed audience, and I know of no better-informed audience than one composed of the Uitlanders of Johannesburg. At the same time, I should not like the Uitlanders of Johannesburg to think for one single moment that I am not strongly in sympathy with them to-day, as I was on July 14, 1894, when I spoke on the National Union platform. The feeling

I had towards them then I have towards them now ; the sentiments I uttered then are my sentiments to-day. I felt then that unless a liberal franchise were granted to the Uitlander population there would always be a strong tension between the old burgher and the newcomer. Without a liberal franchise there can be no means of fusing the new and the old, and without the means of fusion the result must end in open enmity, with all the dire consequences which such enmity will bring in its train. Any measure, therefore, which does not provide the means for a quick and thorough fusion will be inadequate, and will sooner or later revive the acute state of tension to which the retrogressive franchise legislation has brought us. If I thought that the proposals of President Kruger were likely to relieve the strain for a considerable number of years, I could advise their acceptance ; but I feel confident that his proposals will in no way allay the unrest and dissatisfaction. Anyone who knows the feelings of the Uitlander population of Johannesburg must know that half-measures will do no good. It is with them now a matter of sentiment and a feeling of degradation. Unless their sentiment can be satisfied, and unless this feeling of inferiority can be done away with, the Uitlander question will be a festering sore in the vitals of South Africa. Some say the sentiment is folly and the feeling of inferiority unreasonable. It may be so ; but I am convinced that these feelings are firm-rooted, and cannot be eradicated until a fair, just, and full franchise is given to the Uitlanders. I am Afrikaner-born, and yield to no man in love for my country ; and I will state my views openly, though I know I am detested by a large body of my countrymen for entertaining these views. Hated or not hated, I feel that these views are right and just, and that they will one day prevail. They who prevent the Uitlander from getting a full and fair franchise seem to me narrow-minded and bad statesmen, the evil genii of this Republic, the cause of intense racial feeling, and the authors of future evils too awful to contemplate. I do not anticipate that British subjects will flock to the registration offices if a five years' full franchise were offered them ; but I do know that their sentiment will be appeased, their ideas of justice will be satisfied, and their feeling of antipathy to the governing class in this country will be allayed. No man likes to belong to an inferior caste, an Englishman least of all. No man likes to have his inferiority flaunted in his face at every turn, and, unfortunately, the legislation of recent years has done that to the Uitlanders but too frequently.

WHAT THE UITLANDER HAS DONE

The hybrid naturalized burgher has not been proud of his position in this country, and he has so universally expressed his contempt for what he has obtained that it is hardly to be wondered at that free men will have none of it. In this country the sentiment against the period of suspension from all rights is an active living sentiment. He who thinks it mere idle prejudice lacks the true appreciation of the circumstances under which we live, and is no statesman. Apart from sentiment, the Uitlander is entitled to

a full voice in the affairs of this country. The Uitlander raised it from a pastoral to an industrial country of a high order, he is making it to-day, and supplying the Government with the very resources that keep him down, and he will be the main factor in its future prosperity.

THIRTEEN YEARS AND STILL UNENFRANCHISED

Sir Alfred Milner said in the late Conference : 'My doctrine is that however long a period of residence you fix before a man becomes a citizen of your State, you should admit him once and for all to full rights on taking the oath of allegiance, and this is specially important in the South African Republic.' These words are absolutely true. I, who have been thirteen years in this country, and am still an unenfranchised Afrikaner, feel that these words are not only true, but wise and statesmanlike. The period of probation is repugnant to all Uitlanders and to a great many burghers. No franchise law that contains this provision can ever allay the unrest and satisfy the Uitlander. There are other points in President Kruger's proposal which might appear to be insignificant to a casual observer, but which will never work in this country.

PROOF OF RESIDENCE SUFFICIENT

Absolute proof of residence should be enough, and the field-cornet's books—at least, as they have been kept in the past—could never be admitted as the only proof. To see a field-cornet's books is sufficient to know this. We all know that some of these books have been lost. They are not kept in any special chest or archives. They may easily be lost, stolen, burnt, or falsified. In the past field-cornets have not regarded these books as being of very great importance.

A PUERILE AND TRIVIAL EXCUSE

No effort has been made to keep them accurately posted, and the mere neglect to register ten or twelve years ago should not debar a person from being admitted to citizenship as fully as his more careful neighbour. The excuse that such a citizen has not complied with the law is puerile and trivial. As well might we say that a person is not married because he neglected to sign the marriage-register kept by the parson. What is meant by two years' 'continuous registration' I do not know. It seems to me that once registered, the registration must necessarily be continuous. Nor do I understand the advantage to the State of such a provision. Residence during the time of registration must also be continuous, so that if for business purposes or for family reasons I am compelled to cross the border I forfeit my right to become a citizen. Then the would-be citizen must show that he has abided by the laws. What laws? The term is vague and general. The man who has been fined for not having plucked the *Xanthium spinosum* out of his field has not abided by the laws. Must he therefore be excluded from citizenship? What is an act against the Regeering?

By Volksraad besluit the Regeering consists of the President and the State Secretary. Does this mean an act against these gentlemen? What sort of an act? Who is to judge whether the person applying for citizenship has done an act against the Regeering? Is the Regeering itself to judge this? The measure is ridiculous. If the Executive Council, then the door is open to favouritism and bias. If the Volksraad, then party politics will play a great part in deciding who is and who is not to be admitted. Surely it is enough to exclude such persons as have been convicted of some crime, and not to leave the matter enshrouded in doubt. Then the citizen must be a citizen of his own State, and he must produce proofs thereof. How many of us if called upon could do this? How many persons are doubtful as to which State they belong to, owing to the conflicting laws of various States, and the complicated questions that this matter gives rise to! Even great international jurists sometimes disagree on this point. Take, for instance, the Jameson burghers that were admitted to burgher rights here, and who have forsworn allegiance to their own State. If they cannot prove satisfactorily within three months that they should have got these rights, to which country do they belong? Not to the country they have renounced, and by act of the Raad not to this country. To what country, then? How could they produce proofs of citizenship?

THE PROPOSAL UNSATISFACTORY AND UNACCEPTABLE

But, sir, I do not wish to criticise the proposal at full length. I merely wish to show how unsatisfactory and how unacceptable the proposal is. It does not appear as if it had been made with a desire to appease the sentiment of the Uitlander, or if made with that desire, the proposers have not grasped the situation. Nothing short of a full franchise after a certain term of years can allay the unrest and satisfy the Uitlander sentiment. The term of years should not be an impracticable term—five, six, or seven years at the utmost. There should be a property qualification and adequate proof of residence, such as a Court of Law would accept. There may be provisions to exclude the criminal class, but further there should be no restrictions. Past residence should also be taken into account, but whatever the number of years may be, if the Uitlander can prove that he has been domiciled here for the term of years required, then he should be admitted to the full franchise. As General Joubert has lately said, he must be able to demand it—not to beg for it on his knees. Unless the Raad passes some such measure, and opens the door freely, unobtrusively, and honestly to the Uitlanders, I feel certain that we shall always have dissatisfaction and unrest, and this country, which might be prosperous, will gradually fall back instead of advance. But if there is one thing more than another for which I loathe and detest this illiberal policy of excluding the Uitlanders from the full franchise, it is that I firmly believe that it adds more to the race-hatred that we see around us than any other thing that I know of. It feeds and waters the roots of race-hatred in this country, from whence it

spreads its trunk and branches over the whole of South Africa. May the Legislature of this country realize the evil that has been wrought, and atone for the past by soon giving the Uitlander the hand of friendship and that share in the government of this country to which in the eyes of every just man he must appear to be entitled.

(Signed) J. W. WESSELS.

APPENDIX B

BOER ARMAMENTS

A COLOSSAL STORE

It is altogether wrong to imagine that the Boers only began to arm their burghers and fortify their country after the Jameson Raid. That event naturally gave an immense impetus to their warlike preparations, but it is easy for those who have lived in the country to trace back many significant incidents of the importation of munitions of war to a period much antecedent to that date.

It is not necessary to go back further than the year 1886, for by a curious and perhaps not altogether fortuitous coincidence that was the date of the establishment of the Transvaal Government gunpowder factory. One Nellmapius, now dead, but whose memory is kept green through his connection with the liquor monopoly and the gift of his present residence to Paul Kruger, was concerned in the establishment of this powder factory. This factory was avowedly erected in order to supply the burghers with good powder at a cheap rate; but it is on record that the Government, even at that time, was fully alive to its possibilities in view of future eventualities.

IN 1894

In the year 1894 Dr. Leyds paid one of his periodical visits to Europe, his poor throat affection being, as usual, the alleged cause of his absence from the Republic for some months. His real object, however, was to place large orders for war materials with sundry European firms of very high standing.

The guns and ammunition came from various countries, some undoubtedly from England; but Germany, America, Scandinavia, and France also contributed. Whether the respective Governments knew the destination of the large orders then given it would be now futile to inquire.

From month to month and from year to year the steady importation of men and material continued.

Over a hundred thousand Mauser rifles and about half that number of Lee-Metfords came into the country, together with a

disproportionately large quantity of cartridges, estimated at many million rounds. A large quantity of these have been traced to their ultimate destinations within and without the Transvaal. Every burgher of the country received a rifle for himself and every member of his family. From a hundred to five hundred rounds of ammunition accompanied this practically free gift.

BLIND OFFICIALDOM

This distribution of arms was by no means confined to the Transvaal. It is extraordinary, in the light of later events, that this action on the part of the Transvaal Government, which was not done too secretly, and was freely commented upon by the *Uitlander* press, should not have been brought to the notice of the Imperial Government, or, if such was done, that no steps were taken to check this arming of the disloyal element among Her Majesty's subjects.

The importation of cannon from France and Germany went on steadily also, and in 1898 the Transvaal possessed fourteen 6-inch Creusot guns, carrying a 94-lb. shot. They also had the five Nordenfeldts taken from Dr. Jameson's column, ten Krupp 5-inch guns, ten English 7 pounders, eight English 12 pounders, six Krupp 90 pounders, and twenty 77 mm. Krupps. They also added to their armament three Maxim-Nordenfeldts, 37 mm.; ten Hotchkiss, 37 mm.; thirty Maxims of 303 and Martini pattern; and 500 Mauser pistols.

BOER ARTILLERY

This was two years ago. A careful reckoning up of their present available artillery takes the following shape: Eight Krupps, 75 mm.; sixteen Creusot, 75 mm.; ten Maxim-Nordenfeldts; twenty-four Maxims, 75 mm.; eight howitzers (four Krupps, four Creusot), 12 mm.; four Krupp mountain guns, 37 mm.; four Creusot, 155 mm.; ten Hotchkiss, 37 mm.; ten English 7 pounders; eight English 12 pounders.

An estimate which places the Boer artillery at a greater number than 100 to 120 pieces is probably erroneous.

PRETORIA FORTS

The armaments of the Pretoria forts just previous to the outbreak of war were two Creusot guns, each of which weighed four-teen tons and carried a 94-lb. projectile, carrying over ten miles.

The guns, however, may possibly have been shifted to the front.

Shortly after this time—in July, 1896, to be precise—Mr. Webley, of Birmingham, known all over the world as a revolver-maker of note, was staying for some weeks at Pretoria, and was understood to have done good business in connection with the various orders placed by the Transvaal Government.

During 1899 enormous stocks of food-stuffs were collected in

Pretoria. The big iron Government store in Market Street contained 100,000 bags of mealies. Beckett's had the same quantity in stock, and half the number of sacks of flour. Johnstone and Co., John Jack and Co., and other firms also held huge warehouses full, and hardly any house in the town but had laid in provisions for at least six months. All these comparatively small details are significant.

It should not be forgotten that for thirteen years past a very large proportion of the taxes, direct and indirect, mulcted from the Uitlanders in the shape of high duties, railway charges on mining machinery, 'war tax' on gold farms, etc., has been spent on arms and ammunition.

A BIG BILL

This is the official statement of the expenditure of the Transvaal on military affairs from 1889 to 1898 :

1889	£75,523
1890	42,999
1891	117,927
1892	29,739
1893	19,340
1894	28,158
1895	87,308
1896	495,618
1897	396,384
1898*	163,451

Beyond these figures there are large payments for war material which are concealed under other heads of expenditure. For instance, in 1895 'Sundry Services' stood at £838,877 ; in 1896 'Special Payments' are set down for £682,008 ; and in 1897 'Public Works' show a grand total of £1,012,686. Over and above these items, which in themselves are so suspiciously large as fully to warrant the belief that they include part of the cost of armament, there is a yearly increasing total assigned to secret service, which has been as high as £120,000 a year. The spending of this is largely in the hands of Dr. Leyds, and it is a fair assumption that a portion thereof has been devoted to the acquisition of munitions of war.

The Boers have steadily been arming for ten years past, if not more. They knew—or, at any rate, Kruger, Joubert, and Leyds knew—that war had to come sooner or later, and they determined not to be unprepared.—*Cape Times*, March 24, 1900.

SECRET SERVICE

Lord Salisbury, in his speech in the House of Lords, January 30, 1900, said that in one year the Transvaal had spent in secret service no less a sum than £800,000.

* For the first nine months only.

APPENDIX C

PRESIDENT KRUGER AND HIS DECLARED AIMS

THE following article, written by the author of this volume, appeared in one of the Transvaal dailies at the time of the last Presidential election (1897).

For various reasons I have no desire to alter the article from the form in which it was originally written—at least, it affords evidence of a phase of thought and feeling at that time, and proves that the writer was not wise only after the event.

PRESIDENT KRUGER

‘Weighed in the balance, and found wanting.’

Now that we are on the eve of another Presidential election in the Transvaal, and as the prostitute press point to President Kruger as the one and only man capable of ably swaying the destiny of this State, the present is not an inopportune time to consider the man and his work.

There be some who point to Paul Kruger as one standing alone in rugged grandeur, not only far above his fellows, but as one of the wisest and best of rulers; while others denounce him as bitterly as ever Gladstone has been denounced; but we would rather take him and his work, and, after making due allowance for the difficulties against which he has had to contend, endeavour to show that these difficulties have, to a great extent, been of his own creation, and that golden opportunities have been lost.

From the Uitlanders' point of view, it is not necessary to go further back in the history of this Republic than some ten years ago, when a new era of prosperity began to dawn upon this land so richly endowed by Nature. We assume that, in view of the new order of things and the future effects which to a statesman must have been apparent, the chief aims of President Kruger should have been: the independence of the State, its advancement in power and wealth, and, in accordance with the motto of the country, a union of all its peoples—‘Eendragt maakt magt.’* Alas! not only are burghers and Uitlanders disunited, but the people of the land themselves. Apart from a growing discontent amongst the burghers of the Transvaal, look at the sorry spectacle of ‘union’ (?) in the land: First and Second Raad, Executive, Government and Judiciary—turn where we will, and instead of union and strength we find discord and discontent.

And how has Paul Kruger furthered aims which should have

* Union makes strength.

been his ideal? Dangerously near to the rocks has Independence sailed. No less than four times since 1887 has the independence of the Transvaal been jeopardized, and, all times, needlessly. Shortly after the time of the 'flag-pulling incident,' in 1890, it is an open secret that the ill-feeling aroused caused a conspiracy which even aimed at the capture of the capital itself; in 1895, at the time of the 'Drifts Question'; at the end of that year, when the political disabilities imposed upon the Uitlanders and the refusal to recognise their just claims resulted in the Reform Movement; and again this year, when (with a British squadron at Delagoa Bay) in diplomatic terms the repeal of the Aliens' Immigration Law was demanded. At all these times the Government under Paul Kruger courted disaster. The present situation, too, proves how grossly incapable are those who, by virtue of their positions, hold the destiny and independence of this country in their trust; for—owing to extravagant mismanagement and misgovernment—by the discontent of the people and the unsatisfactory state of the Government Exchequer, a position has been created so analogous to that of 1877 that, quite apart from the Uitlander and his side of the question, the future cannot be viewed by burghers of the Transvaal without apprehension.

As regards the advancement of the State, it may be best sorrowfully to draw a veil over the picture, rather than to dwell upon the fact that so fair and rich a land is strangled with incubuses which have sprung from and are nourished in its own bosom. One significant fact suffices. 'Transvaal Fives' stand at £107; Natal and Cape of Good Hope Four Per Cent. Stock stand respectively at £122 and £117.*

In the matter of the union of all the peoples of the land, instead of 'union and strength' we see discord and weakness—discord promoted by the Head of the State. In 1890, when President Kruger was so royally welcomed by the so-called 'alien population' of Johannesburg, at the great Paardekraal meeting the following year, at the 'forgive and forget' time, and, last of all, the day the remaining two Reformers were released, when Johannesburg was with impressionable heart joyfully celebrating Victoria's Jubilee—all these were golden opportunities when, by the exercise, on the part of Paul Kruger, of such wisdom and tact on a memorable occasion displayed by England's 'Good Queen Bess,' the Uitlanders might have been won as firm and grateful friends and supporters of the State. *But Pretoria's aim is not unity.*

President Kruger's declared desire is to secure and maintain the peace of South Africa. But, considering that no racial question between Dutch and English exists in Rhodesia, and that (until the persistence in a policy of unfriendliness to all Afrikaners born outside the South African Republic was the cause of the regrettable incidents which clouded South Africa early in 1896) race feeling had died out in the Orange Free State and Natal; and further, considering that (prior to the mistake which had the slightest justification only by the existence of a position which rendered

* Prices taken from the *Statist*, August 21, 1897.

such a raid possible) race-hatred had almost died out in the Cape Colony, it surely may be concluded that the only possible cause which might, amongst its white inhabitants, disturb the peace of South Africa, *i.e.*, race-hatred, has been fostered and promoted by the man of lost opportunities.

The solution of the South African problem lies in the fulfilment of the law by the law-makers of the South African Republic. President Kruger quotes Scripture glibly at will, but it is a sincere pity he does not endeavour to act up to the teachings of the holy Book he quotes. Leviticus says (xix. 33, 34): 'And if a stranger sojourns with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him. But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born amongst you'; and (xxiv. 22), 'Ye shall have one manner of law as well for the stranger as for one of your own country; for I am the Lord your God.' If President Kruger be a 'doer of the law' it is not yet too late to take these emphatic commands to heart, and the problem will solve itself. And then 'White South Africa' may all together grapple with the other great problem awaiting solution—the Native Question.

In this necessarily brief review of Paul Kruger's recent stewardship we have not referred to qualities essential in a statesman and ruler—qualities often ascribed to President Kruger—namely, greatness, coupled with ability to rule, and patriotism. Has not reason here been blinded by fulsome adoration?

President Kruger undoubtedly deserves credit for possessing a policy and aim which he has persistently and consistently endeavoured to carry out—a policy antagonistic to British supremacy in Southern Africa. But now it is a wonder he has not sufficient acumen to perceive that he might as well attempt to stay the ocean with a broom. Presuming on the prejudices of his race, with the positive assistance of the Afrikaner Bond, and the negative aid afforded by a vacillating and timid Colonial Office, President Kruger *once* saw his aims within measurable distance of realization; but his hopes have been shattered by the partial fulfilment of the dreams of another, whom he so jealously and bitterly hates. Mackenzie, Warren, and Rhodes have all left their indelible marks upon the history of British South Africa and Transvaal expansion; but beyond the circumstance that Paul Kruger was President of the South African Republic during an exceptionally important period of its development, what record will live which will justify future generations calling him a 'great man'? What has Paul Kruger *achieved*?

As compared with the politicians of the Cape and Natal, and by the parasites paid from Pretoria, President Kruger may be lauded as a heaven-born genius; but when in opposition to firm men like the three above named he has failed, and now in sorry plight we see a hide-bound State divided in councils, and discredited, not only in South Africa, but in the eyes of the world. A man worthy to be called 'great' would (enjoying the guaranteed independence the State was favoured with) have strengthened the position he held by absorbing all South Africans at once, and Europeans after probation, instead of making the majority of the inhabitants of the

State not only aliens in name but in feeling. President Kruger's ability as a ruler should be measured by his success.

In conclusion, let us look at Kruger the patriot. In his younger days, before he was blinded by the 'god of this world,' Paul Kruger apparently was a patriot. Indeed, we believe he really had a pride and unselfish love for the country of his adoption*—for President Kruger himself is only an old, or early, Uitlander!—but, unless we are greatly mistaken, of late years the term 'independence of the State' has merely been a bogey to conjure with. It is worthy of note that, although when necessity arises he is able to coerce or sway his Raads, President Kruger is ever ready with the assertion that his burghers will not consent to his giving what he professes to be willing personally to concede; and now with patriotism so mixed with selfish and interested motives to suit his own purposes or policy he desires to play off all parties one against the other to the end. Relatives and partizans of President Kruger have benefited and been interested in concessions and 'jobs' to the detriment of the State, but we need go no further back than the present year to see the depths of his latter-day patriotism. It is a true saying, 'Money speaks.' Let us see how eloquently President Kruger's does for his burghers. Although an exceedingly rich man (we understand with a sum running well into six figures deposited at interest on the continent of Europe), and one in receipt of a salary of £7,000 a year, to say nothing of 'coffee-money,' or aught else, yet when his beloved burghers in his own old district, Rustenburg, were reported to be fever-stricken and starving, we learn on the authority of the official press of the country that President Kruger contributed £5 to the Rustenburg Relief Fund! Again, were President Kruger's love for his country as great as his professions indicate, would he not, like Rhodes, who has spent fortunes on the land his name is so closely associated with, rather have come to its assistance with a temporary loan at nominal interest than have gone to private individuals in the manner and on the terms he has recently done?†

We can come to no other conclusion than that not only has President Kruger's stewardship been in the main productive of evil for the Transvaal in particular and South Africa in general, but that he and a following have grown rich while the resources and finances of the country have been wasted and squandered, while neither the Uitlanders nor the burghers of the State as a whole have been benefited.

* Mr. Kruger was born in Colesberg, Cape Colony.

† About this time the Transvaal Government borrowed sums of money from Messrs. Sam Marks and J. B. Robinson.

APPENDIX D

EVIDENCE AS TO UITLANDERS' WILLINGNESS TO
'BURY THE HATCHET' AFTER THE RAID

Since writing the text of Chapter II., I have had the opportunity of leisurely going over the debates in the Cape Assembly about the time of the Raid, and onwards from that date.

I notice in the course of Mr. J. Rose-Innes's remarks on the Peace Debate words which confirm the statement I made from personal knowledge of the feelings of the average Uitlander at that time. Mr. J. Rose-Innes, Q.C., is the leader of the Moderate Party at the Cape—or was, I should say, for now there is no middle party—and is a gentleman who has held Cabinet rank as Attorney-General.

Mr. Rose-Innes said :

'He did not want to say anything about Transvaal affairs more than was necessary, but they were known to everybody. He said that they had there a new population which was much larger than the old population, which owned more of land, and which bore most of the taxation, having no representation, no power of holding public meetings, liable to be sent across the border without an appeal to law. He asked the House was that a position of affairs that could go on? Surely they could express an opinion on the amendment before the House. He did not expect that improvements should be done all at once. No one, he was sure, would expect that President Kruger could deal with one fell swoop with those grievances. They knew there was an extreme party in the Transvaal, and they knew that there were many difficulties in the way of redressing those grievances all at once.

'But he said that if the Government of the Transvaal would only take two steps in advance, and come to the relief of the Uitlander population, and seek to deal with them in a liberal-spirited manner, much could be done; but they did nothing. . . . He was sure that, were steps taken by the Transvaal Government, *the Uitlanders would meet the Government more than half-way*. He said last year, and he repeated it, *that great responsibility lay on the Afrikaner section of the Bond*, for they could exert great influence on the Transvaal Government. . . . He said again that they had a heavy responsibility if they did not seek to use their influence with the Transvaal Government, *for it might come that the time would be past*.

'He used the words "continuance of the policy of moderation" in his amendment because he was convinced that the English Government had pursued a moderate policy in the past; and throughout the generality of their dealings in South Africa, he

said, England had pursued a moderate policy' (Cape Hansard, House of Assembly, 1897, p. 82).

In the course of the debate in which the speech above quoted was made Mr. Schreiner, in alluding to Mr. Rose-Innes, said that 'there was no member in that House who wished more earnestly and more sincerely for peace and harmony in South Africa than did that honourable and learned member, the leader of the Opposition.'

APPENDIX E

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION—ABRIDGED REPORT

In the *Staats Courant*, or Government Gazette, of April 14, 1897, the following notice appeared :

It is hereby made known for general information that the Executive Council has seen fit to institute an inquiry with reference to the present alleged state of affairs in connection with the mining industry of the Witwatersrand diggers in general, and to furnish the Executive Council with a report regarding all matters that may have stood in the way, or have hindered, and still may hinder, the development of the mining industry ; and further, *as soon as possible*, to make such recommendations as may tend to the improvement and amendment of such matters.

The Commission charged with this inquiry consists of the following gentlemen : S. W. Burger, Member of the Executive Council ; J. S. Smit, Commissioner of Railways ; C. J. Joubert, Minister of Mines ; G. Schmitz-Dumont, Acting S. M. Engineer ; J. F. De Beer, First Sp. Jud. Commissioner, as ordinary members ; with Mr. Thos. Hugo, of the National Bank of the South African Republic. Messrs. E. Brochon, J. Pierce, and A. Brakhan shall either jointly as a Commission, or severally, support the permanent members of the Commission with their advice, when requested. In order to make the work of the Commission as wide as possible they are authorized to take evidence on all those matters that can forward the aim of the Commission.

The Government desires to bring under the notice of all persons concerned that the willing tendering of evidence and information by each and every one, no matter from whom required, will greatly assist the above-described aim.

(Signed) C. VAN BOESCHOTEN,
Acting State Secretary.

Government Offices, Pretoria,
April 14, 1897.

COMMITTEE'S REPORT—ABRIDGED

TO HIS HONOUR THE STATE PRESIDENT AND HON. MEMBERS
OF THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, PRETORIA

HONOURABLE SIRS,

In accordance with your instructions contained in your letters addressed to the members of this Commission, dated April 5, 1897, your Commission have the honour to report as follows :

On April 9 last your Commission commenced proceedings at Pretoria, and, after having been engaged there for a few days in arranging preliminary matters in connection with the inquiry, your Commission decided to go to Johannesburg to pursue their investigations.

On April 20 the inquiry commenced at Johannesburg, and your Commission deemed it in the interest of all concerned to have the proceedings in public, and to give the same the widest publicity.

In the first place, your Commission set themselves the task to institute minute and careful investigation with regard to the depression in matters connected with the mining industry, and ascertained that during the year 1896 there were 183 gold mines within the State, whereof 79 produced gold to an amount and value of £8,603,821. The remaining 104 mines yielded no gold, most of these being in a state of development and equipment, whilst only 25 companies declared dividends to a total amount of £1,718,781. For various reasons some mines have temporarily ceased operations. The cause of so many mines not paying dividends is primarily to be ascribed to the high cost of production. There are various other causes that have contributed to the existing condition of things, but where mistakes have been made in the past your Commission is pleased to state that at present there exist all the indications of a pure administration ; and the State as well as the mining industry must be congratulated upon the fact that most of the mines are controlled and engineered by financial and practical men who are devoting their time, energy, skill, and knowledge to the interest of the mining industry, and who have not only introduced the latest machinery and mining appliances, but also the greatest perfection of method and process known to science. But for these, a good many of the mines now producing gold would not have reached that stage.

The question, therefore, becomes one of national economy ; and it is incumbent upon the Government, considering the rapid growth and progress of the country, so to alter its fiscal law system and administration as to meet the requirements of its principal industry. A close scrutiny of the combined report of the Chamber of Mines and Mercantile Association proves that the commercial interest and that of the mining industry are so interlaced that it is hardly possible to separate the one from the other, and all economical measures with regard to taxation, freight, etc., must apply to both.

Your Commission think that, with the natural facilities for agriculture, this industry ought to be greatly encouraged. As a natural

result, the development of this industry will materially reduce the cost of living, which will have an immediate and beneficial effect on the price of labour. It is a fact much to be regretted that the advance of agriculture is not proportionate with that of the mining industry and the general growth and progress of the country ; and it is, therefore, of the greatest importance to establish an agricultural department, and for the Government to take active measures to promote the interests of the industry by assisting, where such is feasible, to have same conducted on the most improved and modern principles as practised in other parts of the world. In submitting to the Government a scheme for reducing the burdens of the mining industry, it is naturally to be expected that the latter will also practise economy in every department. Judging from recent events, and by the persistent manner in which the mines have reduced, and are further trying to reduce, the expenses, it leaves no doubt with your Commission that the mines, after so far having taken the initiative, will act responsively to any economical measure the Government may think proper to introduce. Your Commission entirely disapprove of the concessions through which the industrial prosperity of the country is hampered.

Such might have been expedient in the past, but the country has arrived at a stage of development that will only admit of free competition according to Republican principles. This applies more especially to the gold industry, that has to face its own economical problems without being further burdened with concessions that are irksome and injurious to the industry, and will always remain a source of irritation and dissatisfaction.

From the commencement of the inquiry it was clear to your Commission that the question of labour was a most vital one for the mines, and seeing that the cost of labour amounted to from 50 to 60 per cent. of the production costs, your Commission are of opinion that the labour question deserves the first place in their report.

Not only in this Republic, but in most countries all over the world, the labour question is a most difficult one to deal with. It still remains a subject for discussion, notwithstanding that the most renowned and eminent politicians and statesmen have tried to solve the question.

A combination of circumstances in this country renders the solution still more difficult ; and from the evidence laid before you it will be apparent how complicated the question is.

To begin with

WHITE LABOUR

Your Commission would strongly recommend that all measures should be taken by which the cost of living at the mines would be reduced as much as possible.

Judging superficially, and taking into consideration the wages paid by the companies in other parts of the world, and the evidence on the subject submitted to your Commission, it would appear as if wages paid here are too high ; but, taking all the circumstances into consideration, the contrary is apparent.

It must be taken as a fact that no skilled labourer can or will work for a salary or wage less than will enable him to support himself and his family.

According to evidence, a miner earns from £18 to £30 per month, according to ability, and your Commission are of opinion these wages are not excessive, regard being given to the high cost of living at the mines; in fact, they are only sufficient to satisfy daily wants, and consequently it cannot be expected that white labourers will establish their permanent abode in this Republic unless conditions are made by which their position will be ameliorated. . . .

Your Commission are of opinion that as long as the cost of living cannot be considerably reduced it will be almost impossible to reduce the wages of white labourers; and they would strongly recommend that, as far as possible, necessities of life should be imported free of import duty, and conveyed to the mines as cheaply as possible. Your Commission, further, are of opinion that it will be desirable to encourage as much as possible other industries besides the mining industry, which will also tend to procure employment for white labourers.

LIQUOR LAW

Your Commission have thought it desirable to consider the liquor traffic also in their report, because they are of opinion that it directly affects the mining industry.

It must be remembered that the liquor traffic, together with the import duties and licenses in connection with the same, contributes to the revenue of the State.

It has been proved to your Commission that the Liquor Law, No. 17, 1896, is not carried out properly, and that the mining industry has real grievances in connection therewith, owing to the illicit sale of strong drink to the natives at the mines, and they wish specially and strongly to insist that the stipulations of Article 16 of the law shall be strictly carried out. The evidence given on this point proves a miserable state of affairs, and a much stronger application of the law is required.

Your Commission recommend :

- (a) That all licenses for boarding-houses for white people at the mines shall in future be only issued by the Commission for Liquor Licenses (licensing board).
- (b) More police, and better system of supervision at the mines.
- (c) That where any unlicensed person is convicted of selling strong drink to natives at the mines or elsewhere, the only punishment to be inflicted shall be imprisonment. Your Commission are in favour of the strict carrying out of this law, but have found that it is in some respects too drastic.

TRANSIT DUTY

These duties are unfair, and ought to be abolished. Yearly an amount of £600,000 is paid by this Republic to the neighbouring States (Orange Free State excepted).

It may be adduced from the other side that heavy expenses have been made to construct docks and warehouses ; but against this can be said that the consignors and consignees are charged heavy dock fees, which, if carefully calculated, amply repay the expenses.

The authority of the Commission for the figures quoted is Mr. Wiener, member of the Cape Parliament and Chairman of the United Chambers of Commerce of South Africa. and your Commission are of opinion that statistics from such a source can be taken to be reliable.

The Commission recommend that negotiations shall be entered into with the interested colonies to have those transit duties abolished, but before doing so wish to recommend that the Government of this Republic shall abolish the transit duties on goods to the north as at present levied.

IMPORT DUTIES

With reference to this matter, your Commission can only recommend that if possible food-stuffs ought to be entirely free from taxation, as at the present moment it is impossible to supply the population of the Republic from the products of local agriculture, and consequently importation is absolutely necessary.

EXPLOSIVES

Before entering on this subject, we wish to put on record our disappointment with the evidence tendered on behalf of the South African Explosives Company, Limited.

We expected, and we think not unreasonably, that they would be able to give reliable information for our guidance respecting the cost of importation, as well as of local manufacture, of the principal explosives used for mining purposes ; but though persistently questioned on these points, few facts were elicited, and we regret to say they entirely failed to satisfy us in this important respect.

The importation of a cheap supply of all necessities required for mining purposes in order to secure success is perhaps too obvious to need repeating, but we may mention that the one item most frequently referred to by witnesses in this connection was the cost of the explosives.

It has, we consider, been clearly proved that the price paid by the mines for explosives of all kinds is unreasonably high, having due regard to original cost and expenses of delivery in the South African Republic, and in our opinion a considerable reduction should be brought about.

In making recommendations with this object in view, it must be stated at the outset that the main difficulty in dealing with the question arises from the existence of the contract, by means of which the monopolists are able to maintain the present high price, in spite of the fact that the manufactured article is mostly obtained by them in Europe at a very much lower cost. Consequently the advantages which the Government intended to confer on the country by establishing a new industry here have not been realized,

whilst the monopoly has proved a serious burden on the mining industry. That the principal explosives used here (blasting gelatine, and to a small extent dynamite) can be purchased in Europe and delivered here at a price far below the present cost to the mines has been proved to us by the evidence of many witnesses competent to speak on the subject, and when we bear in mind that the excess charge of 40s. to 45s. per case sold does not benefit the State, but serves to enrich individuals for the most part resident in Europe, the injustice of such a tax on the staple industry becomes more apparent, and demands immediate removal.

It is in evidence that the South African Republic is one of the largest, if not the largest, consumers of explosives in the world, and following the rule of commerce in such cases it is reasonable to suppose that the most advantageous terms would be secured for so large a consumer, which no doubt would be the case were it not for the monopoly now in the hands of the South African Explosives Company, whereby they and their friends make enormous profits at the expense of the mining industry.

These profits have been estimated by the Volksraad Dynamite Commission at no less than £580,000 for the years 1897 and 1898, being £2 per case on 290,000 cases, the number which it is estimated will have to be imported to meet the demands for those years. It is thus clear that the hope of establishing a factory capable of supplying the requirements of the mines within a reasonable time from the products of the country is far from being realized. From the evidence of witnesses other than the managing director of the Explosives Company, we are led to believe that dynamite No. 1, containing 75 per cent. of nitro-glycerine, can be delivered free on board at Hamburg at 23s. 6d. per case of 50 lbs., the cost of bringing it to Johannesburg being about 14s. additional. The managing director of the company, however, has since stated that Nobels invoice it to them at 29s. 6d. free on board in Hamburg; but the difference is not essential to the point we have to deal with here.

This explosive, whether costing 23s. 6d. or 29s. 6d. in Hamburg, is supplied to the mines at 85s. per case, showing a profit of 47s. 6d. in one case and 41s. 6d. in the other, of which the Government receives 5s. per case.

That this is a reasonable estimate is supported by the report of the Volksraad Dynamite Commission, who state that the company makes a profit of £2 per case on imported dynamite, and further by the evidence of a former agent of Nobel's Dynamite Trust, whose statement was to the effect that he made an offer on behalf of Nobels to deliver dynamite ex-magazine on the Rand at 40s. per case of 50 lbs., excluding duty, and this at a time when it had to be brought a considerable distance by ox-waggon.

In the case of blasting gelatine, which is now more largely used than No. 1 dynamite, the margin of profit made by the company at the expense of the mines is even greater.

The evidence led on behalf of the company is that the cost is 43s. 6d. per case free on board in Hamburg, the freight, etc., to Johannesburg being about 14s. per case. Therefore, by the com-

pany's own showing, the difference in price in Europe between blasting gelatine and dynamite No. 1 is 14s. per case (43s. 6d. and 29s. 6d.), whilst the charges for bringing the articles into the South African Republic are the same. Seeing that the company charges the mines for blasting gelatine 22s. 6d. over and above the price of dynamite No. 1 (namely, 107s. 6d., as against 85s.), it is evident that the profit falling to the company is still larger. Other evidence laid before your Commission gives the difference in cost of blasting gelatine and No. 1 dynamite at only 7s. to 10s. per case.

The mining industry has thus to bear a burden which does not enrich the State, or bring any benefit in return, and this fact must always prove a source of irritation and annoyance to those who, while willing to contribute to just taxation for the general good, cannot acquiesce in an impost of the nature complained of.

The importance of this question to the mining industry may be gathered from the fact that explosives have been shown to average 9 per cent. of the total working cost, but for the development work the percentage is a higher one.

On June 4, 1897, your Commission inspected the factory at Modderfontein, and it cannot be denied that the construction of the works and general equipment are in many respects admirable; and it appeared to us greatly to be regretted that so much money should have been invested in an undertaking for the manufacture of any article whereof the ingredients have to be imported at a great cost, four tons of raw material being required to produce one ton of the manufactured article. It has been proved to our satisfaction that none of the raw material used is found in this country, or only in such small quantities as to make it practically valueless for the purpose required; and the coal consumed, although obtained here, is 40 to 50 per cent. dearer than that delivered at factories in Europe.

Labour, also, of the kind required is three or four times more expensive than, for instance, labour in Germany, while the excessive cost of transport tends greatly to enhance the price of such materials.

We are informed that experiments have been made with the object of manufacturing sulphuric acid from material procured here, but these efforts to use the products of the country are still in the experimental stage.

There is also no market here for the by-products, which in Europe have considerable commercial value, thus further increasing the cost of the manufactured article. All these drawbacks, which make it almost impossible to establish a *bonâ fide* industry, fall on the mines, and render their task, especially that of the low-grade mines, extremely difficult and discouraging.

The desirability of establishing industries of all kinds within the Republic cannot for a moment be doubted; but when it is proposed to establish an artificial industry, whose only hope of success lies in the extension to which it may be allowed to unduly profit from, instead of benefiting a natural and more important enterprise, the economic fallacy of the proposition becomes sufficiently clear to

need little further demonstration. Another point that has been brought to the notice of your Commission is the prejudicial effect exercised by the monopoly in practically excluding from the country all new inventions in connection with explosives, and in view of the numerous dynamite accidents that have taken place from time to time it is to be regretted that it is not possible to make satisfactory trials of other and less dangerous explosives for the working of mines.

These questions have received the careful consideration of your Commission, who are forced to the conclusion that the factory has not attained the object with which it was established, and that there is no reasonable prospect of its doing so.

That there are good grounds for believing that the contractors have failed to comply with the conditions of their contract, which required them to establish, complete, and bring into operation, on or before April 24, 1896, one or more factories for the manufacture of dynamite and other explosives of such nature and quality, and of such quantity, as the requirements and demands within the South African Republic shall require and demand.

For the aforesaid reasons, and in view of the opinion expressed by the Volksraad Dynamite Committee, that the legal position of the Government against the contractors is undoubtedly strong, your Commission desire to recommend that the case be placed in the hands of the legal advisers of the State, with a view to ascertain whether the contract can be cancelled.

Meanwhile, your Commission recommend that the Government avail itself forthwith of its right under Article 15 of the regulations, namely:

The Government will reserve for itself—

- (a) The right, when the interests of the State render it necessary, to take away the agency of trading in gunpowder, dynamite, cartridges, and other explosive stuffs, from above-mentioned persons, etc.,

and at once take into its own hands the importation of dynamite and other explosives for the benefit of the mining industry, subject to duty of not more than 20s. per case, or such other less sum as may be determined on from time to time. This protecting duty, while considerably increasing the revenue of the State, would at the same time afford ample protection to any industry of this description in the Republic.

In the event of cancellation being advised to be possible, free trade in explosives to be at once established, subject to a duty of 20s. per case, or such other less duty as may be determined upon from time to time, and manufacturing of other explosives in the Republic to be allowed also, to be protected by the same import duty.

Your Commission are of opinion that effective free trade will in no wise be jeopardized by the existence of any ring or combination for the sale of explosives in Europe.

Your Commission further wish to recommend the free importation of detonators.

Your Commission desire further to observe that it is not clear to them, judging from the published accounts of the South African Explosives Company for 1895 and 1896, that the Government receives the proportion of surplus profit secured to it under the contract, namely, 20 per cent., and would strongly recommend, in accordance with Article 6 of the contract, an immediate investigation of this company's accounts by qualified accountants, in conjunction with the financial adviser of the Commission, in order to find out what amount is still due to the Government under this head ; and, further, to cause inquiry to be made about the quantity of cases of blasting material, gelatine, and dynamite imported during 1896-97.

RAILWAYS

Your Commission have followed with great attention and interest the evidence and statistics submitted on this point.

From these it appears that not only are the tariffs charged by the N.Z.A.S.M. Company such that, by reduction of the same, the industry would be considerably benefited, but that such a reduction would not only be fair, but carry with it, as a natural consequence, that the neighbouring States and colonies would have to reduce their tariffs considerably. It does not lie within the scope of the labours of this Commission to enter into the application of the tariffs at present existing and charged by the N.Z.A.S.M., because this would require a technical knowledge of railway matters, about which your Commission had neither the power nor opportunity to gain information.

Your Commission have come to the conclusion that, taking into consideration the evidence submitted to them, and taking the gross revenue of traffic of goods at about £2,000,000 (as in 1896), it will be desirable to recommend so to regulate the tariff for the cartage of goods that the gross revenue for goods traffic for 1896 would have been reduced by £500,000, equivalent to an average reduction of 25 per cent.

Further, your Commission deem it desirable that the Government shall make such arrangements as will secure to them in the future a voice in the fixing of the tariffs of the N.Z.A.S.M., and express their confidence that as soon as prosperous times will warrant such a course, a further reduction in tariffs will be effected.

Your Commission wish to recommend that the reduction will be chiefly applied to traffic of coal, timber, mining machinery, and food-stuffs, according to a scale to be agreed upon between the Government and the N.Z.A.S.M.

Your Commission are of opinion that in this manner the industry will be met in a very fair way.

Your Commission wish to express their opinion that it is absolutely necessary that the reduction in all local tariffs will be brought about as speedily as possible, while they express the hope that where the co-operation of the neighbouring States and colonies

is required, negotiations will be initiated, and carried out so speedily that the reductions to be so initiated will come into force not later than January 1 next.

Several witnesses and some of the members of the Commission have urged the expropriation of the N.Z.A.S.M. by the Government. Your Commission, however, for several reasons known to them, and after same have been communicated to those members of the Commission who wished to urge expropriation of the N.Z.A.S.M., do not at the present moment desire to urge expropriation, provided by other means terms can be secured from the company so as to obtain the reduction at present urgently required on the basis as above set forth. Your Commission have been informed that the company have proposed to the Government to adopt the dividend of the three years 1895, 1896, and 1897 as a basis for the expropriation price, and your Commission can agree to such proposal.

The expropriation price being thus fixed, the company will have all the more reason to co-operate towards the lowering of the tariffs. Further, it appears from the evidence of the managing director of the N.Z.A.S.M. that, in consideration of the reduction of tariffs, he wished to have secured to the company a certain period of existence. Your Commission cannot recommend this course, because they do not deem the same to be in the interests of the State, and it would be contrary to the wishes of the public.

Your Commission further wish to recommend that the Government shall take measures to effect an alteration as speedily as possible in the tariffs of the neighbouring States and colonies, so as to place them on a reasonable basis. From the evidence and statistics submitted to your Commission, it appears that the neighbouring States and colonies have made very large profits out of their railway traffic, and it is only fair to expect that they will understand the desirability of a considerable reduction.

Before leaving the subject of the reduction of tariffs, your Commission want to remark that the tariff for coal traffic ought to command the largest reduction.

Your Commission have further found that the mining industry has real complaints about the few facilities given by the company in delivery of coal and goods in general, and your Commission are of opinion that every measure ought to be taken to facilitate such delivery.

In connection herewith your Commission recommend that a line of railway shall be constructed to the south of the Main Reef, between Boksburg and Krugersdorp, specially intended for the carrying of coal; and that to the different companies leave should be granted to construct sidings from that line and other lines to their mines, with permission to employ steam-power, after approval of the plans by the Government Commissioner of Railways. This will take away the objection at present existing against the payment for the detention of coal-trucks and the expenses thereon.

Your Commission further wish to recommend that it will be desirable to relieve the tariffs or coal-traffic of every and any petty charges which are at present charged for truck-hire, shunting,

detention, etc. Your Commission further recommend that the company will, as soon as possible, provide a quantity of proper coal-trucks, by which coal can be carried in bulk, and by which the unnecessary expense of bags will be obviated.

Finally, your Commission are of opinion that the greatest facilities ought to be granted for the better despatch of all agricultural produce at a low price, and, if required, by night trains, to the principal markets of the Republic. There is no reason why milk and other perishable articles cannot be loaded at night at any station of the N.Z.A.S.M., and delivered in time for the markets. As an argument against this may be adduced that at the present moment a very small quantity of such produce would be offered for transport, but your Commission are of opinion that if the opportunity were afforded, probably an important industry in these articles would be created.

GOLD THEFTS

According to the evidence submitted to your Commission, gold thefts are on the increase, and, although the Volksraad had given the matter their favourable consideration, and have, at the instance of the mining industry, so amended the Gold Law as to provide for the punishment for the sale and for being in possession of raw gold, still, it has been stated to your Commission in evidence that the gold thefts amount to about 10 per cent. of the output, equivalent to an amount of £750,000 per annum.

It follows that the administration of the law must be faulty, because there are only very few instances where the crime has been detected and punished.

If those figures are not exaggerated, and your Commission have no reason to suppose so, then this matter deserves the serious consideration of the Government.

The suppression of this crime can be considered as a real saving to the industry, and this amount of three-quarters of a million would, especially in times of depression, exercise a large influence on the yield and financial position of the mines.

The industry asks that the penal clauses regarding this matter shall be eliminated from the Gold Law, and that a separate law be passed, more or less on the basis of the I. D. B. Law of Kimberley, Cape Colony, and that measures should be taken by which the injured parties shall be enabled to exercise control and have supervision over any Department to be established for the detection and suppression of thefts of raw gold.

Your Commission are of the opinion that the Government could grant this request without injuring their dignity on the basis hereafter mentioned ; on the contrary, it would remove the blame from the present administration, viz., that these thefts can be practically carried on with impunity.

INDUSTRIAL BOARD

The evidence which has been laid before your Commission has contained suggestions to establish a Board on which Government

nominees and representatives of the mining industry and of the commercial community of the Witwatersrand should sit, so that the Government representatives should have the benefit of the experience of men whose daily occupation it is to look closely into the affairs appertaining to mines, etc. Your Commission is of opinion that it is advisable that these suggestions should be acted upon. The scope of this Board should consist of the supervision of the administration of the following laws, viz. :

The Liquor Law, as far as it concerns the proclaimed gold-fields ;

The Pass Law ;

The law relating to gold thefts.

And will, further, have an advisory voice in the supply of natives to the mines, which your Commission has recommended your Government to take in its own hands.

The area under the surveillance of the Board should include the Heidelberg, Witwatersrand, and Klerksdorp districts, and other gold-fields, as may be found desirable hereafter.

Your Commission suggests that the Board consists of the following : Five members to be appointed by the Government, and four delegates to be appointed by the following bodies, with the consent of the Government, namely, one delegate of the Chamber of Mines, one of the Association of Mines (or in case of an amalgamation, two representatives of the new chamber), a nominee of the Mine Managers' Association, and a nominee of the commercial community of Johannesburg.

Your Commission would advise that a separate detective force be placed under the department, whose duty it would be to detect any infringements of the above-mentioned laws, and to bring the offenders to justice in the ordinary course of law.

It should also be in the sphere of the Board's work to report to the proper authorities any laxity on the part of the officials who have to administer the above-mentioned laws.

The Board is to report to the Executive Council upon the working of the laws referred to, and to suggest alterations. It must be well understood that the power of this Board must in nowise clash with the sphere of the Minister of Mines' Department and the Licensing Board, but co-operate with same.

We would adduce as a reason the more for the creation of such Board, that Government could depute to them the right to receive deputations, hear their arguments, and report to the Government on the subject, whereby a great saving of time would be the result.

We would recommend that the Commission be appointed at once, and that they shall frame their proposals for regulations and submit them at once to Government. . . .

SWEEPSTAKES

Evidence has been laid before your Commission that the running of sweepstakes and other forms of betting on the races in this Republic has a very injurious effect commercially, and especially on the morality of the young generation of the Republic.

Your Commission are aware that this question is already being dealt with by the Volksraad, and can only express their hope that this honourable body will proceed to modify the law in such a manner that such sweepstakes and other forms of betting will be prohibited.

CLOSING REMARKS

Before closing this report, your Commission must express their satisfaction with the way witnesses have responded to the Commission's invitations.

It would be invidious to particularize where there are so many who, at a great sacrifice of time, have devoted themselves to a careful compilation of facts and figures, than which no such interesting or exhaustive statements of the local mining industry have ever been laid before the public.

At the request of your Commission, representatives from Barber-ton and Klerksdorp came to Pretoria to give evidence, and the public spirit displayed by those gentlemen in coming all the distance to represent the interests of their respective communities deserves the greatest praise. It must be mentioned here that the interests of the aforesaid mining communities are identical with those of the Witwatersrand gold-fields, and any benefits resulting from this inquiry will necessarily extend to those fields.

Your Commission respectfully suggest that for the purposes of general reference, and to be placed in the official archives, this report, with all the evidence led, statistics, and further addenda, be printed and published in book form. It will also serve a useful purpose in illustrating to foreign investors the conditions under which the mines exist and are worked, the richness of the reefs and the regularity of the ore deposits. Credit will be restored, as it will be obvious to all who take an interest in the matter that the bogus companies, mostly floated in Europe by unscrupulous promoters, do not come within the pale of legitimate enterprise connected with the mining industry. The establishment of a local mining board has been strongly urged by witnesses.

From an industrial and commercial point of view this country must be considered as still in its infancy, and without loss of dignity and prestige the Government may accede to the above request.

Experience in these matters can only be attained after the lapse of long years, and by coming in contact with experts from other countries, the State will reap the benefit of the knowledge obtained in their country, where these problems have for decades exercised the minds of their leading citizens.

In conclusion, your Commission fervently hope that they truly and faithfully interpreted the object of the inquiry, and that their suggestions and recommendations, if acted upon, will confer a lasting benefit on

‘LAND EN VOLK.’

The full finding of the Commission will be found in the volume compiled and published by the Witwatersrand Chamber of Mines of the South African Republic, 1897, pp. 445-458.

Also Parliamentary Papers, C. 9,345, from which source I have taken some of the conclusions of the Commission.

APPENDIX F

AFRIKANDER BOND'S CONSTITUTION, AND LEAGUE'S
CONSTITUTION

In the text of Chapter III. I have given the constitution published in the first instance, and republished at the date named by the *Friend of the Free State*. Although this, it appears, was only a draft constitution, I have allowed it to stand, as revealing the idea which was in the minds of those who were originally the chief conspirators against British supremacy, viz., such as Mr. Reitz and the late Mr. Borckenhagen, editor of that bitterly anti-English paper the Bloemfontein *Express*.

The present programme of the principles and *general* constitution of the Afrikaner Bond was approved in 1886, and has never been altered since. It is as follows :

PROGRAMME OF PRINCIPLES OF THE AFRIKANDER NATIONAL
PARTY

1. The Afrikaner National Party acknowledges the guidance of Providence also in the destiny of countries and nations.

2. Its aim is to form, under the guidance of Providence, a pure nationality, and to prepare our countrymen to establish a 'United South Africa.'

3. To gain this object it considers it necessary :

(a) To acquire a firm *union* of the different European nationalities in South Africa ; and

(b) To promote the *self-dependence* of South Africa.

4. It considers that the *union* referred to in clause 3 (a) should rest on a clear and plain conception of each other's common interests in politics, agriculture, stock-breeding, commerce and industry, and on the acknowledgment of each other's peculiar rights regarding religion, education, and language, so that all jealousy between the different national elements of our countrymen be removed, and place be made for a palpable *South African* feeling.

5. To promote the independence, clause 3 (b), it expects :

(a) That the feeling of national self-respect and of patriotism toward South Africa shall be developed and cherished in schools, families, and by medium of the press.

(b) That an election system be applied, by which not only the rights of number, but also of property and of intellect be acknowledged, and to guard as much as possible against bribery and coercion at elections.

- (c) That our agriculture, stock-breeding, commerce and trade be supported by all lawful means, as, for instance, by an efficient Masters and Servants Act, and by a circumspect and judiciously applied system of protection.
- (d) That the South African Colonies and States regulate their native question themselves, either separately or by mutual agreement, thereby developing the active forces of the country by means of efficient civil laws.
- (e) That foreign intervention with the local concerns of South Africa be guarded against.

6. While acknowledging the Governments existing in South Africa, and intending to fulfil its obligations towards them faithfully, it considers that it is likewise the duty of those Governments to promote the interests of South Africa in accordance with the foregoing clauses, and while it guards on the one hand against unnecessary or rash interferences with the domestic and private affairs of the burgher, against all direct interference with the religious development of the nation, and against enactments which might impede the unfettered influence of the Gospel on our countrymen, and, on the other hand, to discharge all the direct duties of a good Government, under which may be classed :

- (a) Taking into account in all its general doings the Christian character of the people.
- (b) Maintaining the freedom of religion for everyone as long as the public order and honour are not injured.
- (c) Acknowledging and carrying out the religious, social, and bodily wants of the people for the existing weekly day of rest.
- (d) The application of an equal judicious tax system.
- (e) To bring into operation an impartial, and as much as practicably an inexpensive, efficient administration of justice ; and
- (f) To guard the public honour, and to watch against the adulteration of bread-stuffs, and the pollution of soil, air, or water, as well as against the spreading of *contagious diseases*.

7. To enable these principles to gain a footing the Afrikaner National Party comes forward as a self-dependent party, and enters into co-operation with other parties only when it can do so without the violation of its principles.

GENERAL CONSTITUTION OF THE BOND

Article 1.—The Afrikaner Bond establishes itself in the various States and colonies of South Africa.

Article 2.—The chief object of the Bond is the forming of a *South African nationality* by union and co-operation as a means to the object in view—a United South Africa. This object the Bond endeavours to gain by constitutional means, giving all

support to the respective Governments and Legislatures, and respecting the rights of each.

Article 3.—Anyone may become a member who, in a proper way, and by signing the following schedule, declares that he will maintain the declared principles and observe the duties of the same.

SCHEDULE TO BE SIGNED BY MEMBERS OF THE AFRIKANDER
BOND

The undersigned hereby declares with his signature to embrace and maintain the declared principles of the Afrikaner Bond, and binds himself to fulfil faithfully the duties of membership of the Bond according to the constitution.

Article 4.—The management of the Bond is conducted by :

- (a) Ward Committees in each ward, where not less than ten members join to form a branch of the Bond, under proper management.
- (b) District Committees in each district, where two or more Ward Committees unite. District Committees will fix the number of representatives for the respective Ward Committees. Where there is only one Ward Committee in a district, counting fewer than twenty members, such a branch can join itself to a neighbouring District Committee, but such a ward branch counting more than twenty members may send a representative to the Provincial Committee.
- (c) Provincial Committees in each Republic or Colony, where not less than five District Committees combine, leaving to the Provincial Committees to fix the number of representatives for the various District Committees.
- (d) A Central Committee, consisting of two delegates from each of the Provincial Committees.

Article 5.—Each committee has the right to make its own local rules, providing they are not in opposition to the acknowledged principles of the Bond, as laid down in this constitution.

Article 6.—The duties of the Bond, in which each member is bound to take part according to his ability, are as follows :

- (a) To attend to the registration of qualified burghers.
- (b) To insure the election of competent men for civil and political offices.
- (c) To promote effective, thorough, and Christian education.
- (d) To assist in the mental development by spreading sound literature.
- (e) By keeping a watchful eye on the interest of our national industries, guarding especially agriculture and stock-farming, these being the chief sources of this country's wealth.

Article 7.—Every two years there shall be elected :

- (a) New Ward Committee members by the ordinary members, and new District Committee members by the Ward Committee members in December.
- (b) A new Provincial Committee by the District Committee in January.
- (c) New members for the Central Committee not later than May. All elections of committee members shall take place by ballot.

Article 8.—At the annual meetings the various committees are bound to make up their reports, including the financial statements, and send them without delay to the higher committees.

Article 9.—Each province manages its own money matters through the Provincial Committee.

Article 10.—The Central Committee may modify this constitution, with due regard to the opinions of the Provincial Committees.

This constitution to be entitled 'The Constitution of the Afrikaner Bond in South Africa.'

[The Bond, it might be remarked, was founded in the Cape Colony. The Paarl claims its birthplace. It is often stated that the organization was founded in the Orange Free State. I have Mr. Du Toit's authority for the statement that it was formed in the Colony. It was the Orange Free State Branch that Messrs. Borckenhagen and Reitz formed at Bloemfontein.]

CONSTITUTION OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEAGUE

GENERAL CONSTITUTION

Title.—The title of this association shall be 'The South African League.'

1. GENERAL PRIMARY PRINCIPLES

(a) An unalterable resolve to support the existing supremacy of Great Britain in South Africa, and a strenuous opposition to any attempts that may be made to weaken or destroy that supremacy.

(b) The promotion of good government within, and amicable relations between, the various States and colonies in South Africa.

2. ORGANIZATION

The primary units of the League Organization shall be known as branches, and two or more of these branches may constitute a province, each of those provinces being coterminous with the territory of the State or the colony in which it is situated, and being autonomous as regards its internal organization, so long as it adheres to the general laws and general primary principles of the League ; and each of such provinces shall have full power to frame its own primary principles and constitution, so long as these are not in conflict with the general laws and general primary principles of the League.

3. CENTRAL CONFERENCE

For the purpose of securing harmonious action on the part of the provinces on matters of common concern, and providing for the due observance of the general primary principles and general laws of the League, a body—known as the Central Conference—shall be formed as soon as at least two provinces shall be in existence, such body being consultative only, excepting in cases of distinct breaches of such general primary principles and general laws, in which cases it shall, with the approval of a majority of the provinces expressed by their Congresses, have power to remove any province from connection with the League.

4. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT

Each province shall be governed by an assembly known as a Congress, to be constituted in such a manner as the provincial constitution may provide. The presiding officer of each province shall be known as president, and shall be assisted by such executive officers as the provincial constitution may provide for.

5. NEW PROVINCES

No province or branch outside the limits of any province shall be recognised unless the consent of the executive of an existing province has been obtained to its formation, and the executive shall be responsible for its being put in full possession of the laws and principles of the League, and for the notifying its formation to other provinces. Extra-provincial branches shall be independent as regards their internal organization, subject only to the general laws and general primary principles of the League. At the first Congress of newly-formed provinces two delegates shall represent each branch irrespective of membership.

6. CENTRAL CONFERENCE PROCEDURE

The Central Conference shall be composed of two delegates from each province, elected annually by the executive of such province from among its own members. Conference shall meet every three years, at such time and place as the convener may decide. The president of the Cape Colony Province shall, in the first instance, act as convener. Conference shall elect its own chairman at each meeting, and he shall act as convener at the next meeting, provided always that the convener of Conference for the time being shall always have power to summon a special meeting of Conference, and shall be compelled to do so on receiving a request to that effect from the executives of at least two provinces.

7. AFFIRMATION OF PRIMARY PRINCIPLES

All persons desirous of becoming members of the League shall be required to affirm, in writing, the general primary principles.

8. ALTERATION OF LAWS

No general laws shall be altered, added to, or abrogated, except by resolution of the Conference, confirmed by a majority of the Provincial Congresses.

PROVINCIAL CONSTITUTIONS

SOUTH AFRICAN LEAGUE (CAPE COLONY)

PRIMARY PRINCIPLES

(a) The League affirms most strongly its unalterable loyalty to the British Crown, and binds itself to resist to the utmost any attempt that may be made to weaken the connection between this colony and the motherland.

(b) Every elector should regard it as a duty to put aside the personality of individual politicians, and give his vote only to such candidates for Parliamentary honours as may be in accord with his own political principles.

(c) The Ministry of the colony should be composed of men who are in agreement with one another on all broad legislative questions.

(d) It is a mischievous principle for any body of politicians to dictate the legislative policy of the colony without assuming, in the persons of its leaders, the responsibility of carrying that policy into effect.

(e) It is the duty of all members of the League to exercise their influence at Parliamentary elections in favour of such candidates as are approved of by the League in the electoral divisions, and are in accord with League principles.

APPENDIX G

SIR ALFRED MILNER'S SPEECH AT GRAAFF-REINET

The *Cape Times* of June 16, 1899, republished portions of Sir Alfred Milner's speech at Graaff-Reinet and its comments thereon as under :

'DISAFFECTING THE DUTCH'

WHAT SIR ALFRED MILNER REALLY THINKS—AS SET FORTH A
YEAR AGO

In view of the heart-burnings caused by some reference to a propaganda of disaffection among Dutch colonists, which appears in a fragment of a despatch of Sir Alfred Milner's as condensed by cable, it seems well to reproduce the substance of Sir Alfred's historic speech on this subject made at Graaff-Reinet more than a year ago (March, 1898), much of which is quite startlingly *à propos*

at the present moment. An address had been presented to His Excellency by the local Afrikaner Bond, vehemently protesting against charges of disloyalty, and asking the Governor apparently for a testimonial on the point. Sir Alfred Milner said it was his rule as Governor not to talk politics, especially not party politics; but where controversial matter had to be touched, to 'speak frankly and without reserve'; a course which 'might not be the way to win immediate popularity, but was most conducive to clearing the air, to removing inveterate misunderstanding, and to promoting in the long-run those objects which all good men and loyal citizens had at heart.' Acting on these principles, His Excellency dealt with the subject of the Bond address as follows:

'Of course I am glad to be assured that any section of Her Majesty's subjects are loyal, but I should be much more glad to be allowed to take that for granted. Why should I not? What reason could there be for any disloyalty? Of course you are loyal. You have thriven wonderfully well under that Government. This country, despite its great extent and its fine climate, has some tremendous natural disadvantages to contend against; and yet, let anyone compare its position to-day with what it was at the commencement of Her Majesty's reign, or over thirty years ago. The progress in material wealth is enormous, and the prospects of future progress are greater still; and you have other blessings which by no means accompany material wealth. You live under an absolutely free system of government, protecting the rights and encouraging the spirit of independence of every citizen. You have courts of law manned by men of the highest ability and integrity, and secure in the discharge of their high functions from all external interference.

'You have, at least as regards the white races, perfect equality of citizenship, and these things have not been won from a reluctant Sovereign. They have been freely and gladly bestowed upon you because freedom and self-government, justice and equality are the first principles of British policy (loud cheering, continued for some time)—and they are secured to you by the strength of the Power that gave them, and whose navy protects your shores from attack without your being asked to contribute one pound to that protection, unless you yourselves desire it. Well, gentlemen, of course you are loyal. It would be monstrous if you were not. (Cheers.) And now, if I have one wish, it is that I may never again have to deal at any length with this topic. But in order that I may put it aside with a good conscience, I wish, having been more or less compelled to deal with it, to do so honestly, and not to shut my eyes to unpleasant facts. (Cheers.)

'The great bulk of the population of the colony, Dutch as well as English, are, I firmly believe, thoroughly loyal in the sense that they know they live under a good constitution, and have no wish to change it, and regard with feelings of reverence and pride that august lady at the head of it. If we had only domestic questions to consider, if political controversy were confined in this colony to the internal affairs of the country, there would no doubt be a great deal

of hard language used by conflicting parties, and very likely among the usual amenities of party warfare somebody would call somebody else disloyal, but the thing would be so absurd, so obviously absurd, that nobody would take it seriously, and the charge would be forgotten almost as soon as uttered.

‘What gives the sting to the charge of disloyalty in this case, what makes it stick, and what makes people wince under it, is the fact that the political controversies of this country at present unfortunately turn largely upon another question. I mean the relations of Her Majesty’s Government to the South African Republic, and that whenever there is any prospect of any difference between them, a number of people in the colony at once vehemently, and without even the semblance of impartiality, espouse the side of the Republic. (Hear, hear.) Personally, I do not think that they are disloyal. I am familiar at home with the figure of the politician, often the best of men though singularly injudicious, who, whenever any disputes arise with another country, starts with the assumption that his own country must be in the wrong. He is not disloyal, but really he cannot be very much surprised if he appears to be so to those of his fellow-citizens whose inclination is to start with the exactly opposite assumption, and so I do not take it that in this case people are necessarily disloyal because they carry their sympathy with the Government of the Transvaal—which, seeing the close tie of relationship which unites a great portion of the population here with the dominant section in that country, is perfectly natural—to a point which gives some ground for the assertion that they seem to care much more for the independence of the Transvaal than for the honour and the interests of the country to which they themselves belong.

‘For my own part I believe the whole object of those people in espousing the cause of the Transvaal is to prevent an open rupture between that country and the British Government. (Cheers.) They loathe very naturally and rightly the idea of war, and they think that if they can only impress upon the British Government that in case of war with the Transvaal it would have a great number of its own subjects at least in sympathy against it, that is a way to prevent such a calamity.

‘But in this they are totally wrong, for this policy rests on the assumption that Great Britain has some occult design on the independence of the Transvaal, that independence which it has itself given, and that it is seeking causes of quarrel in order to take that independence away. But that assumption is the exact opposite of the truth. (Cheers.) So far from seeking causes of quarrel, it is the constant desire of the British Government to avoid causes of quarrel, and not to take up lightly the complaints (and they are numerous) which reach it from British subjects within the Transvaal, for the very reason that it wishes to avoid even the semblance of interference in the internal affairs of that country, and as regards its external relations, to insist only on that minimum of control which it has always distinctly reserved, and has reserved, I may add, solely in the interests of the future tranquillity of South Africa. That is Great Britain’s moderate attitude, and she cannot

be frightened out of it. (Prolonged cheers.) It is not any aggressiveness on the part of Her Majesty's Government which now keeps up the spirit of unrest in South Africa. Not at all. It is that unprogressiveness, I will not say the retrogressiveness, of the Government of the Transvaal, and its deep suspicion of the intention of Great Britain, which make it devote its attention to imaginary external dangers, when every impartial observer can see perfectly well that the real dangers which threaten it are internal. Now I wish to be perfectly fair. Therefore let me say that this suspicion, though absolutely groundless, is not, after all that has happened, altogether unnatural.

'I accept the situation that at the present moment any advice that I could tender, or that any of your British fellow-citizens could tender in that quarter, though it was the best advice in the world, would be instantly rejected because it was British, but the same does not apply to the Dutch citizens of this colony, and especially to those who have gone so far in the expression of their sympathy for the Transvaal as to expose themselves to these charges of disloyalty to their own flag. Their good-will at least cannot be suspected across the border, and if all they desire—and I believe it is what they desire—is to preserve the South African Republic, and to promote good relations between it and the British colonies and Government, then let them use all their influence, which is bound to be great, not in confirming the Transvaal in unjustified suspicions, not in encouraging its Government in obstinate resistance to all reform, but in inducing it gradually to assimilate its institutions, and what is even more important than institutions, the temper and spirit of its administration, to those of the free communities of South Africa, such as this colony or the Orange Free State. That is the direction in which a peaceful way out of these inveterate troubles, which have now plagued this country for more than thirty years, is to be found. (Cheers.)'

APPENDIX H

THE YOUNG AFRIKANDER

TRAINING HIM IN RACE-HATRED

That 'propaganda,' of which a recent despatch spoke, begins young. Students' magazines are, all the world over, welcomed as showing what the coming generation is thinking about. They tell us what the young men do in the few hours of leisure, snatched from the tyranny of the lecture-room—how they fare at field sports, what views they entertain on men and things, and the general topics of the day. Very rarely does one find these interesting publications engaging in the political rough-and-tumble. But then, these journals, or the most of them, concern the doings of colleges whose *raison d'être* is the training of youth for ordinary commercial and professional life; it is left for 'theological seminaries,' institutions consecrated to the work of training the coming generation of Dutch clergymen—it is left for these to develop the political side of the young Afrikaner student.

How well this duty is performed is shown by the press organ of the young recluses who are being trained for the Doppe Church of the future. The magazine is known by the title of the *Studenten Blad*, and is the official mouthpiece of the students attending the Reformed Church Theological Seminary at Burghersdorp, an institution presided over by the Rev. Mr. Cachet, whose remarks at the recent treason meeting in that village caused the telegraph wires all over South Africa to tremble. The *Albert Times*, to which we are indebted for translations of some of the recent literary efforts of the embryonic clergymen, presents quite a charming picture of life in the Burghersdorp Seminary. The students, we learn, number 'some thirty or forty,' drawn from all parts of South Africa. Their manners and morals are unimpeachable, their modesty charming, and their behaviour on all occasions irreproachable. We are also told that they pursue their studies with zeal and diligence, so much so, that every year sees 'some three or four' clergymen added to the Reformed Church from their number—from which it will be observed that the average course of study at Burghersdorp is ten years. During this happy seed-time the pursuit of the classics and the Fathers does not claim their attention. The young men have some leisure for literary recreation, and the *Studenten Blad* shows what use they make of it. This, for instance, is the view which the magazine takes of the political situation of the day. It is interesting and instructive. Listen:

'The fact cannot be disputed that we all, as students, are striving to be true patriots—that is, patriots of the Afrikaner nationality. Without boasting, we can point to: (a) Our general attitude

towards the English—although residing amongst them, we form a separate circle, and are quite satisfied with our own society (“met onsselven”); (b) our hearty participation in the brilliant victory of our Bondsparty in the Parliament and at elections—we are nearly all registered voters, and certainly do something for our Bond interests; (c) our warm interest in the present questions concerning the Transvaal and Free State—the much desired union and Afrikaner University for both, Chamberlain’s impudent protest, etc. These are the subjects of our daily conversation. Many of our actions prove this—that we desire to be members (“leden”) of a people that is not English.’

Lest the foregoing should not be accepted as sufficiently proving the students’ claim to be ‘really true-hearted Afrikaners,’ the writer appeals to the well-known hatred of the seminary students for the English language, and their affection for the ‘taal.’ As per the following :

‘Take one proof—the taal. Without hesitation it must be admitted that, if one wishes to remain an Afrikaner he must use his own vehicle of thought. “But we certainly speak Afrikaansch.” Oh yes; but what a sad state of affairs do we find! It is hard to confess, but we are allowed too much liberty (“een al te vrijen voet”); we are cosmopolitans with regard to the English and Dutch Afrikaansch language. We agree heartily with the petitioners for less English in the Transvaal. “If our taal loses ground we are lost.” But is not our daily language a strong proof of the decline of our mother-tongue because we are so fond of English (“de rooitaal”)? We are all guilty. For example, if we speak of one of small courage, we call him a “coward” instead of using our own and more expressive term “lafaard.” We say “change” for “kleingeld,” “show” for “tentoonstelling,” etc.

Naturally, the writer concludes with an appeal to ‘the brothers to ‘clean and purify the taal of all English words.’

Then another student proceeds to unbosom himself in the same number of the *Studenten Blad* (May 26). His theme is the English. Hear him :

‘Must we love this people (the English) who robbed our ancestors of their freedom, who forced them to leave a land dear to them as their heart’s blood—a people that followed our fathers to the new fatherland which they had bought with their blood and snatched from the barbarians, and again threatened their freedom? Our fathers fought with the courage of despair, and retook the land with God’s aid and with their blood. But England is not satisfied. Again is our freedom threatened by the same people, and not only our freedom, but our language, our nationality, our religion! Must we surrender everything and disown our fathers? I cannot agree with this. The thought is hateful to me—the thought of trampling on the bodies of our fathers as we extend the hand of friendship to those who have slain our fathers in an unrighteous quarrel.’

But then comes the Biblical teaching about loving one's enemies. The student proves himself equal to the occasion. Thus :

'But some may say that the Bible teaches us to love our enemies. I think, however, that the text cannot be here applied. Race-hatred is something quite distinct from personal enmity. When I meet an Englishman as a private individual, I must regard him as my fellow-creature ; if, however, I meet him as an Englishman, then I, as an Afrikaner, must regard him as the enemy of my nation and my religion—as a wolf that is endeavouring to creep into the fold. This is the chief reason why we must regard them as our enemies ; they are the enemies of our religion. I think I can with truth add that race-hatred was encouraged amongst the children of Israel, if not indeed commanded. Afrikanders, let us take heed that we are not deceived ; the English will be our oppressors, but never our friends. Let us take heed for our freedom, our nationality ; let us fight for our religion.'

Loyalty, as we all know, is a strong point with the Bond. A third writer in the *Studenten Blad* explains loyalty as understood at the seminary. The following occurs in a description of the Queen's Birthday sports at Burghersdorp :

'Most of our students were there. This was certainly not out of a sense of loyalty, but rather, I think, of curiosity. . . . The worst of the affair was that at the conclusion of the sports three cheers for the Queen were called for. Where were the students then? I turned and ran. My throat would not budge. An Afrikaner does not hold with all this shouting ; at least, all these rumours of war have wound him up to such a pitch that he cannot stand and scream for the benefit of the English.'

Such are the written and printed thoughts of Young South Africa as raised at the Burghersdorp Theological Seminary—the Reformed clergymen of the coming generation.—*Cape Times*, July 5, 1899 (weekly edition).

Thus it is apparent that the hostility advocated in the articles from the *Patriot*, and reprinted in pamphlet-form under the title of 'The Birth of the Bond,' still exists. Everyone taking an intelligent interest in the question should read this pamphlet. The thanks of South Africans are due to Mr. F. J. Quinton for his action in getting these articles reprinted, and so brought to the notice of persons in England. Having the privilege of this gentleman's intimate acquaintance, I have knowledge that, although not a public man, he has ever been a persistent opponent of the Bond and its aims. Years before the Raid he prophesied that what is to-day happening would surely come to pass through the action of the Bond.

APPENDIX I

BOND ORATORY AND AFRIKANDER AIMS

(The following is taken over in its entirety from the *Cape Argus* of June 9, 1899.)

The meeting reported below was held on British soil by British subjects more than four months before the declaration of war, and may be taken as a fair sample of the way the majority of Bondsmen expressed themselves all over the country. As usual, it will be noticed the Dutch clergy were well in evidence.

The *Albert Times* on the following Monday published a special edition containing a full report of the meeting, some of the speeches being given verbatim, and this we reprint below (the headings are not those of the *Albert Times*):

A largely-attended meeting convened by the Bond was held at Burghersdorp last Saturday night. Some 150 Dutch-speaking persons, mostly members of the Reformed Church, were present. Only one Englishman was in attendance, namely, Mr. E. Jukes Knight, Mayor of Burghersdorp.

Some half-dozen members of Parliament were expected, but Mr. Jotham Joubert, M.L.A., who was shockingly late, was the only law-giver present.

Mr. P. H. Henning, of Rhenosterhosk, was appointed to the chair; Mr. W. J. J. Venter acted as vice-chairman.

Letters were read from Mr. Pretorius, M.L.C., and Mr. A. S. du Plessis, M.L.A., expressing regret at their unavoidable absence on account of ill-health.

Mr. GERT COETZEE moved: 'That this meeting expresses its regret that so many members of Parliament should be ill at the same time.' (Laughter.)

The motion was put to the meeting and carried.

Mr. JOTHAM JOUBERT, M.L.A., after referring to education, irrigation, and the Scab Act, spoke on the Transvaal question. He was glad that the conference had been arranged, and looked for the best results. He was also pleased to note that President Kruger was willing to extend the franchise. If the Volksraad sanctioned this step it would

STOP THE MOUTHS

of the agitators for some time yet to come, but not for ever. The Transvaal had conceded much, and yet the demand for more remained. And the Transvaal could now give more without danger to the State. There were 40,000 burghers in the State. Then a

number of those crying out for the franchise did not really desire it. They made money out of the agitation. He trusted that everything would be peacefully arranged. (Applause.)

THE REAL BUSINESS

It was now resolved, on the motion of the Rev. L. P. VORSTER, that the meeting discuss Transvaal affairs.

Mr. PAUL GROBLER handed in the following resolution, the joint production of the conveners of the meeting: 'We, the burghers of Albert, Cape Colony, gathered here, deeply regret the difference of opinion that exists between the Imperial Government and that of the South African Republic. We are of opinion that this state of affairs is largely to be attributed to the misleading representations made to the Imperial Government regarding the position of affairs in the South African Republic. We are convinced that if no change is made in the policy pursued in later years by the Imperial Government towards the South African Republic, this will inevitably have a disastrous effect in South Africa and on the British Empire. We are aware that we, as Christians, owe obedience to our lawful rulers, but for this very reason must not keep silence when we feel that our rulers, the Imperial Government, misled by misleading representations, stand in danger of taking unjust and unrighteous action against the South African Republic, the more so because the matter intimately affects our fellows in the Church and relatives. We are, however, rejoiced that at this moment a conference is being held at Bloemfontein between representatives of the Imperial Government and of the South African Republic with the object of removing these differences of opinion, and hope that this conference will be crowned with success.'

A ROARING LION

Professor J. LION CACHET, head of the Reformed Church of South Africa, was in hearty sympathy with the resolution for many reasons. He would like first to explain how and why the meeting came to be held. At the last meeting a wish was expressed by the electors to meet their members of Parliament before the session commenced, and so this meeting was arranged, and notice sent to the surrounding places. To his surprise, he saw in the newspapers that a great deal of notice was being taken of the meeting, and the threat was held out that if Burghersdorp started to hold meetings, the Leaguers would do the same to shut the mouth of Burghersdorp. Not only enemies, but even friends, had advised that the best course was to keep silence and everything would come all right. The local branch of the Bond had, however, resolved to call the meeting and to adhere to their own opinion in spite of advice. Their opponents had already held meetings on every side. The League was holding meetings to the north, south, east and west, and on all sides of the earth, and for all he knew under the earth. (Laughter.) Well, certainly they were busy on the other side of the earth, in Australia and England, all agitating and stirring up the English

Government to make an end of the miserable Boers. (Applause.) There were two sorts of people in the land, the man who knew and the man who knew nothing. There were the Englishmen born and resident in the country. He knew that if the majority of them were asked, Do you wish to make

AN END OF THE BOERS?

they would say, 'No. We live here and are quite satisfied. We have no grievances.' The Englishmen in their midst were not the mischief-makers; it was the newcomer, who knew nothing about the country, except to be continually making an uproar and keeping the fire of race-hatred alight. (Applause.) Now, why should they be silent while these people made all the noise and deceived the Imperial Government? There was already that Uitlander petition before the Imperial Government (and those who wished to know how it was drawn up should read *Ons Land* and other papers), and just while the conference was sitting there comes an answer to the petition from the Imperial Government. While the other side was busy doing all this, they must keep quiet. They would not keep silence—not so long as they were told that everything the poor Transvaal did or attempted was against the Convention. When the Bond conference sat he thought that the Transvaal question would be discussed. In fact, the Burghersdorp branch had already prepared a resolution on the subject; but when they heard that Cape Town had also prepared a resolution, they gave way respectfully to their big brother. What happened? Not a word was said on the subject. The Congress, for reasons he did not understand, had not discussed the matter. It would have been far better had they done so, for matters had got worse and worse. South Africa had stood on the verge of a great war. He did not know that the danger was yet past, but how near to war they had come they might never know. Now, war with the Transvaal was a terrible matter. They all had relatives—fathers, brothers, sons or daughters—in the Transvaal, and what was their duty in this matter? He had a son in the Orange Free State, and in the case of war with the Transvaal, this State would certainly be involved. Must he say to his son, 'Come home and hide in your mother's bedroom'? or must he say, 'Act like a man, and defend the freedom of the land you live in'? (Applause.) And their children in the Transvaal—must they say to them, 'Come back'? Some might, indeed, come back. He saw many brave talkers flying with the women and children at the last alarm—(loud laughter)—but there would be many of their children who would never return. (Applause.) Was it right that foreign countries like Australia and America should interfere ('bemooien') in the quarrel, and that they with children in the Transvaal should keep silence? The Transvaal was blamed from end to end of the earth for all the trouble; but if people would only fairly consider the matter, the Transvaal had never been given time to put its house in order. It might be that there was need of improvement; but when the enemy is always at your gate, there is no time for papering your house ('het huis te plakken'). The Transvaal

had never had time. The trouble began at Johannesburg with the hauling down of the Transvaal flag. In any other land in the world such an insult would have set the

BULLETS A-FLYING ;

but the Transvaalers were patient. Then there was an uproar when the Governor was in Johannesburg, and so matters went on until the Jameson Raid. Now the trouble had begun again, and was going on, and no wonder that the Transvaal, especially the old Transvaal, was annoyed, and had said, 'We are not going to give what you ask.' It was partly the fault of the people of the colony ('onze schuld'), insomuch as they had not protested long ago. Now the conference was sitting all these matters would be discussed, and there might be some good result ; but if the Imperial Government did not say to the Transvaal, 'We will make an end to this trouble, we will set you free,' there would never be peace. They had gone through all these hardships, and now every Piet and Klass that the steamers brought out came to the country and said, 'Now, see, we are the majority. The whole land belongs to us.' The agitation originated and was kept alive in the big towns and cities, where they only desired to make an end of the Transvaal. It was something like the preparations ('opschudding') made for the reception of Mr. Rhodes. Even in Burghersdorp the municipality had been invited to take part in his reception, but to the honour of the Mayor and Council they had refused. Was this not a blow in the face of the Afrikanders ? If he were to give his hand to Rhodes, he would feel that he was treading on the bodies of those

SLAIN AT DOORNKOP.

(Applause.) Yes, this man was received as a hero, and yet they were told that they must hold their peace, and this, too, when they felt that the Imperial Government was being deceived. He had never spoken in England ; but felt sure that if the English knew the truth, they would be on the Afrikander side, and all the troubles would be at an end. He believed that the Imperial Government was being misled by lying telegrams and other misrepresentation. He could only express the hope that the conference would convince the Imperial Government of their folly, and that an end would come to the trouble. Why could not all South Africa live at peace as they did in Burghersdorp, where they only quarrelled at election times, and joined heartily in all works for the public good ? He was heartily in sympathy with the resolution, and hoped it would be carried unanimously. (Cheers.)

The speech was well received, and was marked by frequent bursts of cheering.

AN 'ENGLISH' OPINION

After a short pause, Mr. EDWARD JUKES KNIGHT, the Mayor of Burghersdorp, rose, and, speaking in English, said :

Mr. Chairman, long years ago—I don't know how many—I said in this very room that the less interference we had from the

Imperial Government in internal affairs the better it would be for us all. Eighteen years ago, when the unfortunate Transvaal affair took place—unfortunate chiefly to the British arms—I was the only leading man in Burghersdorp who took up the Transvaal side. I was publicly affronted in one of these very rooms for the support I gave the Transvaal; but I think that my friends see now that I was right, and that when Mr. Gladstone gave back the country it was the only course to secure the peace of South Africa. I held then, sir, that the excuse made by the Imperial Government that the Transvaal and the other States were in great danger from the native tribes was a mistake. The Transvaal was quite able to maintain her independence, and there was no need for Imperial interference. When I now see the Imperial Government stirred up by capitalists and the press, I think, sir, that a mistake is being made. I think that the conference is a great mistake. But now that we have gone into it, it is perhaps best to see what the outcome will be before another step is taken. If an arrangement can be arrived at by consultation, it will be good. Of one thing I am quite satisfied, that the independence and rights of the burghers are quite safe in the hands of Oom Paul, and therefore it is best to see exactly what is going to happen. But if the Imperial Government is going to make the same mistake as before, and interfere in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, if it is going to make a cause of war—an unrighteous cause—then I say every right-minded man will be on

THE SIDE OF THE TRANSVAAL.

(Loud applause.) The dynamite concession is certainly against the interests of the Transvaal, but that is their business. As to the franchise, you cannot expect that the men who fought and cleared the land of natives are going to hand over their independence and a sort of unlimited franchise to a few strangers. I think that the Transvaal would do well to give them representation in the Volksraad, but not so much as to endanger the liberty of the Transvaal. I think that the Bond and South African League should abstain from holding meetings at the present time in the interests of peace, but I cannot see that a meeting like this one can be blamed for utterances like these, and for saying we want peace and the safeguard of our liberties. (Loud applause.)

AN INTERLUDE

Mr. GREYVENSTEIN, an old farmer from Bumboesberg Ward : Mr. Joubert, I want to know if it is lawful for England to interfere in Transvaal affairs? (Laughter.)

Mr. JOUBERT, M.L.A. : My friend, it is not my business ('buiten mijn vak').

Mr. GREYVENSTEIN : That is my opinion. (Roars of laughter.) But what has Australia to do with the Transvaal?

Mr. JOUBERT (jestingly) : Well, they send meat and grain to Africa.

Mr. GREYVENSTEIN opined that Australia should be compelled to eat its own meat. (Laughter.) The Transvaal was quite able to govern itself. The people were 'baas' there. As to the rebels in the Transvaal, he thought the Government wonderfully lenient. They would be hanged in the Cape Colony. They did hang some the other day ('ander dag') at Slachter's Nek. I was not there. (Laughter.) They must make a 'schikking,' and must tell the Imperial Government not to go so easily into the Transvaal. (More laughter.)

The Bamboesberger was now called to order, and sat down saying that he was no 'preacher.'

ENGLAND THE BULLY

Rev. LOUIS PETRUS VORSTER, Reformed pastor at Burghersdorp, said that he heartily agreed with the previous speakers. Referring to the meeting, he said he felt convinced that the large attendance was owing to the fact that the people knew Transvaal affairs were to be discussed. This was a proof of how deeply the people felt on this subject, and how necessary it was to give utterance to their feelings. The enemy had already held meetings, and done their best to keep race-hatred alive. Since the Jameson Raid he had a deep mistrust for those who had the ear of the Imperial Government, especially of Chamberlain, and they could not expect that the old Transvaal burghers would have much confidence in the British Government, especially since Mr. Gladstone's death. The Jingo party, and a still stronger party, appeared to be trying to undermine the Transvaal. Force of arms had failed, for the Transvaal could always hold its own against any force. The land could only be taken by other means. Rhodes had said that he would try constitutional means to gain the end, and it seemed to him that since that time a steady hemming in of the Transvaal had been going on. Everything the Transvaal did was against the Convention. And if the Transvaal did not give way at once,

THREATS OF WAR

were used. Before the Jameson Raid there was the Drifts affair, which nearly caused a war. The Transvaal gave in. Now there was the dynamite concession. He did not for a moment think that such a paltry affair could have raised such a war-cloud, and felt sure that there was something else behind. It might be Rhodes was again at the bottom of the mischief. As to the petition signed by 21,000 English residents, he was told that half the signatures were forgeries, and could well believe it. Yet it had been received by the English Government as genuine. This was how the Imperial authorities were deceived. Now, as Christian folk, they must obey their rulers, and did so. They had been falsely accused of disloyalty because they did not make a great protestation. Well, if they did not, it was because they felt that the British Government was paying too much heed to agitators

who desired war, and especially to the greatest enemy of the Afrikanders—Rhodes. Once this man had the confidence of the African Bond, but now, if he paid all his gold and lived another hundred years, he would not regain this lost confidence. (Applause.) Rhodes had acknowledged his share in the Raid before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, and if they did not hate him for this misdeed, they could certainly never trust him. And yet, what was being done? Preparations were being made to welcome him as no Governor had ever been welcomed. This was an insult to the Afrikanders. (Applause.) Rhodes was a great Imperialist, and the Transvaal the enemy of Imperialism. Men were always crying out for more rights in the Transvaal, but see Rhodesia! There half the gold belonged to the Chartered Company, while the Transvaal only took a small percentage. The Transvaal could not give the franchise to everybody, for Johannesburg would certainly misuse it. He did not agree with Mr. Joubert that the Transvaal might extend the franchise, for those who cried out for it did not really want what they asked for. They only wanted more grievances to embroil the Transvaal in war. This was what they of the colony must protest against, for, as subjects of the British Empire, they were responsible for her acts. If an injustice were done to the Transvaal or Free State, they would be as guilty as England. He thought the conference a great mistake. The Transvaal knew what to do without advice, and England's aim was merely to hamper and hem in the Transvaal. He was weary of England's threats of war against the Transvaal.

THE NEW BREAKFAST MAN

He did not believe England dared to make war, for she had not men enough to conquer the Transvaal. It might be a bloody war, it might last for years, but the Transvaal and Free State could raise 80,000 men, and to conquer these England would need a force of 150,000. Where would she get ships enough to convey such an army, where horses and provisions? Certainly not in the colony, for even if they remained neutral here they would not sell their horses and forage to England, and so help in the war against their brothers. England's threat was only a threat, the talk of a man with an unloaded gun. One hundred Transvaalers would shoot one thousand Englishmen dead. (Loud applause.) All their Maxims would not take the Transvaal.

Mr. C. HENNINGS (Nissen Bros.) said that the meeting must not be under the impression that the Transvaal had no friends abroad. Australia and England might be antagonistic to this State, but Germany was an ally and supporter. The German papers showed that feeling there had not changed.

The Rev. DU PLESSIS, of the Reformed Theological Seminary, felt his heart grow warm for the Transvaal. He was in full sympathy with the resolution. That the Uitlander grievances did not signify very much was proved by the fact that many of the signatures on the 21,000 petition

WERE FORGERIES,

and that a contra-petition had been signed by 25,000 persons. He

felt obliged to state that *Ons Land* was not doing its duty in keeping quiet during this critical time, while the *Cape Times* and other Jingo organs were doing their best to provoke war. The little *Bondsman* was the only paper which really expressed the feelings of the 'ondervelders.' He was glad to hear Mr. Knight's views, and to know that he and many other Englishmen sympathized with a feeble and oppressed people. (Applause.)

Mr. VAN ROOY, of Steynsburg, said there were no real grievances in the Transvaal. There was nothing to make a noise about. The public were deceived by the newspapers, and the Jameson Raid and the late elections had failed to convince them of their folly.

EMISSARIES

Mr. OLIVIER, member of the Free State Volksraad, referred to the petition, and said the whole thing was a forgery. The whole agitation was engineered by the capitalist and share-market niggers.

Mr. VAN DER WALT, a Transvaal burgher, said it did him good to see such a meeting of Afrikaners on British soil. If war should come the Transvaal would be quite able to defend herself. (Applause.) He prayed the Almighty that the day would come when the whole of Afrikanerdom would be freed from the foreign yoke. (Loud and prolonged applause.)

The resolution was now put to the meeting and carried unanimously, every person in the room, with the exception of the reporters, rising and cheering.

The Rev. Mr. VORSTER moved a vote of congratulation to Mr. Solomon on his election for Tembuland, which was carried.

It was resolved that the result of the gathering should be wired to the *Express*, *Ons Land*, the *South African News*, *Rand Post*, and *Volksstem*.

The meeting then broke up.

The proceedings were throughout most harmonious, and all allusions to the Transvaal, England's mistaken policy, or her military weakness, were heartily applauded. It is estimated that some 120 to 150 persons were present.

APPENDIX J

RECRIMINATIONS

The following letter appeared in the *Cape Times* shortly after the arrival of the first lot of Boer prisoners from Elandslaagte at Simon's Bay, amongst whom was a fair sprinkling of colonials.

I have had the incident alluded to confirmed from another quarter.

THE UNKINDEST CUT

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'CAPE TIMES'

SIR,

I think the following will interest many of your readers, and will show up the loyal (?) Bondmen in this colony. Travelling in the Wynberg train on Saturday to Cape Town, I was fortunate enough to travel in the same compartment with several gentlemen (Wellingtonians) who were on their homeward journey from Simon's Town, where they had been to see some of the Transvaal prisoners—former acquaintances and friends of theirs. I picked up a conversation with my travelling companions, and very soon found out that the prisoners, instead of being in the pitiable plight that *Ons Land* and some of that journal's correspondents tried to make the world believe, were quite happy under the circumstances. They told me that the prisoners, one and all, were fully satisfied with their treatment, and had nothing to complain of. When I arrived in town, I met a teacher, an old friend of mine, who is renowned as a great sympathizer with the Transvaal cause, and on inquiry he assured me that he had just been to see the prisoners, and he fully bore out the statement given above, adding, 'If you come across any person who complains in the name of the prisoners, tell him straight to his face it is a lie.' But to come back to the best part of the business. My travelling companions told me a nice piece of news. Several of them were speaking to one of the prisoners on the *Penelope*, when up walked one of the most prominent and conspicuous Bondmen from Wellington. He, too, came to greet his good and true friend. But what was the Bondman's surprise when his friend (?) the prisoner addressed him in a very stern tone as follows: '*You here, too, you traitor! Where are you Bondmen who led Oom Paul to believe that you would rush to his assistance? You are a mean, low lot! Away with your Bond! You call yourself men?*' Here the Bondman, who had changed colours like the rainbow, and was becoming very pale in the face, wailed: 'Look here, old chap, don't talk so loud; you may be sorry some day for what you have just said.' But the prisoner had no patience, and chimed in very sternly: '*What! Me afraid! me sorry! Oh no. I am colonial born, but as I threw*

in my lot with the Transvaal, became a burgher, and have all my property there, I fought for Oom Paul, and I am not ashamed of him. But you traitors, I call you cowards!" etc. (Here followed very unparliamentary language.) Again the Bondman tried to pacify by saying : ' But you are of English descent, and you fight for the Transvaal!' ' What?' replied the prisoner. ' I am not ashamed of that. You have a Queen to be proud of. You have a free colony under that free British flag. No; it's you fellows, you Bond traitors—traitors to your noble Queen, traitors to Oom Paul—who ought to be ashamed of yourselves.' As it was getting too hot for the Bondman, he sneaked away like a bitten cur.

I found the names of my travelling companions, and took the trouble to find out all about them. I am now quite convinced that they are thorough gentlemen, and that their word can be implicitly relied on. They made no secret of the matter, and, if necessary, their names, as well as that of the prisoner and the Bondman, can be supplied.

I am, etc.,
COLONIST.

APPENDIX K

UITLANDERS' PETITION TO THE QUEEN

The following is the text of the Uitlander petition presented to the Queen :

' For a number of years prior to 1896 considerable discontent existed among the Uitlander population of the South African Republic, caused by the manner in which the Government of the country was being conducted. The great majority of the Uitlander population consists of British subjects. It was, and is, notorious that the Uitlanders have no share in the government of the country, although they constitute an absolute majority of the inhabitants of this State, possess a very large proportion of the land, and represent the intellect, wealth, and energy of the State. The feelings of intense irritation which have been aroused by this state of things have been aggravated by the manner in which remonstrances have been met. Hopes have been held out and promises have been made by the Government of this State from time to time, but no practical amelioration of the conditions of life has resulted. Petitions, signed by large numbers of Your Majesty's subjects, have been repeatedly addressed to the Government of this State, but have failed of their effect, and have even been scornfully rejected. At the end of 1895 the discontent culminated in an armed insurrection against the Government of this State, which, however, failed of its object. On that occasion the people of Johannesburg placed themselves unreservedly in the hands of Your High Commissioner,

in the fullest confidence that he would see justice done to them. On that occasion also President Kruger published a proclamation, in which he again held out hopes of substantial reforms. Instead, however, of the admitted grievances being redressed, the spirit of the legislation adopted by the Volksraad during the past few years has been of a most unfriendly character, and has made the position of the Uitlanders more irksome than before. In proof of the above statement, Your Majesty's petitioners would humbly refer to such measures as the following :

The Immigration of Aliens Act (Law 30 of 1896).

The Press Law (Law 26 of 1896).

The Aliens' Expulsion Law of 1896.

'Of these, the first was withdrawn at the instance of Your Majesty's Government, as being an infringement of the London Convention of 1884.

' THE MINING INDUSTRY

'Notwithstanding the evident desire of the Government to legislate solely in the interests of the burghers, and impose undue burdens on the Uitlanders, there was still a hope that the declaration of the President on December 30, 1896, had some meaning, and that the Government would duly consider grievances properly brought before its notice. Accordingly, in the early part of 1897, steps were taken to bring to the notice of the Government the alarming depression of the mining industry, and the reasons which, in the opinions of men well qualified to judge, had led up to it. The Government at last appointed a Commission consisting of its own officials, which was empowered to inquire into the industrial conditions of the mining population, and to suggest such a scheme for the removal of existing grievances as might seem advisable and necessary. On August 5 the Commission issued their report, in which the reasons for the then state of depression were duly set forth, and many reforms were recommended as necessary for the well-being of the community. Among them it will be sufficient to mention the appointment of an Industrial Board, having its seat in Johannesburg, for the special supervision of the Liquor Law and the Pass Law, and to combat the illicit dealing in gold and amalgam. The Government refused to accede to the report of the Commission, which was a standing indictment against its administration in the past, but referred the question to the Volksraad, which in turn referred it to a Select Committee of its own members. The result created consternation in Johannesburg, for, whilst abating in some trifling respects burdens which bore heavily on the mining industry, the Committee of the Raad, ignoring the main recommendations of the Commission, actually advised an increased taxation of the country, and that in a way which bore most heavily on the Uitlander. The suggestions of the Committee were at once adopted, and the tariff increased accordingly.

'INTERFERENCE WITH JUSTICE

'At the beginning of 1897 the Government went a step further in their aggressive policy towards the Uitlander, and attacked the independence of the High Court, which until then Your Majesty's subjects had regarded as the sole remaining safeguard of their civil rights. Early in that year Act No. 1 was rushed through the Volksraad with indecent haste. This high-handed Act was not allowed to pass without criticism ; but the Government, deaf to all remonstrance, threatened reprisals on those professional men who raised their voices in protest, and finally, on February 16, 1898, dismissed the Chief Justice, Mr. J. G. Kotze, for maintaining his opinions. His place was filled shortly afterwards by Mr. Gregorowski, the Judge who had been especially brought from the Orange Free State to preside over the trial of the Reform prisoners in 1896, and who, after the passing of the Act above referred to, had expressed an opinion that no man of self-respect would sit on the Bench whilst that law remained on the Statute Book of the Republic. All the Judges at the time this law was passed condemned it in a formal protest, publicly read by the Chief Justice in the High Court, as a gross interference with the independence of that tribunal. That protest has never been modified or retracted, and of the five Judges who signed the declaration three still sit on the Bench.

'CONDUCT OF THE POLICE

'The constitution and personnel of the police force is one of the standing menaces to the peace of Johannesburg. It has already been the subject of remonstrance to the Government of this Republic, but hitherto without avail. An efficient police force cannot be drawn from a people such as the burghers of this State ; nevertheless, the Government refuses to open its ranks to any other class of the community. As a consequence, the safety of the lives and property of the inhabitants is confided in a large measure to the care of men fresh from the country districts, who are unaccustomed to town life, and ignorant of the ways and requirements of the people. When it is considered that this police force is armed with revolvers in addition to the ordinary police truncheons, it is not surprising that, instead of a defence, they are absolutely a danger to the community at large. Encouraged and abetted by the example of their superior officers, the police have become lately more aggressive than ever in their attitude towards British subjects. As, however, remonstrances and appeals to the Government were useless, the indignities to which Your Majesty's subjects were daily exposed from this source had to be endured as best they might. Public indignation was at length fully roused by the death at the hands of a police-constable of a British subject named Tom Jackson Edgar. The circumstances of this affair were bad enough in themselves, but were accentuated by the action of the Public Prosecutor, who, although the accused was charged with murder, on his own initiative reduced the charge to that of culpable homicide

only, and released the prisoner on the recognisances of his comrades in the police force, the bail being fixed originally at £200, or less than the amount which is commonly demanded for offences under the Liquor Law, or for charges of common assault.

‘SUMMARY OF GRIEVANCES

‘The condition of Your Majesty’s subjects in this State has indeed become well-nigh intolerable. The acknowledged and admitted grievances of which Your Majesty’s subjects complain prior to 1895 not only are not redressed, but exist to-day in an aggravated form. They are still deprived of all political rights; they are denied any voice in the government of the country; they are taxed far above the requirements of the country, the revenue of which is misapplied and devoted to objects which keep alive a continuous and well-founded feeling of irritation, without in any way advancing the general interest of the State. Maladministration and peculation of public moneys go hand in hand, without any vigorous measures being adopted to put a stop to the scandal. The education of Uitlander children is made subject to impossible conditions. The police afford no adequate protection to the lives and property of the inhabitants of Johannesburg; they are rather a source of danger to the peace and safety of the Uitlander population.

‘THE RIGHT OF PUBLIC MEETING

‘A further grievance has become prominent since the beginning of the year. The power vested in the Government by means of the Public Meetings Act has been a menace to Your Majesty’s subjects since the enactment of the Act in 1894. This power has now been applied in order to deliver a blow that strikes at the inherent and inalienable birthright of every British subject, namely, his right to petition his Sovereign. Straining to the utmost the language and intention of the law, the Government have arrested two British subjects who assisted in presenting a petition to Your Majesty on behalf of 4,000 fellow-subjects. Not content with this, the Government, when Your Majesty’s loyal subjects again attempted to lay their grievances before Your Majesty, permitted their meeting to be broken up and the objects of it to be defeated by a body of Boers, organized by Government officials, and acting under the protection of the police. By reason, therefore, of the direct, as well as the indirect, act of the Government, Your Majesty’s loyal subjects have been prevented from publicly ventilating their grievances and from laying them before Your Majesty.

‘Wherefore Your Majesty’s humble petitioners humbly beseech Your Most Gracious Majesty to extend Your Majesty’s protection to Your Majesty’s loyal subjects resident in this State, and to cause an inquiry to be made into grievances and complaints enumerated and set forth in this humble petition, and to direct

Your Majesty's representative in South Africa to take measures which will secure the speedy reform of the abuses complained of, and to obtain substantial guarantees from the Government of this State for a recognition of their rights as British subjects.'

As well as being responsible for the Uitlanders' petition to the Queen, the South African League did excellent work in the Transvaal, although by many, especially those with no other aspirations than to make money, it was an unpopular body. Messrs. W. Wyburgh, Clem. D. Webb, T. R. Dodd, and others, and the Uitlander Council at a later date, performed solid work in the cause of reform shortly before the war. The League in South Africa and the Imperial South African Association in London have done much to enlighten people as to the true state of affairs.

The League officials responsible for the petition have fairly met and disproved the charges and insinuations made regarding the genuineness of the signatures to the Uitlanders' petition to the Queen. (*Vide* Blue Book, C. 9,345.) It is not necessary here to add to their testimony, illustrating the manner in which the political parsons of the Dutch Reformed Church allow their tongues to speak falsely in their zeal for the Afrikaner cause. The letter below gives proof. It appeared in the *Cape Times* of May 10, 1899, and as I procured the signatures of the members of the clubs alluded to, and wrote the letter in question, it will be admitted mine is not hearsay evidence.

MORE FACTS ABOUT THE PETITION

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'CAPE TIMES'

SIR,

With much in a long letter signed by Mr. D. P. Faure, published in your issue of to-day, I have no concern, but for truth's sake and to prevent misapprehension I desire to give an unqualified denial, as I hereby do, to one portion of that letter, about which I can speak with authority. Mr. Faure says: 'If it were known in England that (*a*) one shilling was paid for every signature obtained; (*b*) that miners and workmen were told by the canvassers that they would please their employers by signing; (*c*) that not a single member of the Johannesburg clubs (*sic*) and only four members of the Stock Exchange had signed it, no great importance would be attached to that petition.' To these allegations I would reply: (*a*) One shilling was not paid for every signature obtained. With reference to the statement marked (*b*), it is sufficient that men did sign their names. Whoever it may be alleged they desired to please, the fact that as free-born Britons they (as a last resource) signed a petition to their Queen is enough. This

they had every right to do. I can say nothing milder than that the statement of Mr. Faure marked (c), that 'not a single member of the Johannesburg clubs signed it,' is an absolute falsehood. I personally saw four members, in the space of a few minutes, with myself sign the petition in the Rand Club, and I know members of both the Rand and New Clubs, as well as 'four members of the Stock Exchange,' who subscribed their names to the petition, although here I would remark in connection with the members of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange that, speaking generally, they have little sympathy with anything which does not directly benefit their pockets. Rights and privileges are little to them so long as they have a 'good market.' As I am a resident in the so-called 'South African Republic,' I have good reasons for not publishing my name, but to you, sir, I am not unknown, and, unlike Mr. Faure, I can prove what I say to be true. I enclose my card, but subscribe myself, as I am,

A CAPE COLONIAL.

May 9, 1899.

The name enclosed is that of a well-known and respected man of business who has lived in Johannesburg for many years.—
ED. C. T.

APPENDIX L

AFRIKANDERS TO AFRIKANDERS

Being the prime mover in refuting the sentiments of the time-servers alluded to as being those of representative colonial Afrikanders, I am able to speak with the greatest authority on this subject. The second 'open letter' was given no prominence by Mr. Hofmeyr, but as by the same post that carried Mr. Hofmeyr's copy I sent one to the *Cape Times*, our sentiments were not smothered.

The day after the *Cape Times* received my letter the following leading article appeared :

'AFRIKANDERS TO AFRIKANDERS'

'Mr. Hofmeyr, in his capacity of leader of the Bond, has received a second "open letter" from Afrikaner residents of Johannesburg. Known and admired for his love of fairplay and above-board methods of political warfare, Mr. Hofmeyr will, of course, insure to this document a prominence in the columns of the Bond organ equal to that accorded to the letter he took pains to publish a week or two ago. Having without request published the first

communication, we take the liberty to print to-day a translation of the second letter, without which the record would be incomplete. The original of this second letter has, of course, been addressed to the Bond leader, and its publication should effectually dispel the misconception which the first must have occasioned as to the attitude reputable Cape Colonists resident on the Johannesburg gold-fields have assumed with reference to the electoral struggle now proceeding in this colony. It would have been strange indeed if the contents of the first communication had been allowed to pass as accurately representing the genuine Afrikaner sentiment of Johannesburg upon the question of the day. It was a wily letter, specially concocted for use amongst the most bigoted of people, and it contained the requisite strain of maudlin blasphemy, without which nowadays no appeal to the passions and prejudices of Afrikaner Bondmen is considered complete. It is, however, to be regretted that the signatories of this precious epistle were not better informed as to some of the realities of Cape politics. If there was anything about the elections for the Legislative Council specially comforting to those who signed the letter, they are welcome to it, but seeing that the progressive party managed to secure a substantial majority in that branch of the Legislature as the result of the elections, the Progressives themselves do not seem to have much to grumble at.

‘The letter which we publish to-day fully exposes the gross misrepresentations attempted in the first communication to Mr. Hofmeyr. That epistle, published a week or two ago, was the outcome of a hole-and-corner meeting at the Transvaal Government offices at Johannesburg, from which meeting even the friendly press was excluded with, as it seemed, unnecessary violence. It is no secret that the meeting was packed with Government officials, Hollanders—who have no more right to the name and designation of Afrikaner than men from China—nephews and sons-in-law of Bond leaders and hangers-on, and a phalanx of lawyers and their clerks. There were sixty-seven signatures attached to the communication, and of these fourteen were those of Government officials, twenty-one lawyers and their assistants, and the rest well-known devotees of the Transvaal Government. Few signed who were not either connected officially with the State, or who were not dependent upon Transvaal Government favours in some way or other. Why the individuals who hail from Holland should seek to interfere in domestic concerns of this colony, and presume to call the men of the Cape their “dear brothers,” why they should subscribe themselves as “originally from the Cape Colony,” and why it should be necessary for them to state with emphasis that they have ‘assembled on our own initiative,’ thus seeming to anticipate the suggestion that they had assembled on somebody else’s initiative or direction, we do not profess to understand. The way in which these gentlemen of Johannesburg thank Heaven that money “has not yet become the god of Afrikanders,” and pray that the “worship of Mammon may never with any probable reason be charged against Afrikanders,” is quite on a par with the remainder of their curious epistle. Happily the attempt to wilfully deceive the

Afrianders of this colony with a letter signed by Hollanders, Transvaal Government officials, and the like, purporting to be a *bonâ fide* Cape Colonial composition, has been exposed, and it is to be hoped that it is not too late to overtake the injury which such misrepresentation is calculated to occasion.

‘There are three sentences in the letter signed by the more representative and genuine body of Afrikaner people in Johannesburg which we hope will not be entirely thrown away upon those who have any regard for the opinion of true Afrikaner colonists in the Transvaal. They are these :

“That the sentiments expressed in the (previous) letter cannot be taken as the sentiments of influential and representative Cape Colonials resident in the South African Republic.”

“That we, as Cape Colonials, are not in sympathy with the present Government in Pretoria, nor with its supporters at the Cape, and we resent the untenable and false position in which we are placed in this State.”

“That we do not yield to the signatories of this letter in our desire for union and prosperity throughout South Africa, but we believe that union and prosperity will be best assisted by the return to power in the Cape Colony of members pledged to progressive legislation, and not by the return of men pledged to the reactionary principles preached by the leaders of the Afrikaner Bond.”

‘The address of which these sentences form a part is signed by 300 men, who are neither ashamed nor afraid to say from which part of the colony they hail. Almost all the signatories are, we are assured, colonial born, and any who are not have been resident for at least twenty years in the colony, surely a term sufficiently long to justify them in calling themselves Cape Colonists. As to the names, none will deny that Morkel, Steytler, Beyers, Meintjes, Van Dyk, De Beer, De Villiers, Moller, Van der Walt, and Becker, are reputable Cape Colonials’ patronymics. The thoroughly representative character of the communication is further attested by the addition of the place of former residence in the colony of the signatories. The men have gone to the Transvaal from Cape Town, Paarl, Somerset West, Somerset East, Burghersdorp, Middelburg, Uitenhage, Graaff-Reinet, Colesberg, Swellendam, Victoria West, Knysna, Caledon, Oudtshorn, Cradock, Mossel Bay, Ceres, Tarkastad, Murraysburg, Fraserburg, Tulbagh, Riversdale, Prince Albert, Hanover, Bedford, and so on, and thus have some right to tender advice to their relatives in the Colony. The value of the communication is further attested by the fact that none of those connected as leaders of the Reform Movement were asked to subscribe to the letter; nor had the South African League any connection with the project. It is, by the way, interesting to learn that owing to the terrorism exercised by the Transvaal Government, surveyors, members of the legal profession, and others in prominent positions expressed their inability to sign their names for fear of the consequences, although they were in perfect

sympathy with the sentiment expressed therein. Professional men who dared to dabble in politics other than those agreeable to the powers that be at Pretoria are, of course, marked, as witness the means adopted by Dr. Leyds only a few months ago to obtain the names and addresses of those who attended professional gatherings in support of the action of Mr. Kotze. Are all the atrocities of the Leyds régime to be perpetuated under the rule of Mr. Reitz, relationship with whom was one of Mr. Schreiner's proudest boasts when he addressed the electors of Malmesbury a week ago? But for this the list would have been longer.'

The standing of the signatories having been called in question by a correspondent of the *Cape Times*, I addressed a further communication, giving the *occupations*, etc., of some of the best known of those who signed. The list was as follows :

- J. H. Mostert, speculator.
- H. de V. Steytler, solicitor.
- F. W. Beyers, solicitor.
- C. Meintjes, of H. Eckstein and Co.
- W. H. Morkel, speculator.
- J. Van Niekerk, medical practitioner.
- Fred. J. Moller, late secretary of defunct Republican and Colonial Trust Company, now well known as a public accountant, etc.
- C. A. Wentzel, attorney and notary, etc.
- Chas. Pietersen, of Robert Kuranda's, son-in-law to the special landdrost, Johannesburg.
- R. M. Bowker, a representative of a good old frontier family.
- J. L. Leeb, director of companies and financier.
- H. E. O. Green, assistant secretary Chamber of Mines.
- A. F. Brown, secretary South African Mutual Life Assurance Association.
- F. W. Bompas, accountant and secretary of companies.
- T. Sheffield, managing director *Argus* Printing and Publishing Company.
- George Sheffield, of same firm.
- Fred. W. Bell, district manager Equitable Life Assurance Company of United States.
- Cullis Relly, district manager Mutual Life of New York.
- G. E. Murray, medical practitioner.
- H. J. Stonestreet, solicitor.
- Henry S. Caldecott, solicitor, etc.
- E. J. Adcock, chemist and druggist.
- Henry Lindsey, solicitor.
- E. P. Martin, managing Brister and Co., merchants.
- T. B. Parker, of Parker Brothers, merchants.
- W. F. Adams, speculator and director of companies.
- Chas. Marx, director of companies.
- F. W. Forbes, financier.
- W. T. Graham, director of companies, etc.

A. Lange, Brink, solicitor.
 J. C. Kirkwood, speculator.
 Tom Andrew, mining and mechanical engineer.
 John Croxford, secretary of companies.
 G. C. Fitzpatrick, solicitor.
 B. B. Reid, importer.
 J. W. Smythe, secretary Ægis Insurance and Trust Company.
 George D. Stonestreet, manager Bonanza Gold Mining Company.
 Chas. E. De Beer, broker.
 Francis Becker, accountant.
 J. P. Ablett, merchant.
 William Kidger, broker.
 G. A. Stretton, solicitor.
 Owen Relly, speculator.
 H. Rose-Innes, solicitor.
 F. M. Blundell, solicitor.
 A. J. Prince, manager Montrose Gold Mining Company.
 G. F. Savage, secretary Rand Club.
 Jer. Auret, solicitor.
 Chas. Jerome, agent Lewis and Marks, Johannesburg.
 C. C. Cawood, representing Rudge-Whitworth, Limited.
 Chas. Exley, merchant.
 Henry F. Thompson, Johannesburg Waterworks.
 A. J. Judd, speculator.
 Walter Reid, architect.
 Harold Fry, solicitor.
 M. Moller, accountant.
 Ben. Bertram, medical practitioner.
 C. Kleudgen, speculator.
 G. W. Evans, secretary Kimberley Permanent Building and Investment Company, Limited.

A gentleman, signing himself 'Fairplay,' insinuated the League was responsible for our protest. What 'Fairplay' stated will be seen from the reply forwarded to the *Cape Times* as under :

'AFRIKANDERS TO AFRIKANDERS'

FACTS FOR CAPE ELECTORS

TO THE EDITOR OF THE 'CAPE TIMES'

SIR,

Under the above heading, I notice in your issue of the 6th inst. a letter signed 'Fairplay'; rather should its author have subscribed himself 'Prejudiced.' The insinuations contained in the letter in question may be summarized as under, against which I beg to reply in parallel columns :

What 'Fairplay' states.

'The appeal from Afrikaners to Afrikaners . . . and your comments are grossly misleading . . . and is nothing but a trick to obtain votes for the so-called Progressive candidates.'

'It seems strange that out of 300 names only 28 are Dutch, and the rest all English names.'

'All English,' says 'Fairplay.'

'It seems strange . . . that at the head of the list of signatures . . . should be put five or six Dutch names.'

'Whether the list of names so mentioned are of leading men up in Johannesburg I know not, but they evidently,' etc.

'It must not be lost sight of that the League has branches up in the South African Republic which no doubt are doing their best to mislead Afrikaners.'

'This is only another blind to get votes for the very men who, if elected, would return him (Rhodes) to power immediately.'

If so, then what was the former open letter addressed to the care of the Hon. J. H. Hofmeyr, and published in *Ons Land*? And, be it noted, the Transvaal Hollander clique's letter was uncalled for.

'Fairplay' stultifies his own cognomen by writing of 'names.' Had he been fair, he would have counted 60 persons, or about 20 per cent. of the total number, and then it must be remembered the total includes a sprinkling of other nationalities. The urban population of the Transvaal, not unnaturally, is more English than Dutch. The subscribers to the 'appeal' were sought by a couple of busy men in Johannesburg from amongst business men in that town, so to a fair-minded man the wonder rather will be that such a large proportion of the names were Dutch. One, too, has yet to learn that persons of English origin have less claim than their Dutch friends to be called 'colonials.'

As a matter of fact, eleven out of the first twelve were Dutch names, and good names, too.

I would recommend 'Fairplay' to write about something he does know. For his edification, however, I refer him to the list sent herewith (see p. 209).

The League was approached and asked to notice the first appeal from so-called Afrikaners; but the Executive declined to associate themselves with the movement, giving as their reason that, if 'Afrikaners' were in earnest, they of their own initiative would protest against being so grossly misrepresented.

That the 'appeal' was no 'blind' can be judged by a consideration of the circumstances which necessitated its existence.

And, as previously stated, 'the appeal is nothing but a trick to obtain votes for the so-called Progressive candidates.'

The facts are these: A meeting of a hole-in-the-corner nature, held in a Government building, attended by Hollanders and Government officials, and presided over by a son-in-law of the well-known Bond member, the Hon. M. L. Neethling, express, as the sentiments of 'Afrikaners,' those held by themselves and a small section of Cape Colonials in Johannesburg; then when, in no secret way, an influentially signed protest is forwarded by Cape Colonials to the same quarter as the first address, omniscient Mr. 'Fairplay' stigmatizes it as a 'blind.'

Has his party alone the right to express its opinions? The second movement was to expose a 'blind,' and that this has been done so successfully is 'Fairplay's' real grievance.

It may interest your justice-loving and fair-minded critic to learn that, although press telegrams were allowed to pass between the Cape and here concerning the first appeal sent to Mr. J. H. Hofmeyr, yet others sent respecting the second appeal were censured out of existence by the impartial authorities in this State. In conclusion, I may mention that prominent Bondmen at the Cape, whose names I know, have written to their relations here who signed the genuine appeal to Afrikaners practically demanding an explanation of their conduct. The tenor of the replies returned to the patriarchs at the Cape is that, if they could only come to live here in this so-called Republic, they, too, would soon change their tone. If your correspondent will allow you, sir, to give his name to me, you are at liberty to give mine to him, each to give it unconditionally. Meanwhile, I beg to subscribe myself

ONE WHO KNOWS.

Johannesburg, August 9, 1898.

'Fairplay' never disclosed his identity as I was willing to do if he would.—F. W. B.

APPENDIX M

THE TRANSVAAL'S UNFRIENDLINESS EVEN TO
FREE STATERS UNLESS THEY WERE WILLING
TO RUN WITH THE ANTI-BRITISH CLIQUE

MR. H. B. PAPENFUS'S OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT STEYN

Mr. Herbert Boshof Papenfus, a Johannesburg solicitor, a Free Stater by birth, and one who obtained burgher rights from the Transvaal before that State adopted so decidedly a retrogressive policy, addressed an 'open letter to President Steyn' through the columns of the Free State *Express*. Mr. Papenfus is a son of a former Attorney-General of the Free State, and a near relative of Mr. Papenfus, Landdrost of Bloemfontein, who, with Mr. Fraser, was one of the party who handed over the keys of the Public Offices at Bloemfontein to Field-Marshal Lord Roberts. The letter was in the Dutch language, and the *Express*, which is a bitterly anti-English paper, is also published in Dutch. As two issues of the paper appeared after Mr. Papenfus's letter should have reached Bloemfontein without its having received publicity, Mr. Papenfus on March 28 telegraphed to the *Express*: 'Do you purpose inserting my letter? Reply sharp. Reply paid.' On the same day he received the following reply: 'Returned by to-day's post. Writing.' Simultaneously, through Mr. J. S. M. Rabie, who wrote 'on behalf of the editor,' the *Express* informed Mr. Papenfus that it regretted it could not see its way to devoting space for the letter, and suggested that it should be sent direct to President Steyn or some other paper. (N.B.—No other paper could have so effectually 'reached' the burghers.) Mr. Papenfus then wired: 'Prepared to pay for insertion open letter advertising rates. Will you insert? Reply sharp. Reply paid.' The following reply was vouchsafed: 'From *Express* to Advocate Papenfus, Johannesburg. We must absolutely decline.'

The *Express* has been the means of spreading Bond propaganda through the Free State. Obviously, it objected to spreading the honest truth. Like *Ons Land*, it prefers rather to mislead.

MR. PAPENFUS'S LETTER

TO HIS HONOUR MARTHINUS THEUNIS STEYN, PRESIDENT
OF THE ORANGE FREE STATE

HONOURED SIR,

I make no apology for addressing you in a matter of such momentous importance as that which constrains me to write you this open letter.

Like yourself, I am a son of the Free State soil ; like yourself, I have enjoyed and profited by the salutary, liberal, and wise administration of the Government of that State. Our fathers both served the Orange Free State in important and honourable positions—mine, at least, fought and bled for his country. It was instilled into me from early years, and I have constantly been taught to regard the Transvaal as a sister State, as a State governed by the same principles as the Orange Free State ; and when, with a view to improving my prospects, I came to this State, I was under the impression that I came to live in a country where I would be cordially welcomed, where I would be received as one of the booy politic, and where I would be recognised as a Republican and an Afrikander.

I might here mention that my career in this country (Transvaal) has been an honourable one, and that I have ever been faithful and obedient to the laws of the country. My career in the Free State, where I was born, and where I have lived for twenty-four years, is well known to you, so that I need not make any reference thereto. Suffice it to say that I also—albeit in a far humbler capacity than yourself—have served the Orange Free State Government with honour and credit to myself, as testimonials from that Government and from prominent men in its service will attest. I have been resident in the Transvaal for more than ten years, excepting a temporary absence in Europe for three and a quarter years, whither I went for the purpose of fitting myself to occupy a higher position in the Commonwealth, so that I might be enabled to be a more useful citizen, and be better qualified to further the interests of Republican government.

I can safely assert that I have failed to discover during my residence here how this State can justify its claim to be called a Republic. Leaving on one side for the present any mention of the thousands of industrious citizens from over the sea who for years have made it their home, how very few burghers of the Free State (and those only for reasons which will be apparent later on), and how very few others, comparatively speaking, of South African birth, who have been peaceful and law-abiding citizens of long and honourable residence, have been politically enfranchised !

I hold it to be the just right of every law-abiding individual who has been resident for a reasonable number of years in any country which lays claim to be considered a civilized State, and who has vested interest in that country, and who will swear allegiance to the Government of that country, to claim and demand political enfranchisement. That is, in my humble opinion, the creed of true Republicanism, and this also is the basis of government and enfranchisement in the Orange Free State.

But this is no Republic. Not only are thousands of law-abiding citizens at present without political privileges, *but they are for ever debarred from obtaining them*, and the barbarous spectacle is presented of a State claiming to be recognised and respected by the civilized world as a free people ('Zil vil zich bij de beschaaftde wereld als en onafhankelijk en vrij volk erkend en ge-eerbiedigd zien,' Art. 3, Law No. 2, 1896), and laying claim to a Republican

form of Government ('De Regeeringsvorm van dezen Staat zal ziju die eener Republiek,' Art. 2, Law No. 2, 1896), excluding children born of the soil from citizenship. When the unenfranchised ask for political privileges to which they have a right, they are either put off with all kinds of absurd subterfuges, such as that, *i.e.*, the country's independence will be jeopardized, or else their just claims and rights are ignored and treated with contempt. In the Free State this eternal and tedious declamation about the country's independence being in danger never was heard and never will be, as long as the policy—I trust a policy the Free State never will depart from—of making the stranger within your gates one of yourselves is followed. Who are the men of whom the Free State is proud, and who are its mainstay? Men who came from outside its borders, and made it the land of their adoption—men who were received as men, and were made citizens. I need only mention such names as Sir John Brand, Fischer, Fraser, Falmer, Fichardt, Wepener, and Brill.

There can be no doubt that the Government of this country is oligarchical; the taxpayers, the vast majority of worthy and law-abiding inhabitants, have no voice in the councils of this State. The Government follows the advice of sycophants and time-servers—men who seek their own ends by encouraging the unenlightened burgher in his ignorance and fostering his prejudices, and who are constantly shrieking about the independence of the State being endangered, of which they do not, and never will, care one iota; men who make the Government (composed for the greater part of sturdy farmers who have not had the advantage of a liberal education and wide experience) mistrustful of the new-comer, for they foresee in the union of the burgher and Uitlander their own exposure and discomfiture. This constant and ceaseless mistrust, with which the Uitlanders (*and we Free Staters are Uitlanders*) are looked upon, begets mistrust, and herein, to my mind, is one of the worst aspects of the situation, for this disunion and dissension is fast becoming, if it be not already, not a race question, but a class question, a party question. Brother differs from brother; Afrikaner grows bitter towards Afrikaner.

There is no reciprocal obligation on the governors and the governed, and the former are only entitled to the loyalty of the latter so long as they govern and do not misgovern. Afrikaners who do not have their reasonable and just claims recognised will be no longer bound to support and uphold those who refuse to recognise those claims.

I shall not now enter into further questions which present themselves immediately in this connection, such as the reckless squandering and wicked abuse of public moneys, the deplorable lack of system in most Government departments, the shameful bolstering up of monopolies and concessions (be they 'corner-stones of the State's independence' or otherwise), the unjust and inequitable taxation, scandals and corruption rampant on every hand, the ostensible 'lending' to one favoured class, but in reality the alienating, of State trust-money produced by the toil and

industry of the other class ; and latest, the so-called Judicial Question—a question, honoured sir, which must strongly appeal to your sense of right and wrong, as a similar question arose at the time you were a member of the Orange Free State Judiciary, when you, with your brother judges, fought for and finally achieved the independence of the Bench.

But now, sir, to the object of this letter. The matters above referred to would not be mentioned by me in public print were it not for a deep feeling of patriotism and of love for the land of my birth, where I have lived so many years—a feeling which, I trust, will be neither affected nor effaced by time or distance, and which impelled me, when the question of closer union with this country was again recently mooted, to send to the Free State a strong petition against such closer union, which petition, I assert without fear of contradiction, was signed by the most prominent and respected Free Staters here, namely, by such as, among others, the father of one of your present judges, by one who for a long time has been an honoured and influential member of your Volksraad, by the brother of your present Attorney-General, by the son of one who for many years has been the Chairman of your Volksraad, by the sons of officials who when living had occupied important Government positions in the Free State, and by others who had themselves held honourable positions in the Free State Civil Service. This same feeling of patriotism and love of country impels me once more to ask of you how you, who must be aware of the difference in the form of Government and methods of administration, as well as of the other differences which I have briefly indicated above, between this country and the Orange Free State, can venture to throw in the lot of 'our' Free State with that of this unhappy country? The Free State holds a strong and unassailable position, internally and externally, for its government is founded on principles of equity and justice to all, and its independence is guaranteed by Great Britain under the Bloemfontein Convention. Briefly, the Orange Free State is politically the Switzerland of South Africa.

You occupy a high and important office of trust. I implore you to pause and reflect upon the grave issue involved in an identification or combination of our State with this country. I write in deep sincerity, and I would ask you to gauge the feeling upon this question of your compatriots who have been resident here for some time, and know the methods of government obtaining here. I am quite satisfied to leave my views to be judged by them ; they are known to you, and I venture to assert that, *with the exception of those whose names figure on the criminal records of the Free State, and of those who are directly or indirectly connected with, or are dependents of, the government of this country*, the views which I have humbly laid before you will carry almost unanimous approval.

The critical position of affairs is my reason for selecting the present method of addressing you, and also because I wish the views which I have here recorded upon this most momentous question to

become known through the medium of the press to my compatriots of the Orange Free State.

I am, honoured sir,
Your most obedient servant,
H. B. PAPENFUS.

(The italics are mine.—F. W. B.)

APPENDIX N

OATH OF MEMBERS OF THE CAPE LEGISLATURE

The former oath taken by members of the Cape Legislature was as follows :

‘I, . . ., do sincerely promise and swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Victoria as lawful Sovereign of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and of this colony of the Cape of Good Hope,

and that I will defend her to the utmost of my power against all traitorous conspiracies and attempts whatever which shall be made against her person, crown, and dignity, and that I will do my utmost endeavours to disclose and make known to Her Majesty, her heirs and successors, all treasons and traitorous conspiracies and attempts which I shall know to be against Her Majesty or any of them ; and all this I do swear without any equivocation, mental evasion, or secret reservation, and renouncing all pardons and dispensations from any person or persons whatever to the contrary.’

Unfortunately the present obligation is only the first portion—the first forty-two words down to ‘Colony of the Cape of Good Hope.’

The oath taken by members of the Executive Council entails no further obligation than secrecy regarding their deliberations.

APPENDIX O

MR. SCHREINER AND THE 'DRIFTS'

The following extracts from a Cape Blue Book, published in 1897, containing the papers relating to the closing of the Drifts on the Vaal River in 1895, show the attitude Mr. Schreiner took at that time :

TO THE PRIME MINISTER

REPORT OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL

With the advice and consent of his Executive Council, the State President of the South African Republic promulgated on August 28 a proclamation, of which I annex a translation. The proclamation purports to be made under the provisions of the Article 8 of Law No. 4 of 1894.

The only provisions of that law to which it is necessary to refer are Articles 6 and 8, of which I annex translations.

The Drifts referred to in the proclamation are at the present moment proclaimed ports of entry for the purposes of the Customs Law in force in the South African Republic, and goods of all classes, whether 'oversea,' the produce or manufacture of Africa, may lawfully be imported by the roads which cross the Vaal River at those Drifts.

There can be no doubt that the power to close a port of entry which has once been proclaimed, and the power to differentiate between the classes of goods which may be imported at a port of entry, are powers of a specially important character, which would require special enactment in order that they, or either of them, might be legally delegated for exercise from the legislative to the executive authority in any State.

As an illustration of this well-recognised principle, I may mention that in this Colony it was found necessary to legislate by Act No. 5 of 1883, that when the power to make by-laws, regulations, etc., was conferred upon the Governor or a local authority, etc., it should be construed to include the power 'to alter or amend, and to repeal and make others.'

It is readily apparent that the powers now under discussion might very seriously disturb the trade or commerce of the State along routes already lawfully sanctioned.

Now, Article 8 merely provides that 'nobody shall be allowed to import merchandise, trading, or other goods, except through a port of entry fixed by His Honour the State President, by proclamation in the *Staats Courant*.' It empowers the State President to fix a port of entry by proclamation, but it does not empower

him to close a port once so fixed. Still less does it empower him to proclaim that certain classes of goods shall not be imported through a lawfully-proclaimed port of entry.

I am decidedly of opinion that the proclamation now under consideration is *ultra vires* for the reasons indicated. Indeed, I consider that upon a test-case, the High Court of the Republic would be compelled to rule accordingly, and to maintain the right of any importer to send goods of other than African origin by road across either of the Drifts referred to in the South African Republic. For the Court could only recognise the original proclamation of the ports of entry, and should hold that the Volksraad alone could so close a port once proclaimed. I need scarcely point out that an amendment of the law by the Volksraad would be a very different matter from a proclamation by the State President, and I do not consider that a move the hostility of which to the import trade through this Colony is manifest should be permitted to pass without notice, or that the legality or otherwise of the proclamation should be left to be tested by litigation after October 1. For there is another and more serious aspect in which the action of the Government of the Republic must be considered. It appears to me that Article 13 of the Convention of London must be considered in its relation to this proclamation. That Article 13 includes the following provision: 'Nor will any prohibition be maintained or imposed on the importation into the South African Republic of any article coming from any part of Her Majesty's dominions which shall not equally extend to the like article coming from any other place or country.'

The proclamation proposes to establish from and after October 1, 1895, a prohibition upon the importation by road of 'oversea goods' coming from this colony, which prohibition does not extend to goods coming from other places. For there are other ports of entry (quite apart from the railways) by road which are left open. And it is an unquestionable fact that if the two Drifts—Viljoen's Drift and Zand Drift—are closed as ports of entry, then there will exist a practical prohibition on the importation of 'oversea goods' coming from this colony by road.

It may be said that the railway is still open, but that argument could only have force if all roads were closed as ports of entry. So long as any road is permitted to remain open in the territory of the Republic for the importation of 'oversea goods,' I consider that the closing of the two ports of entry by road, which alone are available for importation of 'oversea goods' coming from this colony, constitutes, or rather would constitute, a violation of the article referred to of the London Convention. That the next step would be to adopt upon the railway from Viljoen's Drift a prohibitive scale of rates cannot of course be doubted. For it is the expressed intention of the President to 'build a wall,' and construct a 'barbed wire fence,' for the exclusion of goods coming from this colony through the Free State for the supply of markets in the South African Republic.

That this policy is aimed more directly at this colony is apparent from the fact that the road is left open from the side of Natal. If

it be said that the roads closed only connect the two Republics, and not the South African Republic and this colony, the reply is that, in fact, the prohibition operates against 'oversea goods' coming from this colony, since the Orange Free State has no seaport. What steps the latter State may take need not be here discussed. A perusal of the treaties of Potchefstroom of 1889 between the States is instructive, as illustrating how, despite those utterances and obligations of close friendship, the Orange Free State is to be made to suffer for her friendly relations in the matter of customs and railways with this colony.

But I should not be doing my duty if I did not advise His Excellency at this critical point of the view which is forced upon me, viz., that the action of the State President and Government of the South African Republic constitutes, or will, if persevered in, constitute an infraction of Article 13 of the London Convention of 1884. And I beg to submit that the attention of Her Majesty's Government should be drawn to the fact that such action is contemplated by the Government of the South African Republic as is not alone in violation of its treaty obligations, but is not justified by the law under which such action is professedly taken. It would then rest with Her Majesty's Government to take such diplomatic measures as the occasion might be deemed to require.

(Signed) W. P. SCHREINER.

Attorney-General's Office, Capetown, September 4, 1895.

PARAPHRASE OF CONFIDENTIAL TELEGRAM

SECRETARY OF STATE TO HIGH COMMISSIONER

November 1, 1895.

I am prepared to authorize you, on conditions to be stated later on, to send a message to the Government of the South African Republic to the following effect :

Law officers of the Crown, having examined the questions from a legal point of view, advise that the recent action of the South African Republic is a breach of Article 13 of the London Convention of 1884. I am advised further that the Government of the South African Republic cannot now set itself right by making the prohibition of entrance by the Drifts general, so as to include colonial goods, if and when it reissues the proclamation, which I have been surprised to see it appears to entertain some intention to legalize by doing.

Her Majesty's Government accept the legal advice they have received ; but they consider, independently of the Convention rights of the British Empire, that the closing of the Drifts, and especially the extension of that measure to colonial goods, is so unfriendly as to call for the gravest remonstrance, and, while anxious for a friendly settlement, must protest against what they regard as an attempt to force the hand of the Cape Government in Conference by a proceeding almost partaking of the nature of an act of hostility. Proposed message ends.

Communicate this to your Ministers in writing, confidentially, and point out to them that once foregoing message is sent, Her Majesty's Government cannot allow the matter to drop until its demands have been complied with, even if an expedition has to be undertaken.

Her Majesty's Government do not intend that such an expedition should, like most previous colonial wars, be conducted wholly at the Mother Country's expense. Explain that you are therefore instructed to require from your Ministers a most explicit undertaking in writing that if an expedition should become necessary, the Cape Parliament will bear half the gross expense; that the Cape Government, so far as its resources in men may suffice, will furnish a fair contingent of the fighting men required, besides giving the full and free use of its railway and rolling stock for military purposes. If you obtain these assurances in writing, explicitly and without qualification, you may send on the message to Pretoria.

If not, defer action, and report fully by telegraph, awaiting my further instructions.

TELEGRAM

RHODES, CAPETOWN, TO LAING AND SCHREINER, VICTORIA
WEST ROAD

November 2.

Following cable from Secretary of State for Colonies. Begins (see above) ends.

The conditions demanded are the logical outcome of a refusal by Kruger which we know will never occur. Still, the Secretary of State for the Colonies is justified in asking them, as he is not prepared to sit down under a refusal, and wishes to know that he will not have the Cape Colony resisting the passage of troops on a business which they have asked him to undertake. At the same time, it is an outcome which we have never faced. What are your views? Governor insists on a distinct answer, yes or no. The ultimatum is delayed, but will be sent at once if we say yes. Telegraph your decision from Springfontein or Bloemfontein, which will be kept open for the purpose. We, of course, wish that the assurance had not been asked for, but, being asked, we do not see how we can refuse it.

LAING AND SCHREINER TO RHODES

Your identical telegram to each of us received at Victoria Road has had our earnest consideration; in brief, we entirely concur in your view, and consider that the required assurance is fairly asked for, and should be given at once. Word in your telegram was 'hall'; we think you meant 'half.' We think that instead of the word 'legalize,' it would be well if the word 'attempt' to legalize could be inserted in the message from His Excellency to the President, but this point, though important, does not affect our

view. As already stated above, we shall be glad if the message can be sent, not to-day—which is proclaimed as a Day of Humiliation—but the earliest possible moment on Monday, so as to be in the hands of the Government at Pretoria before Conference meet.

APPENDIX P

POLITIEKVERBOND MET DEN ORANGE VRYSTAAT

2. De Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek en de Oranje Vrystaat verbinden zich wederzyds elkander met alle beschikbare Krackten en middelen te on dersteunen, wanneer de onafhankelijkheid van een der twee Staten bedreigd af aangetast werden mocht, tenzy de Staat die de ondersteuning zou meeten verleenende onrechtvaardigheid van de zaak van den anderen Staat antoont.

3. Het is tusschen de Regeeringen van beide Staaten verstaan dat het wenschelyk is, dat zij el Kander zoo spoedig mogelijk wederkeerig op de borgte zullen honden van zaken die den vrede en de onafhankelijkheid van een of van beide Staten Kunnen benadeelen.

Aldeesgedaan en geteekend te Bloemfontein, op den 17 den dag van Maart, 1897.

(Signed) S. J. P. KRUGER,
Staatspresident der Zuid-Afrik. Republiek.

(Signed) M. T. STEYN,
Staatspresident van den Orange Vrijstaat.

[*Translation*]

CLOSER UNION TREATY

Article 1.—Practically preamble.

Article 2.—The South African Republic and the Orange Free State mutually bind themselves to support one another with all available powers and means in case the independence of the two States may be threatened or assailed, unless the State which will have to extend such support points out the injustice of the case of the other State.

Article 3.—It is understood between the Governments of both States that it is desirable that they will as soon as possible mutually inform and advise one another about matters which may prejudice the peace or independence of one of the two States.—Treaty dated March 17, 1897.

APPENDIX Q

BOER DIPLOMACY

As illustrating how Boer diplomacy has ever endeavoured to throw the responsibility for what occurs on other shoulders, the undermentioned examples may be cited. The Boers take action or make a declaration in consequence of which, and as a necessary sequence, an unavoidable result must occur. Then they blame the other side for the result.

In 1880, when the Transvaal Triumvirate and Executive Council took action which made war an unavoidable consequence, they addressed a letter to the Administrator, Sir Owen Lanyon, in which these words occur :

‘We declare in the most earnest manner that we have no desire to shed blood, and that we will have no war on our part. With you therefore it rests to necessitate us to take recourse to arms in self-defence. . . . If it should ever come so far, we shall defend ourselves with the knowledge that we fight for the honour of Her Majesty’ (!), ‘fighting as we do for the sanctity of treaties, sworn to by her, but violated through her servants. . . . From the last paragraphs of our Proclamation, your Excellency will observe the unalterable and determined intention of the people to co-operate with the English Government in all concerning the progress of South Africa. But the only condition to arrive here at is also comprised in the same Proclamation, clearly and explicitly explained, and provided with good reasons.’ (Then, after implying that the Triumvirate required the keys of office, the demand or address concluded with the words: ‘We expect an answer within twice twenty-four hours. Signed by the Triumvirate and Members of the Executive Council.’*)

At the same time, in order to prevent the concentration of troops while awaiting a reply to their Proclamation, a letter was sent to all the commanding officers of British troops, including Colonel Anstruther, who then was marching from Lydenberg to Pretoria without expectation of meeting the Boers or the resistance he experienced. The letter above alluded to was dated December 17, 1880, and stated, *inter alia*: ‘We have the honour to inform you that the Government of the South African Republic have taken up their residence at Heidelberg; that a diplomatic commissioner has been sent by them with despatches to His Excellency Sir W. Owen Lanyon; that until the arrival of His Excellency’s answer we don’t know whether we are in a state of war or not; that consequently we cannot allow any movement of troops on your side, and wish you to stop where you are. . . . We do not wish to take up arms,

* ‘With the Boers in the Transvaal,’ Norris-Newman, pp. 112, 113.

and therefore inform you *that any movement of troops from your side will be taken as a declaration of war, the responsibility whereof we put upon your shoulders.* . . . ?*

THE ULTIMATUM OF OCTOBER 9, 1899

TO THE BRITISH AGENT, PRETORIA

SIR,

Government South African Republic feels itself compelled to refer the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain and Ireland once again to the Convention of 1884, concluded between this Republic and the United Kingdom, and which, in its 14th Article, secures certain specified rights to the white population of this Republic, namely, that (here follows Article 14 of Convention of London, 1884). This Government wishes further to observe that the above are only rights which Her Majesty's Government have reserved in the above Convention with respect to the Uitlander population of this Republic, and that the violation only of those rights could give that Government a right to diplomatic representation or intervention, while, moreover, the regulation of all other questions affecting the position or the rights of the Uitlander population under the above-mentioned Convention is handed over to the Government and the representatives of the people of the South African Republic.

Amongst the questions the regulation of which falls exclusively within the competence of this Government and of the Volksraad are included those of the franchise and representation of the people in this Republic, and although thus the exclusive right of this Government and of the Volksraad for the regulation of that franchise and representation is indisputable, yet this Government has found occasion to discuss in a friendly fashion the franchise and the representation of the people with Her Majesty's Government, without, however, recognising any right thereto on the part of Her Majesty's Government. This Government has also, by the formulation of the now existing franchise law and the resolution with regard to representation, constantly held these friendly discussions before its eyes. On the part of Her Majesty's Government, however, the friendly nature of these discussions has assumed a more and more threatening tone, and the minds of the people in this Republic and in the whole of South Africa have been excited, and a condition of extreme tension has been created, while Her Majesty's Government could no longer agree to the legislation respecting franchise and the resolution respecting representation in this Republic and finally by your Note of September 25, 1899, broke off all friendly correspondence on the subject, and intimated that they must now proceed to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement, and this Government can only see in the above intimation from Her Majesty's Government a new violation of the Convention of London of 1884, which does not reserve to Her

* 'With the Boers in the Transvaal,' p. 113.

Majesty's Government the right to a unilateral settlement of the question, which is exclusively a domestic one for this Government, and has already been regulated by it.

On account of the strained situation and the consequent serious loss in and interruption of trade in general which the correspondence respecting the franchise and representation in this Republic carried in its train, Her Majesty's Government have recently pressed for an early settlement, and finally pressed by your intervention for an answer within forty-eight hours (subsequently somewhat altered) to your Note of September 12, replied to by the Note of this Government of September 15 and your Note of September 25, 1899, and thereafter further friendly negotiations broke off, and this Government received the intimation that a proposal for a final settlement would shortly be made; but although this promise was once more repeated, no proposal has up to now reached this Government. Even while friendly correspondence was still going on an increase of troops on a large scale was introduced by Her Majesty's Government, and stationed in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic. Having regard to occurrences in the history of this Republic which it is unnecessary here to call to mind, this Government feels obliged to regard this military force in the neighbourhood of its borders *as a threat against the independence of the South African Republic*, since it was aware of no circumstances which could justify the presence of any such military force in South Africa and in the neighbourhood of its borders. In answer to an inquiry with respect thereto addressed to His Excellency the High Commissioner, this Government received, to its great astonishment, in answer a veiled insinuation that from the side of the Republic ('van Republiekanske zeyde') an attack was being made on Her Majesty's colonies, and at the same time a mysterious reference to possibilities, whereby it was strengthened *in its suspicion that the independence of this Republic was being threatened*. As a defensive measure, it was therefore obliged to send a portion of the burghers of this Republic in order to offer the requisite resistance to similar possibilities. Her Majesty's unlawful intervention in the internal affairs of this Republic, in conflict with the Convention of London, 1884, caused by the extraordinary strengthening of troops in the neighbourhood of the borders of this Republic, has thus caused an intolerable condition of things to arise, whereto this Government feels itself obliged, in the interest not only of this Republic, but also of all South Africa, to make an end as soon as possible, and feels itself called upon and obliged to press earnestly and with emphasis on Her Majesty's Government for the immediate termination of this state of things, and to request Her Majesty's Government to give it the assurance:

- (a) That all points of mutual difference shall be regulated by the friendly course of arbitration, or by whatever amicable way may be agreed upon by this Government with Her Majesty's Government.
- (b) That the troops on the borders of this Republic shall be instantly withdrawn.

- (c) That all reinforcements of troops which have arrived in South Africa since June 1, 1899, shall be removed to the sea-coast, with an assurance that they will be removed from South Africa within a reasonable time to be agreed upon with this Government, and with a mutual assurance and guarantee on the part of this Government that no attack upon or hostilities against any portion of the possessions of the British Government shall be made by the Republic during further negotiations within a period of time to be subsequently agreed upon between the Governments, and this Government will, on compliance therewith, be prepared to withdraw the armed burghers of this Republic from the borders.
- (d) That Her Majesty's troops which are now on the high seas shall not be landed in any port of South Africa.

This Government must press for an immediate and affirmative answer to these four questions, and earnestly requests Her Majesty's Government to return such answer before or upon Wednesday, October 11, 1899, not later than 5 o'clock p.m., and it desires further to add that in the event of unexpectedly no satisfactory answer being received by it within that interval, it will to its great regret be compelled to regard the action of Her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of war, and will not hold itself responsible for the consequences thereof, and that *in the event of any further movement of troops taking place within the above-mentioned time in the nearer direction of our borders, this Government will be compelled to regard that also as a formal declaration of war.* I have, etc.

(Signed) F. W. REITZ,
State Secretary.

APPENDIX R

CONCERNING ARBITRATION

The Transvaal Government and its friends are great on arbitration. They, at all events, are great advocates of it. Perhaps it is a principle they want to establish! However, regarding arbitration, it is interesting to note, on September 7, 1899, President Kruger said, 'God will be the final arbitrator' (*Cape Times*, September 8), which statement was greeted with cheers by the assembled Raad. Again, on October 2, at the meeting of the Joint Raads, he said: 'The Lord will be with them, and be the final arbitrator, and show up the lying words about the franchise. The Lord will decide' (*Leader*, October 3). In the official bulletin announcing that probably, in the absence of news from Cronje, his surrender was a fact, Paul Kruger condescendingly said that, whatever happens, 'the Lord still reigns' (*Argus*,

March 12). While poor old General Joubert, in addressing the burghers before leaving the Biggarsberg, said, 'God will be the final arbitrator' (*Argus*, March 12, 1900). On a previous occasion when arbitration *was* agreed to, when the decision went against the Transvaal Government, they at once repudiated the award !* It is to be hoped on this occasion they will be more respectful.

APPENDIX S

THE BOND AND THE NAVY VOTE

Astounding though the statement be that Mr. Schreiner was the only one of the Afrikaner party who spoke decidedly and unreservedly in favour of the Cape's contribution to the navy, it is, nevertheless, true.

The Bond party has often been given, and has invariably claimed, credit for the Naval Vote, but, as will be seen from a careful study of the proceedings summarized below, this credit is not justly theirs. The speeches of the Afrikaner members during the Session of 1897 revealed a strong feeling, on the Afrikaner side, of antagonism to Mr. J. Rose-Innes's proposal, even after that gentleman's exhortation that he 'trusted his Afrikaner friends would not be afraid of his motion, and would rise to the occasion.' Mr. Merriman at Stellenbosch, after the conclusion of the Session, declared (August 14, 1897) that 'there was a strong undercurrent of feeling against this vote.' This feeling manifested itself on the Bond side alone.

Mr. SCHREINER, who, although not a Bondsman, is a tool in the hands of the Bond, appealed to the selfish interests of the Afrikaner party in his endeavour to gain support for the vote. He said: 'Whatever may be in the womb of the future for them, however much they might yet be "zelfstandig" enough in time to come, at present South Africa could not protect itself by sea. And he was convinced, as a reasonable man looking at the circumstances of the country, that *for the benefit of South Africa*' (including Afrikanerdom) 'they should continue to trust that the strong arm which now protected them would continue to afford that protection on the sea for a long period to come. *They must have defence, and they could not provide it for themselves*, and because they could not it was necessary that they should take an interest in its being provided for them, *and that interest was the interest of a loyal colony!* There was not a man in that House who would say that he would prefer to be protected by sea by any other Power than Great Britain, and he would say that the Afrikaner members in that House were as firmly attached to the tie which bound them to Great Britain as any members of the House with English names and who held English sentiments.' (As a matter of fact, when the

* Theal, 'History of South Africa, 1854-72,' p. 369.

test came some of the Afrikaner members alluded to were found numbered amongst the rebels, and the Bond Ministry did not greatly exert itself to prevent the aforesaid tie being severed. No Bond members of Parliament fought for Great Britain against the Queen's enemies, while members 'with English names,' like Brabant, Harris, and Tamplin, took up arms in defence of the Empire.)

Mr. KRIGE (Bond) doubted not the motion would be passed, but doubted if it were necessary, and would have liked further explanations.

Mr. VAN DER WALT (Bond), although agreeable to the proposal, as they could not protect themselves, was afraid they could not then afford it.

Mr. VAN WYK (Bond) said 'they could not pass such a resolution in a hurry. They must consider what they were pledging themselves to do. They were a poor country, dependent on others for their prosperity, and therefore they must be careful, and not spend money rashly. He thought that the debate should be adjourned.'

Mr. A. S. DU PLESSIS (Bond) desired the debate adjourned, and could not say he would vote for the motion, as he had not had time to study it in its different bearings!

Mr. SAUER did not desire to rush matters, and moved 'That the house do now adjourn,' and if that were negatived, he said it would be competent to move the adjournment of the debate.

The motion being negatived,

Mr. THERON (Bond) moved that the debate be adjourned.

On June 2, 1897, the debate was resumed.

The SPEAKER explained that the motion under consideration was as follows: 'That in the opinion of this house the time has arrived when steps should be taken to arrange some basis of contribution by this colony towards the Imperial navy, and that the Prime Minister be requested to enter into negotiations in this matter with Her Majesty's Government, and report the result to Parliament next Session.'

Mr. THERON (Bond) seemed to object to the form more than the sentiment of the motion. He said, 'Their loyalty was a thing of every day. They knew very well that *they had too much to lose ever to let their country be under any other Power than England.*' Mr. Theron then admitted 'they owed their freedom of action, of religion, of everything else, to the Imperial Government' . . . though he still maintained that to give a mandate to the Premier binding them to—they did not know what—would be a step in the wrong direction.

Mr. MERRIMAN was Dr. Jekyll and not Mr. Hyde on this occasion. In a stirring speech he struck the right note, and said he was going to vote for it because he believed in the principle embodied in it, and because 'he believed there was behind it a true principle of nationality and a true principle of freedom.'

Mr. LE ROUX (Bond) spoke against the motion, and advised the mover to withdraw it.

Mr. IMMELMAN (Bond) said 'that it was a critical period in their

country's history, and he had his doubts whether under the circumstances the motion before the house was a proper one.'

Mr. VAN DER VYVER moved as an amendment that the word *provisional* be inserted before 'negotiations.'

Mr. J. P. DU PLESSIS said he would vote for the amendment. They were protected against the Premier's possibly going too far, and even if he brought back a report which they thought went too far, they could still vote against it.

Mr. J. ROSE-INNES accepted the amendment, and the motion, as amended, was almost unanimously agreed to.

The following table shows the feeling expressed by all the members who spoke on the proposal. Messrs. Merriman and J. Rose-Innes have been 'paired' and omitted from the list. These gentlemen were in favour of the motion, but neither can be classed as 'Progressive' or 'Bond':

	PROGRESSIVE PARTY.			AFRIKANDER PARTY.		
	For.	Against.	Dubious.	For.	Against.	Dubious.
Upington ...	1					
Rhodes ...	1					
Schreiner ...				1		
Brown ...	1					
Krige ...					1	
Van der Walt...						1
Palmer ...	1					
Douglass ...	1					
Venter ...	1					
Van Wyk ...					1	
Sprigg ...	1					
Du Plessis ...						1
Sauer ...						1
Theron ...						1
Le Roux ...					1	
Sievwright ...	1					
Immelman ...					1	
Berry ...	1					
Van der Vyver				1*		
Ryan ...	1					
	10	—	—	2	4	4

It will therefore be seen that when even only proposing that *provisional* negotiations should be entered into to arrange some basis of contribution towards the Imperial navy, of the twenty-two members who spoke on the motion nine were Bondsmen who consistently voted with the 'Afrikaner party'; the remaining one of

* Proposer of the less binding amendment.

that party, Mr. Schreiner, was under Bondage, and was the solitary member who, without reservation, honestly supported the proposal. Mr. Van der Vyver, the other who may with Mr. Schreiner be taken as having supported the principle, proposed as an amendment the addition of the word 'provisional' before the word 'negotiations,' thus making the whole affair less binding.

Mr. Venter's name is classed with the Progressives and not with the Afrikaner party, as, during the Session, he voted with the Progressives. For that and similar reasons he merited the disfavour of the Bond Dictator, so was ostracised in consequence.

Once and for all to settle this misapprehension that the Afrikaner party expressed itself in favour of the Navy Vote, let us pursue the question further and follow the matter to the end. The day the Assembly passed the amendment, Sir Gordon Sprigg sailed for England to take part in the Jubilee celebrations. A few weeks after the debate on the Navy Contribution Bill, a trip was arranged for the members of Parliament from Cape Town to Simonstown on the flagship, to astonish and educate the Afrikaner party. When Parliament next met the members were in a manner pledged to the principle of a contribution to the Imperial navy. On October 11 the Government was defeated on a vote of 'no confidence' by a majority of two. On October 17, on the first meeting of the house under the new Ministry, Mr. J. Rose-Innes gave notice of motion to ask on the following day, 'Whether the Government intend during the present Session of Parliament to submit any proposal to the house regarding a contribution by this colony to the Imperial navy, and, if so, whether he is in a position to inform the house of the nature of such proposal.' On the following day Mr. Merriman, who had then become 'Treasurer,' said that the nature of the contribution would be secured by Act of Parliament, which he implied would shortly be brought forward. About a fortnight later, when pressed by Sir Gordon Sprigg for some details of the Navy Contribution Bill, Mr. Schreiner said: 'The Bill simply proposes to charge annually to the revenues of this colony the sum of £30,000, and to place that sum in the hands of Her Majesty's Government for disposal in connection with the Royal Navy.'

On December 2 Mr. Schreiner moved the second reading of the Navy Contribution Bill, and in the debate on his motion only three Bondsmen spoke. The second reading was carried without a division, and in due course the Bill became law.

Thus it will be seen how hollow is the much-vaunted boast of Bond loyalty on account of the Afrikaner support to the Naval Vote. 'Afrikaner' loyalty—or, more correctly, disloyalty—has since been proved in practice as unmistakably as I have shown that the Afrikaner Bond party found themselves by force of circumstances bound to acquiesce in the proposal and unable to 'jib,' however much inclined to do so. By his tactics clever Mr. Hofmeyr obviated the necessity of his party placing their individual vote on record, but yet was able to claim credit for their great loyalty to that guardian Power whose protection by sea it was their interest to retain.

APPENDIX T

BOND RESOLUTIONS

‘Of course they’re loyal.’

The devoted loyalty of the Colonial Dutch is shown by the way their Bond desires to embarrass the Imperial Government at critical times, and to raise up and increase already heated feeling.

THE BOND CONGRESS

THE LIST OF MOTIONS

Ons Land publishes the official list of motions for discussion by Congress, which it has been definitely decided will meet at Somerset East on March 8.

THE WAR

The Distriktsbesturen of the Cape, Oudtshoorn, Richmond, Adelaide, Middelburg, and Malmesbury are responsible for those resolutions relating to the war.

Cape and Oudtshoorn.—That without discussion a committee of seven members be appointed, consisting of the executive and four other members, to draft a resolution, and submit the same to Congress: (a) giving expression to Congress’s entire disapproval of the policy which has led to the bloody war waged at present, instead of to a peaceful solution of the disputes with the South African Republic by means of arbitration; (b) urging a speedy restoration of peace on fair and just conditions, as well as a searching inquiry by our Parliament into the way in which during the war private property, the civil liberties, and the constitutional rights of the subject have been treated.

Richmond.—That Congress express its regret that peaceful colonists have been arrested without any foundation for the charge, and that cattle have been seized by Her Majesty’s troops.

Adelaide.—(1) That Congress discuss the omission by His Excellency the High Commissioner of certain paragraphs of a despatch from President Steyn to the Imperial Government. (2) That Congress request the Imperial Government to give the assurance that she will compensate all British subjects in the Cape Colony for loss suffered during the war.

Middelburg.—That Congress protest against the disarmament of European colonists.

Malmesbury and Richmond.—That Congress protest against the natives being armed.

THE PRESS

From Murraysburg comes the following motion: 'That Congress discuss the feasibility of doing something to prevent that the press should continue to be used as a means of spreading untrue reports and exciting the feelings.'

SUTHERLAND PERSISTS

The Distriktsbestuur of Sutherland, disagreeing with the historic increase of power to the Committee of Toezicht by the Congress that met at Worcester in 1897, has tabled a motion that the changes then made in the constitution be repealed.

DRUNKARDS AND THE FRANCHISE

Graaff-Reinet proposes that persons convicted of drunkenness should temporarily forfeit their franchise rights.

Malmesbury has also a motion that the Franchise Act be amended, but it does not say in which direction.

IN THE INTEREST OF THE FARMER

Middelburg will plead for better protection to farmers against stock-thefts in these troublous times.

Fraserburg, Ceres, and Kenhardt desire that the duties on imported meat be reimposed.

The districts objecting to the Scab Act are far less than ever before, only Fraserburg, Prince Albert No. 2, Prieska, and Kenhardt urging that the Act should be repealed.

Albany wants paraffin gratis for exterminating the 'boschluis.'

Victoria West wants more waterbores.

EDUCATION

Oudtshoorn wants Congress to declare itself in favour of the long-promised Education Bill.

Jansenville is in favour of compulsory education.

Wellington desires that South African history should be better taught in the schools.

Richmond wants more Government assistance given to the poor whites.

JURIES IN CIVIL CASES

Worcester and Victoria West are strongly opposed to juries deciding civil cases, and request Congress to pass a resolution that the system should be abolished.

THE REMAINDER

For the rest there are a few hardy annuals about title-deeds in the district of Elliot, quit-rents, placing the mounted police under

the control of the Divisional Council, irrigation works on a small scale on individual farms, and against the colony paying an annual sum towards the Basutoland expenditure.—*Cape Times*, February 21, 1900.

APPENDIX U

The biassed mind of Mr. Steyn, who was held up by so many as trying to persuade President Kruger to relax rather than go to war, is shown by perusal of the letter below.

The *South African News*, October 12, 1899, published the following :

PRESIDENT STEYN'S MESSAGE TO HIS BURGHERS

By the courtesy of *Ons Land* we are enabled to publish the following text of the proclamation issued by President Steyn to the burghers of the Free State :

An occasion which we would gladly have avoided, a time when we as a people are compelled to defend ourselves, with weapons, against injustice and a *disgraceful use of force*, has at length arrived, when our sister Republic on the north of the Vaal River is about to be attacked by an *unscrupulous enemy, who has for several years already prepared himself, and has looked for a pretext for the violence of which he now makes himself guilty, the purpose whereof is to annihilate the Afrikaner people.* We are not only bound to our sister Republic by the ties of blood, by partaking of mutual interests, but also by the formal treaty (necessitated by circumstances) entered into with the object of assisting her if the Transvaal should be unrighteously attacked, *a circumstance which we for a long time past had reason to expect would occur.* We cannot, therefore, possibly see injustice done to her, and see our own dearly-bought freedom placed in jeopardy; but we are called upon as men to resist this. Solemn obligations have not protected our sister Republic against annexation, *against conspiracy, against laying claim to a suzerainty that is non-existent, against continual oppression and interference, and now against a fresh attack which has no other object than her destruction.* Our own unfortunate experiences in the past have made it also sufficiently clear to us that one can place no reliance on the most solemn promises and obligations of Great Britain when she has an Administration at the helm which is prepared to tread under foot treaties, and to find hypocritical pretexts for every breach of good faith committed by her. *As the unrighteous and unlawful British intervention, when he had conquered a barbarian black race on our eastern borders, also the violent assumption of sovereignty over a portion of our territory where the discovery of*

diamonds had aroused the desire for gain (although in conflict with existing treaties). The desire and intention to trample under foot our rights as an independent and sovereign people, in defiance of a solemn Convention existing between the State and Great Britain, have been more than once, and recently again, shown by the Administration at present governing in England by giving expression in public documents to an unfounded claim to paramountcy for the whole of South Africa, and thus also over this State. With reference also to the South African Republic, Great Britain has until the present day refused to agree that she shall recover her original position with reference to foreign relations, a position which she had never forfeited by any fault on her part. The original intention of the Conventions to which that Republic had agreed under pressure of circumstances has been twisted and continually used by the British Administration as a means of exercising tyranny and wrong, and, further, as a means of support of a violent propaganda in favour of Great Britain within that Republic. . . . Besides that, the necessary result of compliance with those claims would be that the independence of the country as a self-governing, independent sovereign people would be irrevocably lost. For many years past British troops have been placed in great numbers on the borders of our sister Republic in order to compel it by terrorism to comply with claims which should be made on the same, and to excite a treasonable rising, and the crafty plans of those whose love of gold is the motive power of their shameful undertakings. . . .

Burghers of the Orange Free State, stand up as one man against the oppressor and the violator of right. . . .

This given under my hand and the Great Seal of the Free State this 11th day of October, 1899.

M. T. STEYN,
State President.

APPENDIX V

As illustrating the amicable spirit and with what freedom of speech affairs were discussed by Afrikanders in the Transvaal more than a month before the Boers declared war, the debate on Mr. Coetser's motion may well be recalled to mind. There was, as a matter of fact, no concentration of troops at the time 'on the Transvaal borders.'

BLOWING OFF STEAM

TROOPS ON THE BORDER—HEATED RAAD DISCUSSION
—A QUESTION AND AN ANSWER—BOER BLUFF AND BLUSTER

PRETORIA, *September 7* (Reuter and Special).—In the First Raad this morning a long discussion took place on Mr. Coetser's

motion asking the Government to explain the object of the concentration of British troops on the Transvaal borders. There was a large attendance of the public, including ladies. All references to war were applauded. The President, the Executive, and all the head officials were present.

Before the discussion commenced the Chairman and President advised the members to be calm, the latter also asking them to refrain from using insulting language.

Mr. COETSER put the question, of which notice had been given, to which the STATE SECRETARY replied that the day before he had gone to the British Agent and had informed him of the motion. The British Agent said he knew nothing about the troops, but would wire to the High Commissioner. He did so, and the following reply was received : 'September 6.—I do not know what the State Secretary refers to when he speaks of the massing of troops. The British troops in South Africa, the number and position of which is no secret, but a matter of common knowledge, are here for the protection of British interests, and to provide against eventualities.' His question to Mr. Greene was as follows : 'In view of the question which will be asked of Government to-morrow with reference to the alleged massing of troops round the borders of the Republic, we would be glad if the High Commissioner could see his way to give any information which might enable us to answer the question satisfactorily.'

Mr. COETSER said he could not understand the High Commissioner's reply. Surely he did not mean the troops were to protect British interests from Boer attacks. The Republic could not longer be at ease, and experience, in fact, supported this contention. He then asked about the detained ammunition.

Mr. REITZ, the State Secretary, explained that Portugal had stopped the arms at Delagoa under Article 6 of their treaty, but later on, after about ten days, and after a long correspondence, the Government of Lourenço Marques forwarded the arms, giving no reason for so doing.

WHAT MR. COETSER CANNOT UNDERSTAND

Mr. COETSER (continuing) said he could not understand what the High Commissioner meant by preparing for emergencies. What emergency could there be? With regard to the ammunition, it seemed as if Portugal was trying to make up for the disappointment caused to the Transvaal.

Mr. SCHUTTE was pleased at the motion, because the public were uneasy through the troops on the border. He considered the troops were placed on the border as a threat; it was the same as putting a revolver in a man's face and saying, 'Your money or your life.' It appeared from the despatches that the troops were used as a threat. He could also not understand the High Commissioner's reply, and thought the Transvaal must also prepare for emergencies. (Applause.) The presence of troops on the borders was causing a panic, and people were fleeing from the country.

WHAT ! NEVER ?

It was nonsense to say that the troops on the border were to protect British interests, as the Boers had never, and never would attack British territory. He did not want to insult Portugal, but it seemed that they stopped the ammunition because they were afraid of England.

Mr. LOMBAARD was glad that the motion had been made, as the people could hear the explanation. They were just beginning to accuse the Government and the Raad of keeping everything secret.

HE EXPECTED IT

With regard to the High Commissioner's reply, that was what he expected. It was just the sort of reply that could be expected from men like Rhodes and other capitalists ; it was the reply to expect from a man who had four bottles of whisky in him. (Applause.) The High Commissioner said troops were on the border to protect British interests. It was a pity the State Secretary had not asked him against whom they must protect them. He could not mean against Boers, because they had never attacked other people. It seemed as if the High Commissioner thought the Boers were a lot of robbers. He proceeded to point out that Mr. Chamberlain said the cause of the trouble was that the Transvaal did not adhere to what the President said at Newcastle in 1881, when, in reply to a question, he said burghers and Uitlanders were treated alike.

THE CAUSE OF THE TROUBLE

He (Mr. Lombaard) held that the cause of the trouble was that in 1875 and 1876 people who had come from the colony, where they could not live and had nothing to eat, sent a petition to the Queen, saying the Boers could not govern the country ; and these people sent such lying petitions to the Queen that it brought on the war of 1881, which caused thousands of men on both sides to lose their lives unjustly. Even people in Government service registered themselves as British subjects, and those people who had the franchise gave it up, and the men agitated for it. How could they agitate when they themselves refused to have the franchise then ? All the present trouble was caused by people on the Rand like Mr. Rhodes and other capitalists, many of whom had already fled. These people grudged the Transvaal its wealth, and agitated, saying that the laws of the country were no good. The speaker next said there were many people in Pretoria who said they wanted to help the Transvaal against England, but they took good care to send their families to the colony, therefore their help was not much good. (Cheers.) The speaker concluded a fiery speech by saying the time had come for the Transvaal to send its burghers to the border—(applause)—and ask the troops what they wanted there. (Cheers.) The fire was bound to start, so let them set it alight,

and let it burn out quickly. War was better than the present state of affairs, as business was ruined and the State chest was drying up. Mr. Chamberlain was trying to ruin the country by stopping all business.

Mr. TOSEN and Mr. DU TOIT: He can't do it.

A CANDID CONFESSION.

Mr. DU TOIT said the Chairman had asked the members not to use insulting language, but it was impossible to speak of Mr. Chamberlain without insulting him. Referring to Mr. Chamberlain's speech at the Highbury garden party, he said Mr. Chamberlain must remember that when Raad members spoke they spoke as men, and not when they had a lot of whisky. The High Commissioner said the troops were on the border to protect British interests, but there was not one line of Boer history to show that the Boers had ever taken a threepence worth of territory from the English. He referred to what the English had done with Natal and Kosi Bay, which were unrighteously annexed. The whole world was convinced of the unrighteousness of this action. The Transvaal must show that they are free people, and obtained their freedom with the rifle and not by robbery. The speaker referred to the paralysis of trade and poverty caused by the presence of the troops, and continuing, said Mr. Lombaard had stated Mr. Chamberlain wanted to empty the State chest, but he (the speaker) said Mr. Chamberlain could not do it. England wanted to show that might is right, but the Transvaal would defend its independence to the bitter end. Mr. Chamberlain was the cause of all the trouble. The Raad could not allow women and children to be frightened away and killed by train accidents. If these accidents occurred, it would be said that the Transvaal caused a panic.

MAUSER PILLS

If Mr. Chamberlain kept on in this way the Transvaal would have to give him some Mauser pills, which would be a good purgative. England sent out ships carrying 35,000 troops, and then let the ships come back at night, and only sent a few hundred men out. By doing this, they tried to frighten the Transvaal, but could not do so. The Transvaal must assume a decisive attitude. Now, Mr. Chamberlain must remember that when war started he would have to fight the whole of Afrikanderdom, which would stand as one man to defend independence. He agreed with Mr. Lombaard that the fire must now be started so as to get it over.

A PRESIDENTIAL REMONSTRANCE

The PRESIDENT remonstrated with Mr. Du Toit, and said he had gone too far.

Mr. FRIKKIE WOLMARANS said this had been going on for four or five months, and it was hard to be calm. When he looked at

the despatches he saw a reference made to friendly conferences, and everything seemed friendly, and still the troops were on the border. That was not a civilized way of doing things, and not the right attitude to be adopted by a strong nation against a weak State. It simply meant that England said: 'I demand so-and-so, and if you don't give it—well, there are my troops on the border.' The Transvaal was determined to go no further. Every day the Raad met members received letters and telegrams from burghers saying, 'Stand fast: go no further.' It seemed as if England thought there was no law or order in the country, therefore troops must be sent. The troops were only threats to the Transvaal, and the Republic could no longer be easy, as the troops were simply here to threaten them. The burghers would not go a hair's-breadth further. He had always thought things would be settled peacefully; but now they must be prepared. The Transvaal could never forget the Jameson Raid. (Cheers.)

HARD TO BE CALM

Mr. VAN RENSBURG said it was hard to be calm any longer. He did not consider the High Commissioner's wire a declaration of war, but the Transvaal must be prepared, not for making war, but for emergencies. It would seem to him that Mr. Chamberlain did not believe in a Deity, else he would not speak as an irresponsible man. For the blood that would be shed he seemed callous. Jameson, Rhodes, and such people were the cause of the trouble.

DON'T SPEAK OF THEIR FAULTS

He did not want to say this country was perfect, but Chamberlain need not speak of their faults in such an offensive way as he did in the despatches. When the speaker saw that Chamberlain spoke as if the Transvaal robbed the Johannesburgers of their rights, he was sorry for Chamberlain's sense of righteousness. England would not agree to a foreign element in arbitration, as if there were no righteousness outside England. He would always try to keep to the Convention, and did not want to deprive England of any rights. Referring to the Uitlander grievances, the speaker said the Germans were satisfied, and he was sure that if Englishmen were individually interviewed they would declare themselves satisfied. Rhodes and the capitalists were the cause of the disaffection. It seemed as if they wanted to get the Transvaal to appease the people who had been misled into putting money into Rhodesia. (Cheers.) The Transvaal must not declare war, but prepare to protect the border. (Cheers.)

Mr. STOFFEL TOSEN asked the Government what they thought of Sir Alfred Milner's wire. Was it a declaration of war?

Mr. WOLMARANS, member of the Executive, said personally he did not think so. Sir Alfred Milner's wire was as inexplicable to the Executive as to the Raad.

Mr. TOSEN said if two men were standing together, and one man took off his coat, the other man must prepare for emergencies.

(Laughter.) He considered it a direct declaration of war. England simply said, 'Give me so-and-so, and if you don't I will thrash you.' He had received a wire from the field-cornet of his district, telling him to persuade the President not to go to the conference, or else there would be a rebellion. The speaker referred to the Jameson Raid, and said traitors, robbers, and murderers were implicated, and should have been hanged.

CALLED TO ORDER

The CHAIRMAN called the member to order.

Mr. TOSEN (continuing) said the Transvaal must prepare for emergencies. They could not blame Portugal for stopping the ammunition, as she was a weak State, and was threatened by England, like the Transvaal.

Mr. WOLMARANS, member of the Executive, explained that at the time of the Raid the Queen assured the Transvaal that the Chartered Company was responsible, and the leaders were punished. It was not right to say that the burghers were not prepared, as they were ready. He pointed out that Sir Alfred Milner's reply was the same as that given at Bloemfontein. He advised members not to declare war.

A GENTLEMANLY DEBATER

Mr. SMUTS said the Afrikaner blood was boiling. Mr. Chamberlain's arguments were all lies. The speaker referred to Boomplaats and the Jameson Raid, and said the Transvaal could not trust the troops on the border. He interpreted Sir Alfred Milner's wire as saying, 'It is my and not your business why the troops are on the border,' therefore the Transvaal must prepare. England saw that the Afrikaners were becoming too strong, and therefore wanted to kill them.

Mr. BOTHA said England wanted to establish supremacy in the South African Republic, but the Transvaal would resist as long as possible. They must not challenge England, but let them know she had gone as far as possible. The Jingoese were the cause of all the trouble. The Jameson raiders went to England and were cheered. Mr. Rhodes was always cheered in England.

Mr. VILJOEN said an Afrikaner had been arrested for telling a Kafir that things looked like war, while here the Uitlander Council said what they liked. The time had come to shut them up for ever.

POOR LITTLE PORTUGAL

Mr. STEYN said Portugal must be called to account for stopping the ammunition. The troops were sent to the border to compel Mr. Kruger to give in. The troops would not frighten the Transvaal. England wanted to wipe the Afrikaners out of existence. His burghers did not want war, but if it came they would stand as one man. The time had come for the Raad to adjourn, so that

members could go home and prepare to set forth to the border. (Cheers.)

Mr. LOUW said when he thought of the treatment of their forefathers, in Natal and the Cape Colony, of Slachter's Nek, and the Jameson Raid, he asked, What is this band of robbers doing on the border? (Hear, hear.) Could Raad members stay in the Raad under the circumstances? No; they must get among the burghers.

SUZERAINTY SETTLED

The despatches showed how the Transvaal was treated with contempt by England, which asserted a suzerainty which, he said, did not exist. Englishmen were freer in the Transvaal than in England. The mistake was, they could say too much here, and could support papers to go against the Transvaal. Afrikanders could not say as much in the colony as Englishmen here. It was time to stop this, and he hoped the Raad would go no further, and concede nothing more.

THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH

The debate in the Raad was continued in the afternoon, when the discussion was continued in the same strain.

The PRESIDENT, who was greeted with loud cheering, said might was not right, but right was might. He was convinced of the justice of the Transvaal cause, and knew that the Lord ruled and was righteous, and would give a good judgment in the dispute. Mr. Chamberlain accused him of not keeping the promises made at Newcastle in 1881. He and the Executive Council did everything possible to treat the burghers and British subjects alike. The Convention was then made, and the Transvaal was then under the suzerainty of England. The Transvaal gave equal rights to all, but British subjects refused to fight with the burghers. They did not want to become burghers. Then another convention was made in 1884, and he thought British subjects would then become one with the Transvaal, but they again refused, and when commandeered to go to war refused, and had to be arrested. Then Sir Henry Loch came up, and said British subjects must be treated the same as the Portuguese, the most favoured nation. The Raad unanimously agreed to this, and afterwards with the wars with Malaboch, Mazoe, and other Kafirs, all who took part were granted the franchise. It seemed as if Mr. Chamberlain could not understand, and never did understand, that British subjects excluded themselves from political rights by refusing to accept the franchise when it was offered, but they stood as before. In the last despatch Mr. Chamberlain proposed a second conference, whereby they could discuss the subjects together, and bring to light what they did not know. Now, he (the President) could not imagine any point which could be raised at a conference in which the Transvaal would not be declared in the right, but the Uitlanders did not want the franchise, but wanted the country.

GOD AND SUZERAINTY

If Mr. Chamberlain stood before the countenance of God, his own conscience must acknowledge that there was no suzerainty. All depended on what reply was received from Mr. Chamberlain to the last despatch; if he repeated the invitation to the conference, he (the President) was ready to send his Commission. The speaker next referred to the schools on the Rand, and said although the medium up to the fourth and fifth standards was English, the Uitlanders refused to send their children there. He had given very much away already; he had given his jacket and trousers, and the only thing left was independence. They were only waiting for Mr. Chamberlain's reply. The speaker said he found his secrets in the newspapers. It was said that there was a desire to wipe out Majuba, but it was the noblest thing England ever did when after Majuba she gave back the Transvaal its independence. This was due to Mr. Gladstone, who saw that the petitions sent to the Queen before Majuba were lies. That deed was indelibly engraved as one of the noblest of England's deeds.

THE FINAL ARBITRATOR

He and Mr. Chamberlain were only arbitrators in this matter, but God would be the final arbitrator. (Loud cheers.) He hoped the Raad would wait until the reply was received, and see if the proposal for a conference was renewed, and then the Transvaal would do their best to meet the other side. God help the hearts of people in the Rand! If people called on Him, He would respond, for He ruled the lot of all. The President hoped, in conclusion, that Mr. Chamberlain's heart would be changed.

The Raad then adjourned.—*Cape Times*, September 8, 1899.

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